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Abstract 
 
 Historians of Louis XIV’s reign have debated evolutions in the king’s administration. 
Such studies, despite heterogenous conclusions, better define our understanding of absolutist 
authority in the ancien régime as manifested through a process of so-called bureaucratic 
centralization. Scholars debate to what extent the monarchy achieved centralization amid the 
interests of individuals and corporations suspended in traditional hierarchies and socio-cultural 
expectations. Recently, scholars have posited that Louis’s government accommodated the 
concerns of its ministers through gratifications and social advancement compelling obedience to 
the Bourbon dynastic state. This dissertation considers for the first time how a politics of 
accommodation characterized the Crown’s rapport with a selection of diplomats in the years of 
Louis XIV’s personal rule.  
Specifically, I examine five ambassadors serving Louis XIV in the Republic of Venice. 
Focusing on French ambassadors in Venice accomplishes three tasks. First, ambassadors’ stories 
highlight how dynasticism perfused the personal ambitions of diplomats as much as it did those 
of the Crown. The dynastic imperative informed the choices of individuals within the diplomatic 
corps, and a desire to advance personal fortune and family honor fueled their participation in 
Louis’s foreign ministry. Secondly, diplomats’ correspondence from Venice elucidates French 
politics with Venice, other Italian states, and within the commercial and maritime spheres of the 
Mediterranean Sea. I consider how centralization facilitated or impeded Louis’s hegemonic 
strategies in Italy and in the sea. Finally, I argue that the Venetians maintained diplomatic 
relevance for the French until 1702. Traditional narratives claim that Venice “declined” on the 
international stage by the mid-seventeenth century, but I underscore that Louis XIV viewed 
Venice as a robust polity critical to the success of dynastic politics throughout most of his reign.       
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x 
Comments on Terminology and Conventions 
1.)  The terms “louisquatorzien” and “ludovician” are employed in this work. They are 
conventional adjectival forms meant to denote characteristics, events, and details 
associated with Louis XIV’s reign. 
2.) The terms “diplomat,” “diplomacy,” and “diplomatic” are employed in this dissertation. I 
am fully aware that these terms were not yet in use in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  
3.) The term ordinary ambassador (ambassadeur ordinaire) referred to resident ambassadors 
who remained in their posts for extended missions. The term extraordinary ambassador 
(ambassadeur extraordinaire) referred to an ambassador sent on special and often 
immediate missions. Extraordinary ambassadors did not normally remain at the site of 
their embassy for extended periods.   
4.) The term incognito (unkown or as-yet-unrecognized) was an official appellation utilized 
in the early-modern period to describe ambassadors arriving early in the state to which 
they were assigned to serve. Diplomats remained incognito – having no rights to 
extraterritorial protection and its attendant privileges – until after the state ceremonies in 
which they presented credentials and received official recognition of their representative 
status.  
5.) When referencing the principal ambassadors of each chapter I will call them most often 
by their family names rather than their titles or appanages, hence “Bonsy” rather than 
“the Bishop of Beziers.” I do use titles at intervals to avoid monotony. 
6.) Historical actors, especially popes, doges, and Ottoman sultans, changed frequently in the 
decades I examine. I have provided lists of these actors in the end matter. 
7.) In an effort to avoid confusion, the names and titles of rulers and other historical actors 
are rendered in their languages. I use “Felipe IV” for the king of Spain, “Benedetto” for 
the Venetian savvio del consiglio, rather than “Benedict,” etc. Popes, however, retain the 
conventional English rendering of their names. 
8.) Where I mention “Italy,” “Italians,” “Italian princes,” or “German princes” I am referring 
to the geographic regions as they were known in the early-modern period and the people 
groups associated with them. Additionally, the majority of geographic place names are 
rendered in their common English spelling, thus, “Mantua” rather than “Mantova,” and 
Rome instead of “Roma,” etc. 
9.) At times I use “Venice” and “Venetians” to indicate the place, its people, and its socio-
political institutions. When it is appropriate I specify nuances such as the “Venetian 
senate” or “Venice’s populace,” etc. 
10.)The term “stato da mar” (literally sea state) refers to the territories beyond Italy across 
the waters of the Adriatic, Ionian, and Mediterranean Seas under the dominion of the 
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Venetian government. The “terraferma” (literally fixed land) was the appellation 
Venetians used to refer to territories on the Northern Italian mainland under their rule. 
11.) Where the terms “relazione,” “relazioni” appear they refer to detailed final reports 
Venetian ambassadors were to write and then read aloud before the Venetian collegio 
upon returning home to Venice from their embassies. These reports did not figure into 
French diplomatic praxis (“relations”) until mention of them appears after 1683, and then 
only in one instance that I am aware of. 
12.) The names of wars in which France was involved I call by the most common English 
name when used in other secondary literature focusing on France. Where wars are 
mentioned in which France was not directly involved, such as the “Candian War” or the 
“Morean War,” I employ conventional appellations used in secondary literature focusing 
on the state in question. 
13.)As this dissertation focuses largely on a French perspective, place names, truces, and 
treaties use the French spelling: thus “Strasbourg” rather than “Strasburg” and 
“Ratisbonne” instead of Regensburg, etc. 
14.) In Chapters 3 and following readers will encounter the terms “chambres de réunions,” 
“réunions,” or “politics of réunions.” These terms refer to the controversial means 
through which Louis XIV and his administration undertook a series of territorial 
acquisitions on the kingdom’s eastern frontiers with the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Spanish Netherlands. After the Treaties of Nijmegen (1678) and Saint-Germain-en-Laye 
(1679) that ended the Dutch War (1672-1679) the king authorized the establishment of a 
number of chambres de réunions. In these courts, or chambers, French lawyers produced 
documentation containing often-tenuous proofs of French rights to territories in imperial 
and Spanish dominions related to earlier treaties or addendums to acquisitions through 
recent wars. They were to expand French land even further through allegedly legal 
precedent without recourse to war. These “réunions à la couronne” (reunions to the 
Crown) shocked Europeans through the audacity of a king who believed he could 
convene courts of law to dictate over other European sovereigns’ territorial rights. 
Subsequent violent invasions of Strasbourg (1681) and the Duchy of Luxembourg (1682) 
among others that the chambres sanctioned further outraged Europeans against the 
French in the early 1680s. Scholars still debate which of Louis’s ministers may have 
devised this method of expansionism. The war minister, the Marquis de Louvois, and the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis de Croissy, have been suggested. 
15.) All translations from the original French or Italian sources are fully my own. I accept 
responsibility for any faults in meaning or nuance. 
  
xii 
In Regards to Venetian Government Institutions 
Venetian patricians were entitled to a seat in the maggior consiglio (Great Council) and to a vote 
in state affairs undertaken in consiglio. This body numbered between 2,000 members in the 
sixteenth century to 1,000 members by 1797. Venice’s government and society became 
increasingly dominated, however, by the decisions and authority of smaller councils like the 
collegio and the Ten by the late seventeenth century. Many of the same prominent Venetian 
families regularly came to hold seats in these deliberative councils forming what Filippo De 
Vivo has called a “conservative oligarchy” that vexed the broader aristocratic population. 
Readers will encounter the following Venetian government officials and institutions throughout 
this work. I attempt briefly to explain their functions below for clarity.1 
1. Il Doge (the duke): Doges were the elected heads of the Venetian state, and they represented 
the incarnate image of the republic. They held little delineated executive power, but they held 
much authority in terms of their capacity to persuade and to advise in councils. The prominent 
families from which they were drawn placed them within factions espousing the direction of 
foreign and domestic policies at any given moment. Foreign ambassadors had personal access to 
Doges only during state occasions to which they were invited. 
2. Il senato (senate): Because the maggior consiglio was too numerous to make all state 
decisions quickly, the senate, variously comprising up to 300 elected men, evolved to facilitate 
more efficient policy making. The same senators often held seats for decades. It was in the senate 
that debates and votes regarding foreign and domestic policies occurred.  
3. Il collegio (the college): The composition of this body changed over time, but it held between 
23 and 26 members who effectively controlled the Venetian state. The collegio normally 
comprised the Doge, 6 dogal counselors, 6 savii grandi, the 3 heads of the quarantia criminale, 
3 state inquisitors, and 3 chiefs of the Council of Ten. It was the collegio that determined 
important affairs that should be passed to the senate for votes. The collegio was also the body 
that controlled diplomacy. Foreign diplomats negotiated with the senate via the collegio, and 
they only ever appeared in person for official audiences before the collegio. It should also be 
noted that the savii grandi set the agenda for both the collegio and the senate. Members of the 
other councils informed the savii of business and information to be passed between councils. 
Their privileged access to knowledge and its transmission between councils gave them great 
authority within the government. Venetian ambassadors read their relazioni – concluding reports 
of their embassies - aloud to the collegio upon their return to the republic. 
                                               
1 On Venice’s government institutions see Filippo De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking 
Early Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28, 30-31, 33-36, 37-40 passim, 74-75; Frederic C. 
Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 253-258 passim, 428-
430. 
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4. Il consiglio dei dieci (Council of Ten):  Founded in 1310, the Ten were charged with 
safeguarding the state and especially, although ironically, the privileges of the patriciate over 
whom they often acted as judges. This council’s role included the prosecution and judgment of 
cases related to the patriciate and to the collection of all secret and classified information related 
to affairs of state and state security. The Ten also controlled the state archives. By the 
seventeenth century the Ten were involved in almost every aspect of state business, and their 
power within the government was a source of tension among the state’s nobility. They 
communicated regularly with Venetian ambassadors at foreign courts. The information the Ten 
collected was transmitted really on a “need to know” basis to entities like the collegio and the 
senate. Theoretically the intelligence the Ten collected was only rarely to pass among the 
broader Venetian government bodies.  
5. Gli inquisitori di stato (State Inquisitors): Founded in 1539 at the behest of the Council of 
Ten, the 3 state inquisitors were drawn from among the Ten and functioned as an even more 
restrictive instrument of that council. The inquisitors’ business was to collect information about 
those within Venice and abroad who had or who were believed to have compromised Venetian 
state information and security. Through their numerous spies and informants in Venice — known 
as confidenti — they sought at once to root out and squelch the leakage of intelligence and to 
collect knowledge of use to the Ten and thus to state security. Venetian ambassadors interacted 
with the inquisitors and became, in their turn, spies. The Ten and the inquisitors employed 
secretive and sometimes brutal tactics to garner information or to safeguard state secrets.  
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 MD Mémoires et Documents 
AN  Archives Nationales de France, Paris 
AE Affaires Étrangères  
 CCR Correspondance Consulaire-Raguse 
 MA Marine 
 B1 Series B1 
 B7 Series B7 
BnF Archives et Manuscrits, Bibliothèque nationale de France (site Richelieu), Paris  
 CL  Clairambault 
 EP Estampes et Photographes 
 MC Mélanges Colbert 
 NaF Nouvelles acquisitions Françaises 
SHAT Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris 
 GR Guerre 
 A1 Series A 
  
xv 
Italy 
ASV Archivio di stato di Venezia, Venice 
 AV Avvisi 
 IS-CDA Inquisitori di stato-Communicazioni degli Ambasciatori 
            IS-DAF Inquisitori di stato-Dispacci dagli ambasciatori in Francia 
 IS-LAF Inquisitori di stato-Lettere agli ambasciatori in Francia 
 IS-RC Inquisitori di stato, Riferte ai confidenti 
  
xvi 
Figures 
Fig. 1  Heinrick van Loon, 1695, Venise, Ville Capitale de la plus Célèbre, et Illustre République de l’Europe.  
From Nicolas de Fer’s, Atlas ou Recueil de Cartes Géographiques dressées, sur les nouvelles observations   
de Mrs de l'académie royale de France. Paris: Danet, 1720. https://cdn6.bigcommerce.com/s-
h76xds/products/464/images/1992/venice_venise_1695_de_fer_map__18078.1441822296.1280.1280.jpg?c
=2 Accessed 2 Oct. 2016. 
Fig. 2  Detail of Ludovico Ughi’s 1729 Iconografica Rappresentazione della Inclita Città di Venezia al Reggio 
Serenissimo Domino Veneto. Venice: Ludovico Furlanetto, 1739.  https://dl.wdl.org/410.png. Accessed 2 
Oct. 2016. 
Fig. 3  Palazzo Paloral, rio della Madonna dell’Orto (currently the Hotel Boscolo Venezia) Public Domain. 
http://media.cntraveler.com/photos/543edbd569d5bb9d1d7e5f48/master/pass/boscolovenezia-italy-rca-
2014.jpg. Accessed 2 Oct. 2016. 
Fig. 4  Frontispiece to André Campra’s 1699 libretto for the opéra-ballet, Le Carnaval de Venise. First published in 
Paris: Chez Christophe Ballard, 1699. Public Domain.  
https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahU
KEwiWluLd_enQAhWMSyYKHfMHCbYQjRwIBw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cairn.info%2Fjean-
francois-regnard-1655-1709--9782200276072-page-
39.htm&bvm=bv.141320020,d.eWE&psig=AFQjCNEPadmnknJQ2brJJIgEBmNGY9_-
7w&ust=1481470641485738. Accessed 10 Dec. 2016. 
Fig. 5  Equestrian portrait of Louis XIV before the siege of Cambrai, c. 1677, atelier of Pierre Mignard. Musée des 
Beaux Arts, Rheims, France. Public Domain. https://etudiarte.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/louis-xiv-a-
cheval.jpg. Accessed 2 Oct. 2016. 
Fig. 6  Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers, c. 1672. Bnf, EP, N2, vol. 184, image D094183. 
Fig. 7  Paolo Veronese, 1573, Feast in the House of Simon, Musee Nationale du Chateau de Versailles. Public 
Domain.https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Veronese,_Paolo_Feast_at_the_House_of_
Simon_1570-1572.jpg. Accessed 2 Oct. 2016. 
Fig. 8  Jean-François, Abbé d’Estrades.  BnF, EP, N2, vol. 521, image D137054. 
Fig. 9  Michel-Antoine Amelot, Marquis de Gournay, c. 1697.  BnF, EP, N2, vol. 3, image D285867. 
Fig. 10  Engraving of a Venetian Nobleman, c. 1688, taken from Maximilien Misson (1650-1722), Nouveau voyage 
d'Italie: avec un mémoire contenant des avis utiles à ceux qui voudront faire le mesme voyage, Tome I, 4th 
ed. (The Hague: Bulderen, 1702), 252. 
Fig. 11  César, Cardinal d’Estrées, c. 1704.  BnF, EP, N2, vol. 522, image D137068. 
Fig. 12  Luca Carlevaris (1663-1729), 1701, Reception of Cardinal d’Estrées, current owner the Netherlands 
Institute for Cultural Heritage. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam. Public Domain. https://upload.wikimedia.org/ 
wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Luca_Carlevaris_The_Reception_of_Cardinal_César_d'Estrées.jpg. Accessed 2 
Oct. 2016. 
  
xvii 
Chronology of Ambassadors, Chargés d’affaires, and Consuls in Venice during the 
“Personal Rule” of Louis XIV, 1661-1715.2 
 
Ambassadors and Chargés d’affaires: 
Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers, ambassadeur ordinaire  (1662-1665)  
Paul Vedoa consul de la nation française and chargé d’affaires (1665-1668) 
The Président de Saint-André, ambassadeur ordinaire3  (1668-1671) 
The Comte d’Avaux, ambassadeur ordinaire4  (1672-1674) 
Pailleroles, chargé d’affaires   (1674-1675) 
Jean-François d’Estrades, Abbé de Moissac  
(known as the Abbé  d’Estrades), ambassadeur ordinaire  (1675-1678)  
Pinchesne, chargé d’Affaires5   (1678-1679) 
The Sieur de Varangeville, ambassadeur ordinaire  (1679-1682) 
Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot, ambassadeur ordinaire6  (1682-1685) 
Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantalet, ambassadeur ordinaire   (1685-1701) 
César, Cardinal d’Estrées, ambassadeur extraordinaire   (1701-1702)  
Hennequin, Sieur de Charmont, ambassadeur ordinaire    (1701-1704) 
Champigny, chargé d’affaires (1704-1705) 
The Abbé de Pomponne, ambassadeur ordinaire  (1705-1722) 
 
                                               
2 N.B. Ambassadors discussed in this dissertation are bolded above. Dates following their names are the years they 
served in Venice. This chronology does not take into account a number of extraordinary and incognito envoys that 
Louis and his ministers sent to the republic most notably the Comte de Rebenac’s incognito embassy in 1691. 
Additionally, listed in the following notes are the secretaries of ambassadors of which I am aware.  
3 Abraham-Nicolas, Amelot de la Houssaie (1634-1706) served as secretary to the Président de Saint-André. He 
should not be confused with the ambassador, Michel-Antoine, sieur d’Amelot. They were possibly related by 
marriage. 
4 Alexandre-Toussaint Limojon de Saint-Didier (1630-1689) served as secretary to the Comte d’Avaux. 
5 François-Martin, sieur de Pinschesne served in Venice and Turin as secretary to the Abbé d’Estrades. 
6 Roger de Piles (1635-1709) served as secretary to the sieur d’Amelot. 
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Consuls: 
Paul Vedoa, consul de la nation française         (1661-1679) 
Jean-Guillaume Le Blond, consul de la nation française        (1679-1718) 
 
 
 
  
xix 
Maps of Venice Indicating Sites Relative to French Ambassadors 
 
 
Fig. 1 The map above is Hendrik van Loon’s 1695 Venise, Ville Capitale de la plus Célèbre, et Illustre République 
de l’Europe; it is taken from Nicolas de Fer’s 1720, Atlas ou Recueil des Cartes Géographiques. The map was 
dedicated to the Dauphin. The black-circled zone to the top left-center indicates the confines of the lista dei francesi, 
the extraterritorial zone protected under French immunities, in the sestiere of Cannaregio. 
A.) The site of the French embassy during the reign of Louis XIV. 
B.) The church and piazza of the Madonna dell’Orto 
C.) Relative site of the church and the piazza of San Francesco della Vigna 
D.) The Venetian arsenal. 
E.) Relative site of Santa Maria Gloriosa. Attached to the church was the Franciscan monastery (colloquially ai 
frari). 
F.) Saint Mark’s Square and environs. In this area were the buildings of Venice’s government institutions, the 
Broglio, and prisons (cachots noirs).  
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Fig.2 Detail from Ludovico Ughi’s 1729 Iconografica Rappresentazione della Inclita Città di Venezia al Reggio 
Serenissimo Domino Veneto. The arrow indicates the position of the palazzo of the French embassy.  
 
Fig.3 Façade of the actual Palazzo Paloral. Pursuing the rio into the distance 
one arrives at the piazza della Madonna dell’Orto. 
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Introduction 
 
Louis XIV’s Foreign Policies and the Republic of Venice Reconsidered through Five 
French Ambassadors. 
 
 
          Fig. 4 
 
 By the close of the seventeenth century the dynastic pretensions of Louis XIV provoked 
the states of Europe into three wars. Within the kingdom of France a rigid royal court and an 
increasingly entrenched bureaucratic administration characterized the later decades of Louis’s 
reign. Ludovician rule became synonymous inside and outside of France with bullying foreign 
policies, economic turmoil, a miserable populace, and a crusty dévot court. These legacies 
progressively defined the rule of a sextuagenarian monarch enshrined-qua-entombed in the 
rituals of Versailles.1 Contrastingly, in Paris a younger coterie flocked around the Dauphin in a 
milieu distanced from the king. In the capital the Dauphin’s circle was often to be found at the 
                                               
1 Georgia Cowart, “Carnival in Venice or Protest in Paris? Louis XIV and the Politics of Subversion at the Paris 
Opéra,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 54, No. 2 (2001), 265-266. See Fig. 4 for the frontispiece to 
Campra’s work. 
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académie royale de musique. Here artistic representations of Italian culture - especially the 
Venetian carnival - provided an ideological foil to Louis XIV’s absolutist regime and the 
militaristic imperatives of Bourbon dynasticism that informed the preceding decades of French 
culture.2  
André Campra’s opéra-ballet, Le carnaval de Venise, appeared at the académie on 28 
February 1699 on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession. This piece, with its subtle 
satirization of a megalomaniacal Louis XIV, according to Georgia Cowart, epitomized the 
disillusionment of French subjects as the reign and the century dragged on. The subjects of the 
king in the piece’s prologue can ultimately find solace from their cares only in the fantasy of the 
republic’s famed carnival and its culture of masks. Likewise, Parisian theatergoers away from 
Versailles looked for an escape in the hedonism and mythologized freedoms of the republic and 
through its artistic representation.3 Such idealized entertainments, however, masked a marked 
juxtaposition with the king’s actual diplomatic relations with the Republic of Saint Mark. As the 
seventeenth century ended, from Louis XIV’s perspective, the long amicable rapport between 
France and “cette république” – that republic – as the king condescendingly referred to Venice, 
outlived its usefulness. This had not always been the case. 
                                               
2 Cowart, “Carnival in Venice or Protest in Paris?” 269, 272-273. Jean-François Regnard wrote the libretto for the 
piece. Jean Duron, “Introduction,” in Le Carnaval de Venise (1699) de André Campra et Jean-François Regnard: 
livret, études, et commentaires, ed. Jean Duron (Wavre, Belgium: Marduga, 2010), 10. Louis XIV expelled Italian 
actors from France in 1697 considering them politically and religio-culturally subversive. The appearance of 
Italianate themes on Parisian stages before approving members of the royal family flew in the face of the king’s 
attempted censorship. Cowart, 267, 272-273; Guy Boquet, “Les Comediens Italiens a Paris au temps de Louis XIV,” 
Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine T26e, no. 3 (1979), 435-436, 438. 
3 Cowart, 280, 295-296. Campra’s piece is set in contemporary Paris, but the characters devise an entertainment set 
in Venice to escape their travails. The theme of Venetian pleasures and the city’s alleged freedoms remained a 
theme for the Parisian artistic milieu. Campra himself took up the subject of Venice again in 1710 with his opéra-
ballet, Les Fêtes Vénitiennes. Subsequent artistic mediums also utilized Italianate themes as counterpoises to 
absolutist propaganda such as Antoine Watteau’s representations on canvas of the commedia dell’arte. Ibid., 266-
267. Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure: Louis XIV and the Politics of Spectacle (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), xviii, xxiii; Boquet, “Les comédiens Italiens à Paris,” 438; Maximilien Misson, Lettre XVII, à 
Venise 14 Février 1688, in Nouveau Voyage d’Italie, Avec un Mémoire contenant des Avis utiles a ceux qui 
voudront faire le mesme voyage, 4th Ed., Tome I (The Hague: Henry Van Hulderen, 1711), 239. Misson noted the 
libertinism associated with seventeenth-century Venice. 
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The aim of this dissertation then is to trace the trajectory and ultimate disintegration of 
Franco-Venetian relations in the late seventeenth century through the diplomatic efforts and 
experiences of five of Louis XIV’s ambassadors to Venice. Central to this investigation is a 
focus on how the independent decisions of individual ambassadors posted to Venice informed 
and delineated many choices in louisquatorzien foreign and domestic politics. The concretization 
of dynastic foreign strategies into de facto action, in part, resulted from ambassadors’ decisions 
distanced from the conseil d’en haut.4 Their actions on France’s periphery, however, were 
central to French diplomacy. They were taken outside the king’s gaze in spite of a propaganda 
“machine” upon which were predicated idealized notions that the reins of power were held in the 
hands of the omniscient autocrat.5 If Louis was omniscient he was so because of the efforts of his 
ministers.6  
Traditional narratives depicting the resultant evolution of Louis XIV’s foreign policy 
goals and the formation of the absolutist French bureaucracy should be viewed from French 
ministers’ efforts outside of the kingdom as much as from those within. To understand more 
fully the longue durée adaptations in Louis’s pretensions to territorial expansionism, historians 
                                               
4 The “high council.” It was in the conseil d’en haut where international affairs were most often discussed, 
dispatches read, and official decisions taken. Lucien Bély, Louis XIV: le plus grand roi du monde (Paris: Éditions 
Jean-Paul Gisserot, 2005), 85- 86. 
5 Many scholars have discussed Louis XIV’s propaganda machine and its ultimate inability to maintain the fiction of 
absolute rule both inside and, more recently, outside of France. See Nathan T. Whitman, “Myth and Politics: 
Versailles and the Fountain of Latona,” in Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, ed. John C. Rule (Ohio: the Ohio 
State University Press, 1969), 286-301; Jean-Marie Apostolidès, Le roi-machine: Spectacle et politique au temps de 
Louis XIV (Paris: 1981); Louis Marin, Portrait of the King (University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Nicolas Henshall, 
The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (London: 1992); Peter 
Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven: 1994); Jeroën Duindam, Myths of Power: Norbert Elias and the 
Early Modern European Court, trans. Lorri S. Granger and Gerard T. Moran (Amsterdam: 1994); Stanis Perez, “Les 
Rides d’Apollon: l’évolution des portraits de Louis XIV,” in Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, no. 50/3 
(2003), 62-95; Cowart, The Triumph of Pleasure: Louis XIV and the Politics of Spectacle (Chicago: 2008); Colin 
Jones, “The King’s Two Teeth,” in History Workshop Journal 65, issue 1, (2008): 79-95; Hendrick Ziegler, Louis 
XIV et ses ennemis: Images, propagande et contestation (Paris: 2013), and Tony Claydon and Charles-Édouard 
Levillain, eds., Louis XIV Outside In: Images of the Sun King Beyond France, 1661-1715 (Oxford: 2015); Ziegler, 
“Image Battles under Louis XIV: Some Reflections,” in Claydon and Levillain.  
6 John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), 166-167. 
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must also peer diachronically through lenses held in the hands of the ambassadors posted outside 
of France within states like Venice. Like domestic policies within Louis XIV’s kingdom, 
Ludovician foreign policy comprised a series of quotidian accommodations and concessions vis-
a-vis the states in which ambassadors were posted, the ambassadors themselves, French 
ministries, and, ultimately, the king. Acting as decision makers outside of France, ambassadors 
became central to policy compelling the monarch and his government to react to their choices 
with lasting ramifications for French international relations and domestic institutions. 
I investigate the careers and embassies of five particular ambassadors posted in Venice 
during the decades of Louis XIV’s so-called “personal rule” (1661-1715). The diplomatic 
rapport between France and Venice devolved from one of apparent sovereign equality and 
expectant mutual benefit in the early 1660s as the personal rule began to one of scorn and near-
rupture by 1702. For the rest of the eighteenth century relations with the republic ceased to be of 
great consequence for French foreign affairs. With this contention in mind, I chose to delimit my 
investigation to five significant embassies from 1662, when the king posted his first ambassador 
to Venice after taking up the reins of government, through 1702 when the rapport withered.  
Louis XIV officially posted nine ordinary ambassadors and one extraordinary 
ambassador to the republic in the decades of his personal rule. Of these, the five ministers chosen 
provide insight into remarkable moments in the history of Franco-Venetian diplomacy and 
evidence of the broader claims I make throughout the dissertation. The six chapters of this study 
focus on the experiences in Venice of Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1662-1665), Jean-
François d’Estrades, Abbé of Moissac (1675-1678), Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot (1682-
1685), Denis II de la Haye, Seigneur de Vantelet (1685-1701), and César, Cardinal d’Estrées 
(1701-1702). Their roles as representatives of Louis XIV’s authority expands our understanding 
5 
of developments in French policies with the Republic of Venice, the Habsburg monarchies, and 
various states of Italy. Moreover, they partially open a window onto the French government’s 
strategies to hegemonize maritime and commercial politics in the Mediterranean Sea. Affairs in 
the Mediterranean as much as continental politics connected Louis XIV’s France and the 
Venetian republic.   
Why France and Venice?  
 Why study diplomatic relations between Louis XIV’s France and the Republic of 
Venice? Was not Venice an irrelevant polity on the international stage by the late-seventeenth 
century? It might seem that the great monarchies surrounding the Most Serene Republic eclipsed 
and overshadowed it as a “secondary state.”7 Was not Louis XIV’s preeminence in Europe an 
established verity? The ideological, military, and commercial expanse between the two states 
seems insuperable through historical retrospection. The initial questions, however, are fraught. 
Some have posited or suggested that the Republic of Venice was obviously in “decline” or 
inconsequential by the last half of the century. In his well-known study, William Bouwsma 
noted: 
It can hardly be denied that Venice in the long run did not, and probably could 
not, rise to the challenges with which she was confronted. By the second quarter 
of the seventeenth century her decadence was evident, though less so to 
contemporaries than to us. Yet her adjustment to novel conditions was more 
successful, and some of its incidental accomplishments were more significant for 
the future, than has often been recognized. To characterize the sixteenth century 
as the decadence of Venice is premature, at the least. Venice retained her vigor 
through the sixteenth century, her European importance through the first half of 
the seventeenth, and, under improbable conditions, her independence until 
Napoleon8  
 
                                               
7 David Parrott, “A ‘prince sovereign’ and the French Crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637,” in Royal and 
Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, eds., Robert Oresko, G. C. 
Gibbs, and Hamish M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 149. 
8 William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty: Renaissance Values in the Age of the 
Counter Reformation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 96. Italics are mine. 
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I hope to demonstrate in part that characterizations of Venice’s “European importance” - read 
diplomatic relevance - like Bouwsma’s to contemporaries should be extended instead at least to 
the advent of the eighteenth century within the context of French foreign policy.  
The mid-century Candian War (1645-1669) between Venice and the Turk depleted 
Venice’s state coffers and cast doubt upon the state’s future authority in the Mediterranean Sea 
and continental Europe to be sure.9 The war, however, did not portend with any certainty that the 
republic was on a trajectory either of irrevocable dissolution or international irrelevance.10 On 
the contrary, by 1699 at the end of the First Morean War (1684-1699) Venice had regained 
almost all of its Mediterranean empire while simultaneously inspiring artistic representations of 
its cultural and political renown upon stages as far afield as Paris. There existed, therefore, no 
discernable synchronicity between the ultimate demise of the Republic of Venice in 1797 and the 
events contemporaries observed in the last half of the seventeenth century. 
Through an examination of Franco-Venetian diplomacy, I argue that the republic 
remained decidedly pertinent in European international politics prompting Louis le Grand, who 
came to dominate international affairs in the last half of the century, to maintain vigorous 
diplomatic ties with it. From the perspective of a purported Venetian “decline” this counterpoint 
is significant. European contemporaries still did not presuppose the inoperable death throes of 
                                               
9 For one contemporary account of the war for Crete see Andrea Valier, Historia della Guerra di Candia (Venice: 
Paolo Baglioni, 1679). See also: W. Bigge, La guerra di Candia fra 1667-1669 (Turin: 1901); Frederic C. Lane, 
Venice a Maritime History, 409-410. In English the most in-depth treatment of the Venetian struggle to maintain a 
Mediterranean empire in the mid and later century is Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turk in the 
Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991); Guido Candiani, “Francia, Papato e 
Venezia nella fase finale della Guerra di Candia,” in Atti dell’Instituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Tomo CLII 
(1993-1994) – Classe di scienze morali, lettere ed arti, 829-872; Candiani, “Conflitti di intenti e di ragioni politiche, 
di ambizioni e di interessi nel patriziato veneto durante la guerra di candia,” Studi Veneziani 36 (Pisa: Istituti 
Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1998), 145-275. Candiani studies the Venetian struggle for its stato da mar 
and the republic’s successful maintenance of vessels required to maintain them in I vascelli della Serenissima: 
guerra, politica e costruzione navale à Venezia à l’età moderna, 1650-1720 (Venice: 2009). 
10 Joanne Ferraro posits that generalized discussions of “decline” do not reflect the realities of the late-seventeenth-
century Venetian economy or the republic’s vigor in broader European and Mediterranean affairs. Ferraro, Venice: 
History of the Floating City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 174-175, 176.  
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the republic even while noting the government’s economic distress and internal socio-political 
strife up to and after the First Morean War.11 The Englishman, Joseph Addison, for example, 
observed in early 1702 to the Whig Lord Sommers, his patron and advisor to Louis XIV’s 
adversary, King William III, that “Among all of these difficulties the republic will still maintain 
itself, if policy can prevail upon force; for it is certain the Venetian senate is one of the wisest 
councils in the world…. The preservation of the republic is that to which all other considerations 
submit.”12  
The Venetian state had not been the only European polity to experience turbulence and 
uncertainty in the mid-seventeenth century.13 France too endured crises. The fraught regency of 
Anne of Austria, the Frondes (1648-1652), endemic corruption in state finance, and the Franco-
Spanish War left the kingdom in economic turmoil and internally unstable.14 The subsequent 
long personal rule of Louis XIV only progressed gradually in the decades thereafter. Scholars 
have understood that the personal rule of Louis XIV propelled France to the apogee of its 
international and cultural authority. This did not happen overnight on 9 March 1661, and this 
                                               
11 That is not to say that there was no mention of Venetian difficulties among contemporaries. In his controversial 
history. Amelot de la Houssaie dedicated Part V of Tome II, “Des Causes principales de la décadence de la 
République de Venise,” to a discussion of the commercial and moral decline of the republic. He noted that among 
the reasons was a shift to Atlantic trade, political and social corruption, and the republic’s seeming inability to create 
a military force to protect its terraferma dominions. Amelot did not, however, suggest that the state was 
inconsequential vis-a-vis European or Mediterranean affairs. He outlined the ongoing political alignments that 
Venice maintained with European states. It should be noted, however, that his history was written and first published 
in 1676 just after the loss of Crete and before the First Morean War when Venice aligned with Leopold I and began 
the reclamation of its lost Mediterranean territories. Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du 
Gouvernement de Venise, Tome II (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1705), 497 passim. For works concerning Venice 
and its relations with the Ottomans from the time of the loss of Crete and through the First Morean War see: Jean 
Georgelin, “La République de Venise et la fin du dominio del mare (1699-1718),” Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique 
90 (1976): 193-219; Le relazioni fra Venezia e la Turchia dal 1670 al 1684 e la formazione della Sacra Lega,” 
Archivio Veneto-Trentino 7, (1925): 1-46; S. Perini, “Venezia e la guerra di Morea (1684-1699),” Archivio Veneto 
S5, no. 153 (1999): 45-91.  
12 Joseph Addison, Remarks on Several Parts of Italy, Etc, In the years 1701, 1702, 1703 (London: J. & R. Tonson, 
1767), 63. 
13 For the classic argument for a general seventeenth-century crisis in Europe see Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle 
for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: 1975). 
14 Jean-Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l’administration de Colbert (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846), 74. 
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was not certain at Cardinal Mazarin’s death in spite of the international successes of the League 
of the Rhine and the Peace of the Pyrenees.15 The untried Bourbon king’s individual ability to 
rule over an economically and militarily exhausted kingdom was not yet assured despite his 
subsequent mythologized prise de pouvoir.16 By 1661, therefore, both Venice and France were 
weakened, war-weary, and, arguably, on the brink either of change or further ruin.  
In that year, European governments waited to see how Louis XIV would fare as sole ruler 
in a kingdom accustomed to canny first ministers. Coincidently they watched to see if Venice 
could defend its sovereignty over the island of Crete and its stature as Queen of the Adriatic Sea. 
Although territorially smaller, the Most Serene Republic of Venice remained an established 
polity vaunting a time-honored conciliar government and a republican political ethos free of the 
succession crises neighboring monarchies experienced in the middle of the century. The “myth” 
of Venice’s stability and freedom undergirded industrial and commercial regrowth and a robust, 
if not, as Richard Mackenney said, “ambiguous” political-cultural heritage among European 
states still in the last half of the century.17 This mythologized stability, however, could not cover 
the internal socio-political fractures – hence the ambiguity of stability – that French ambassadors 
reported to the king from within the republic. Ultimately, the absolutist regime of Louis XIV and 
the stability of the Most Serene Republic rested upon mythologies of power very much in vigor 
as the century closed. Idealized projections of authority aimed at those excluded from 
                                               
15 These achievements succeeded much internal strife even if successful for Mazarin’s foreign policy aims. 
Condren, Louis XIV et le repos de l’Italie, 18-19, 22-23. 
16 “The taking of power.” Wolf, Louis XIV, 134-135; Paul Sonnino, “The Sun King’s Anti-Machiavel,” in Rule, 346; 
Jerome Janczukiewicz, “La Prise de pouvoir de Louis XIV: la construction du mythe,” Dix-Septième Siècle, no. 227 
(2005/2) 243-264.  
17 John Martin and Dennis Romano, “Introduction” in Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an 
Italian City-State, 1297-1797 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 2; Richard Mackenney, “‘A Plot 
Discover’d?’ Myth, Legend, and the “Spanish” Conspiracy against Venice in 1618,” in Martin and Romano, 209; 
David Rosand, Myths of Venice: The Figuration of a State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 
3-4; Vittorio Conti, “The Mechanisation of Virtue: Republican Rituals in Italian Political Thought in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, eds. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin 
Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge Universuty Press, 2002), 74-76. 
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governance were to mask the realities of economic and commercial fluctuation; the uncertainties 
accompanying territorial expansionism and its losses; and the tensions between centralizing 
government institutions and aristocracies covetous of their prerogatives.  
France and Venice faced change and challenge in the last four decades of the century. 
Both governments encountered simultaneous crises again at the dawn of the eighteenth. The 
gloire (glory) that came to characterize Louis XIV’s reign by 1702 dimmed. French domestic 
prosperity staggered after the War of the League of Augsburg as the Grand Alliance challenged 
the king’s geopolitical dominance.18 After two protracted wars with the Ottoman Turks ending in 
1699 - the year Campra’s Le Carnaval de Venise appeared in Paris - Venetian institutional and 
economic distress threatened an increasingly costly French dynastic politics. Louis’s authority 
was stretched to its limits as the final acceptance of Carlos II’s will in 1700 catapulted European 
states into the War of the Spanish Succession. Venice’s international affinities had always been 
of consequence to Ludovician policies in Italy and the Mediterranean Sea, but the republic’s 
diplomatic attachments after the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz pitted it against Louis XIV by 1701. 
During the First Morean War the republic regained much of its Mediterranean empire and 
considerable prestige in the offing. Along the way, however, the Venetian treasury and military-
naval resources diminished and public debt surged ever upward.19 As it scrambled to reestablish 
authority in its stato da mar, Venice’s government looked to allies who might help defend 
Mediterranean interests against Ottoman hatred. An opprobrium, with no coincidental irony, that 
French ambassadors in Constantinople intensified against the republic.20 
                                               
18 John C. Rule, “Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate,” in Rule, 78-79. 
19 Lane, Venice: A Maritime History, 416-417. 
20 ASV, IS-LAF, Busta 153, Inquisitors of State to Pisani, 21 Oct. 1702; Eva Boka and Katalin Vargyas, “Le 
Marquis Charles de Ferriol ambassadeur de France à Constantinople (1699-1703),” Acta Historica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae 31, no. 1/2 (1985), 91. 
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Venice’s increasingly destabilized status by 1702 troubled Louis XIV because the 
republic deferred to the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I. The senate claimed neutrality among 
European dynastic affairs, but French ministers described a different reality. From 1683 to 1699, 
Venetian neutrality became a fiction from the French perspective. Leopold assisted the Venetians 
dividing Ottoman forces on land through his conquests in Hungary and the Balkans. Pursuant to 
the Treaty of Carlowitz, Joseph Addison reported, “...the Venetians are under articles with the 
Emperor to resign into his hands whatever they conquer of the Turkish dominions, that has been 
formerly dismembered from the empire. And having already very much dissatisfy’d him in the 
Frioul and Dalmatia, they dare not think of exasperating him further.”21  
The Venetian senate begrudgingly, if quietly, cast its lot with Leopold. Additionally, the 
troops and money of German princes aided Venice in successful naval battles during its 
penultimate Mediterranean conflict. From the vantage of Louis XIV, his ambassadors, and other 
European commentators, Venice was not a neutral state when the war for the Spanish throne 
began in September 1702. Addison further noted correctly: 
“...the common people of Italy, who run more into news and politicks than those 
of other countries, have all of them something to exasperate them against the King 
of France…. The Venetians will tell you of his leagues with the Turks…. That, 
however,which I take to be the principal motive among most of the Italians, for 
their favouring the Germans above the French, is this, that they are entirely 
persuaded that it is for the interest of Italy to have Milan and Naples rather in the 
hands of the first than of the other.”22 
 
Venice’s government would not ally against Leopold in favor of French dynasticism affording 
him assistance in the terraferma and the Adriatic Sea. It vexed Louis XIV not to be able to 
control Venice’s foreign policies as he had sought to do with other Italian states.  
                                               
21 Addison, Remarks on Several Parts of Italy, 61-62. 
22 Ibid., 39-40. 
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Ambassadors’ correspondence with the court, travel accounts, and other sources reveal, 
therefore, an energetic, thriving Venetian state. Although beset with challenges, the republic’s 
government gave Louis XIV’s dynastic politics in Italy and the Mediterranean Sea the proverbial 
“run for the money” when it wanted during the forty years that I examine. Furthermore, the 
Serenissima’s acidulous political environment and international interests received or aided in 
forming robust French ambassadors who represented and informed Louis’s policies. Venice’s 
senate could not be bullied in spite of the disparities in the size of its dominions and fewer 
resources compared to those of the king. French policies were altered as a result of interactions 
with diminutive states like the republic. For such reasons, the value of an investigation of 
louisquatorzien relations with the Serenissima is timely and appreciable.    
The International Connections of France and Venice 
 
Louis XIV’s dynastic imperative informed and formed his international strategies.23 
French diplomacy was meant to bolster Bourbon territorial expansionism and renown. 
Additionally, Colbertist mercantilism with its commercial, industrial, and maritime innovations 
fed the financial and military needs of the Bourbon state and its expansion.24 Diplomatic 
relations too fed the demands of louisquatorzien institutions and worked either toward 
international complicity or the appeasement, bullying, or outright subjugation of neighboring 
states that would not be easily swayed to accept the king’s dynastic and hegemonic intentions.   
An important systemic aspect of Louis’s rule, diplomacy delineated the policies that his 
ambassadors were to press at foreign courts. Louis XIV believed foreign relations to be a chief 
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concern for the monarch alone and central to the métier du Roi.25 Through royal instruction 
ambassadors exported the skeletal requirements that Louis’s evolving expansionist framework 
demanded. Officially ambassadors mediated and negotiated in favor of French policies vis-a-vis 
the needs and concerns of international neighbors. Unofficially, these ministers worked behind 
the scenes through political and industrial espionage and subterfuge in an effort to actualize 
Louis’s administrative goals. It is significant to the story of Louis’s rule that many of the 
successful foreign policy aims that ambassadors in Venice accomplished resulted from nefarious 
intelligence practices rather than from the idealized official role of the ambassador as an 
honorable simulacrum of the sovereign.  
Venice proved to be rather impenetrable in relation to the louisquatorzien monolith 
against which some other ships of “secondary states” like the Republic of Genoa crashed. 
Responses of international neighbors like Venice to French foreign policy were often beyond 
Louis XIV’s control, but his diplomats were expected to solidify the policies of their master. 
Correspondingly, France’s neighboring states had their geopolitical ends to promote. Diplomacy 
is a story of compromise and accommodation whenever possible accomplished within “...a set of 
assumptions, institutions, and processes — a practice....26 This was the story with Louis XIV’s 
ambassadors. The inability of these ambassadors consistently to persuade the Venetian 
government’s total complicity through accepted diplomatic channels underscored that Louis 
XIV’s authority was not absolute either over the abilities of the ministers he sanctioned or in the 
demands of the international arena.  
                                               
25 The “métier du roi” refers to the “craft of kingship.” Rule, “Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate,” in Rule, 53-54; John 
Condren, Louis XIV et le repos de l’italie: French policy towards the duchies of Parma, Modena, and Mantua-
Monferrato, 1659-1689 (Ph.D. diss., Saint Andrews University, 2015), 19, 22. 
26 Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13. 
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Three principal international connections permeated and informed the “diplomatic 
narrative” connecting Louis XIV’s France and the republic. These connections emerge from the 
correspondence of the ambassadors; they were directly interwoven with the king’s territorial 
expansionism, the push for commercial and maritime hegemony, or the protection of 
louisquatorzien prestige and honor. First, France and the republic were connected through a 
strategic “friendship.” Since the sixteenth century French kings looked to Venice as an ally in the 
states’ mutual antagonism toward the Habsburgs.  
Since the reign of Henri II the French considered Venice to be a counterpoise in the 
Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea against the dynastic pretensions of Austrian and 
Spanish monarchs.27 Venice too believed that friendly ties with France could offset the threat of 
the two Habsburg states and their Italian satellites amid which it was wedged. This relationship 
survived and strengthened under Louis XIII during the crises of the Valtellina through the 
League of Avignon and the later Mantuan Succession.28 Mutual anti-Habsburg strategy held 
sway from the sixteenth century until, as I argue further along, Louis XIV’s administration 
disillusioned the republic’s government in its pleas for assistance against the Ottomans in the 
Candian War.   
 Venetians’ affinity for the French moldered after desultory French forces failed to impede 
the loss of Crete in 1668-1669 despite Venetian assistance in the king’s ongoing feud with Pope 
Alexander VII. The republican government soon understood that the young monarch viewed its 
collaboration, while often necessary, with an annoying condescension. From the 1670s and into 
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the eighteenth century, the Venetian senate gained a mistrust for the territorially greedy king, 
and, while upholding neutrality among European dynastic states’ interests, the republic veered 
decidedly into a favorable rapport with Leopold I. Finally, an open alliance, the revived Holy 
League, cemented Venice’s preference for the emperor from 1684 through the remainder of 
Louis XIV’s reign; although the Venetians officially tried to downplay their anti-French 
sentiment through the rhetoric of neutrality, this pact strengthened Leopold’s resolve against 
French policies. It also partially determined Louis’s other strategies in Northern Italy and among 
Mediterranean polities like the Republic of Ragusa and the Ottomans.    
 The triangulation between France, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire formed a second 
facet of Franco-Venetian diplomacy. The manipulative strategies that Louis XIV and his 
ambassadors employed against the Venetians in Constantinople throughout the last decades of 
the century underscored the ongoing importance of Venice in Mediterranean and European 
affairs. Louis XIV and his ministers were careful in the 1660s to avoid upsetting France’s long-
held alliance with the Ottomans and offending Mehmet IV by lending overt military assistance to 
Leopold I or the Venetians in their conflicts with the sultan. Louis dangled the possibility of 
financial and military aid before Venice’s senate while he declared to his ambassador there that 
he had no intention of sinking men and funds into a war that could provide little benefit to 
France.29  Ultimately, it would also have damaged Franco-Ottoman relations. 
Colbertist economic and maritime policies demanded a healthy relationship with the 
Ottomans to bolster flagging French commercial interests in the Mediterranean. The renewal of 
the trade capitulations in 1673 helped France toward this goal.30 Louis’s strategies regarding the 
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sultan thereafter offended the emperor, the pope, and the Venetians. The republic’s senate looked 
with bewilderment at the king’s machinations with the infidel and rage at his unwillingness to 
counter the Turk during the 1683 siege of Vienna. Venetians saw Louis’s arrogant accord with 
the Sultan as contrary to the values of a Christian prince and a menace to its own sovereignty 
over the Adriatic Sea and surrounding Dalmatian territories.  
French ambassadors in Constantinople undermined Ottoman sentiment against the 
Venetians, and, as the republic began earnestly reclaiming its Mediterranean empire during the 
Morean War, French diplomats to the sultan further inflamed anti-Venetian sentiment. French 
ambassadors in Venice used the threat of possible Ottoman attacks against it to intimidate the 
republic and its continued alliance with Leopold I and the papacy. One French ambassador in 
Constantinople, the Marquis de Ferriol, however, claimed that Leopold I incited the Turk against 
Venice to press his claims in Italy, but by 1702 the Venetian senate was concerned enough about 
the threat French ambassadors to La Porte posed that it resentfully sent an extraordinary 
ambassador to Versailles ultimately prostrating itself to accommodate the king.31 The 
relationship between France, Venice and the Ottomans was distinctly related either to their 
commercial or territorial interests in the Mediterranean Sea and their stance toward Leopold I. 
Louis mobilized the Turk through diplomacy to destabilize the emperor and the Venetians to 
press French policies in Europe, and, in response, these states drew closer together.32  
 Finally, Italian peninsular politics connected the tangled webs enmeshing France and 
Venice. The rapport between France and Italian states at this time has received scholary 
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attention.33 Recent investigations have benefitted in part from new appraisals of the history of 
diplomacy and the broader history of the Mediterranean in the period. I believe that an increased 
appreciation for the role that small, seemingly inconsequential states can play in the 
development, application, or enervation of the authority, prestige, and credibility of large states 
should drive further investigations among early modernists. Recent “modern” geopolitics reflect 
such realities with violent precision and urgency; the meddling and manipulation of larger states 
in the social, economic, military, religio-cultural, and political spheres of “small” states yield 
unforeseen consequences no matter how ideologically self-assured and militarily superior a 
larger state may be. Ludovician political interests among Italian states in the late seventeenth 
century reflected such realities.  
Scholarship has focused upon Louis XIV’s diplomatic and strategic rapports with states 
like Parma, Modena, Mantua-Monferrato, Savoy, and Tuscany.34 On one hand, I have 
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intentionally avoided treading upon the current and ongoing research of scholars working in 
depth on these topics. On the other hand, Louis XIV’s instructions to and the correspondence of 
French ambassadors revealed that the thrust of the king’s diplomatic approach to Venice was 
aimed only indirectly, albeit with intention, at his policies with other Italian states. Ambassadors 
in Venice were to keep abreast of news coming from these states and correspond with 
ambassadors in them when necessary. 
French ambassadors referenced the authority and influence that the republic’s 
government - equaled only by that of the papacy - wielded over other Italian governments and 
their international alignments. As French ties with Savoy and Tuscany were relatively strong 
throughout much of the late seventeenth century and those of Venice with Savoy were almost 
non-existent because of the two states’ long-time feud over Cyprus and arguments related to 
ambassadorial precedence only sporadic communication relative to French interests with these 
states appeared in the diplomatic records.35 Instead the king and the secretaries of foreign affairs 
instructed ambassadors to prompt and to pressure the Venetian government’s collaboration and 
complicity in French policies toward the papal court in an effort to guide other Italian polities.  
Upon this second triangular rapport - France-Venice-Papacy - hinged a number of Louis 
XIV’s domestic ecclesiastical and external political decisions. Much like the unofficial Franco-
Venetian accord against Habsburg hegemony so too Venice’s government and that of France 
supported one another against the ecclesiastical pretensions of the papacy since the late sixteenth 
century.36 The questionable religious convictions of Henri IV and Venice’s 1606 interdict crisis 
inter alia created an often-shared diplomatic block in the face of successive pontiffs’ claims over 
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church doctrine, political interventions, and ecclesiastical nominations and jurisdiction surviving 
well into Louis XIV’s reign.  
The king and his ambassadors utilized a shared and traditional Venetian antipathy for the 
papacy. The king watched with interest how the senate stubbornly dealt with its own quarrels 
over jurisdiction with popes like Innocent XI. A compliant senate, through Venetian 
ambassadors in Rome, could also bolster the king’s indirect control over states like the duchies 
of Modena and Parma who superficially relied on the king for protection against the potential 
encroachments of Spanish, papal, and imperial monarchs. Venetian cardinals in alignment with 
those of France or others in the French camp might counter Francophobe members of the Sacred 
College in papal politics while manipulating the outcomes of conclaves. Without fail 
ambassadors’ parting instructions from secretaries of foreign affairs directed them to remind the 
senate of Venetian cardinals’ traditional attachments to those of France at the Roman court.  
The Marcian Republic, however, benefitted from papal funds, warships, and ideological 
support in its conflicts with the Ottoman infidel throughout the later decades of the century to 
such an extent that, in much the same vein as the Venetian rapport with Leopold I, the senate 
became increasingly reluctant to vet wholesale French policies in Rome. The senate’s hesitation 
grew as Louis XIV’s territorial acquisitions, military depredations across Europe, politics of 
réunions, and machinations in the Mediterranean threatened to alter traditional Venetian spheres 
of sovereignty in the sea and Northern Italy.  
The king’s occupation of Casale in 1681 after its purchase from the Duke of Mantua in 
conjunction with the already-held fortress of Pinerolo on the Savoyard border provided the king 
leverage in Italy that frightened the Venetians. French protectionism of Parma, Mantua, and 
Modena and the brutal bombardment of the city of Genoa in 1684 enraged Venetians and further 
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tempered their willingness to assist the king in Roman politics. By 1683 Venice’s government 
preferred alliance with Leopold I and the popes to the detriment of Louis’s expanding authority 
in Italy as his control over international affairs faltered. With the 1689 election of the Venetian 
Pope Alexander VIII, both France and the republic, however, experienced a rare accord with the 
papacy that lasted through the terminal date of my investigation. This particular link binding the 
two states weakened then contributing to the breakdown of significant diplomatic ties that 
occurred by 1702.  
The attention that ambassadors in Venice paid to these issues and to the republic’s 
interventions in them underscored the continuous part Louis XIV expected Venice’s government 
to play in French international aims; the republic’s “European importance,” pace Bouwsma, 
endured well beyond “the first quarter of the seventeenth century.” The function of ambassadors 
was decisive in facilitating the direction of these diplomatic ends. They acted as the vehicles 
through which theoretical foreign policy emanating from the king and his secretaries manifested 
into tangible action - or not - that then required subsequent royal reaction, response, and 
adjustment.    
Historiography 
The French Dynastic State and the Politics of Accommodation 
 
 In a 2011 survey of French absolute monarchy Hervé Drévillon concluded, “…war and 
diplomacy would appear...as the measure of an absolutism inscribed upon transnational reality 
remaining to be explored.”37 My project is one response to such calls to explore ambassadors as 
extensions of Louis XIV’s ministry of foreign affairs and to analyze the networks the ministry 
employed to achieve royal aims. My study intersects with an extant literature that argues that 
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louisquatorzien governance utilized traditional élite social networks to solidify royal authority 
while expanding bureaucratic innovations at the ministerial level to bolster a distinctly dynastic 
vision of the state. The dynastic imperative in seventeenth-century French social structures 
informed not only royal motivations but also those of the ministerial clans and ambassadors 
whose families received the king’s immediate patronage with its socio-cultural benefits.38 It is 
timely for a study that investigates such administrative transformations as they emerged in the 
work and functions of French diplomats serving beyond the borders of France within a 
conversation about administrative centralization.  
No one denies that Louis XIV’s authority can be characterized as absolute within France 
in the context of seventeenth-century theoretical politics. Nor would scholars disagree that the 
king’s control upon actual domestic governance was not literally absolute: all agree that there 
were constraints to Louis’s power.39 The king, however, remained, in propaganda and theory if 
not in overall practice, the fulcrum of power.40 No one challenged his rights as sovereign in 
France. Be that as it may, the historiography of louisquatorzien absolute monarchy has been 
divided into divergent categories. Since the nineteenth century some studies have argued that the 
king’s administration provided the roots for the would-be modern nation-state while 
simultaneously eroding the ancien régime monarchy - a trend linked to Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
investigation.41 From this vantage a forward-thinking Louis XIV’s centralizing tendencies 
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signaled a decided shift from feudal networks and administration harbingering the advent of the 
post-revolutionary republican nation-state and providing the roots of modern bureaucratic praxis.  
Later twentieth-century revisionist scholarship interpreted Louis’s approach to 
governance differently. They saw developments in his admininstration as exchanges of 
compromise and collaboration between the royal government and elite networks and 
corporations throughout the kingdom. Scholars variously deployed a Marxian social emphasis on 
classes and the particular pressures they placed upon the monarchy at the provincial-urban and 
court patron-client levels.42 Such studies importantly eschewed earlier assumptions about the 
teleological growth of the state. They preferred to reconsider the institutions of the monarchy on 
their own terms without recourse to a state-building project that overlooked the ways in which 
Louis XIV’s administration contended with traditional socio-political networks while embarking 
on centralization. These studies placed the momentum of monarchical government within the 
context of a royal admininstration trying to maintain control over numerous entities that 
challenged it. 
Most recently historians have begun to examine the process and politics of 
accommodation between the royal center and the numerous individual, corporate, and 
geographic peripheries throughout France. They have argued that it was, rather, the Crown that 
imposed a model of fiscal, administrative, and socio-cultural adhesion-cum-centralization upon 
state corporations that in turn were expected to comply with a totalizing royal authority. In these 
                                               
42 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (first published in 1974) (New York: 2013); Beik, Absolutism 
and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: 
1985); Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France (Oxford: 1987); James B. 
Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany (Cambridge: 1994); David Parker, Class and State in 
Ancien Regime France: The Road to Modernity? (London: 1996). In his initial discussions of the French 
bureaucracy Peter R. Campbell saw governmental practices begun under Louis XIV more as compromise than 
collaboration. See Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745 (London: Routledge, 1996), 4. 
Sara E. Chapman, Private Ambition and Political Alliance: The Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain Family and Louis 
XIV’s Government, 1650-1715 (Rochester, NY: 2004). 
22 
studies, the pressures of elite groups within a kingdom suspended in traditional early-modern 
social hierarchies have been seen less as motivating forces demanding response from the Crown. 
Instead, these scholars have argued that the Crown considered and facilitated individual and 
coporate needs as a means of satisfying mutual socio-cultural expectations but always with the 
understanding that the Crown’s concerns should dominate all others. Scholars sharing this 
perspective have examined institutions like the court and royal ministries. Others have examined 
the trend of accommodation in the church, army, guilds, and merchants and urban elites in cities 
such as Marseille.43  
Returning to Drévillon’s remark, my investigation of ambassadors expands upon such 
studies of accommodation. Three of my subjects were of the high clergy and two were robe 
nobles. Their stories further illustrate that the louisquatorzien dynastic state and its apparati 
incorporated and responded to the individual expectations of these men for social advancement 
within the existing hierarchical system that the dynastic monarchy oversaw. In return they 
displayed unwavering loyalty to the Crown and compliance in the administrative tasks that 
secretaries at the ministerial level set for them. The instructions they received from the monarch 
and succeeding secretaries of foreign affairs demonstrate the diachronic centralizing, vertical 
tendencies of royal authority that occurred within the ministry of foreign affairs - and from the 
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late 1680s that of the marine too - in their work outside of France. In return, they expected, and 
in these test cases, received advancement for themselves or members of their family within either 
the Crown’s admininstration or the French aristocratic hierarchy. 
The interpretation of Louis XIV’s administration as an “information state” has received 
recent attention, and, here too, I believe that the volume, content, and frequent requests for all 
types of intelligence between the ministry of foreign affairs and the ambassadors I survey 
correspond to this characterization.44 I contend, however, that the volume of information did not 
decline after Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s death in 1683. Information emanating from Venice actually 
increased as triangular paper trails developed between diplomats, consuls, and both the ministries 
of foreign affairs and the marine from 1688 onward.45  Along the way I also comment upon how 
ambassadors fed the economic and cultural programs associated with the growth of 
louisquatorzien dynasticism. Ambassadors’ individual choices and ministrations affected the 
reaction of the Crown in foreign and domestic policy. Such realities lend further weight to our 
understanding of how louisquatorzien bureaucratic developments and attempts at hegemonic 
expansionism beyond France came to depend upon its ministers as much as ministers depended 
upon the Crown for advancement. 
Mediterranean Studies 
 
 By zooming in on louisquatorzien absolutism-cum-statecraft through diplomacy outside 
of the kingdom, my topic follows the exportation of the king’s dynastic policies into the 
contested spaces of the Mediterranean. Here I speak to a growing literature that has reevaluated 
the significance of the Mediterranean Sea to French history. To put it another way, scholars have 
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been putting France back into a literature that refutes Mediterranean decline in the early modern 
period. Through a study of Franco-Venetian relations over four decades, I demonstrate one 
instance of what Megan Armstrong and Gillian Weiss defined as “the Mediterranean as contact 
zone and site of exchange.”46 
 To speak of Mediterranean studies is to evoke the monumental 1949 study of Fernand 
Braudel, Méditerranée et le monde méditerranean à l’époque de Philippe II. In spite of scholarly 
criticism of Braudel’s study “...as ahistorical, deterministic, and imperialist,”47 all agree that the 
great annaliste opened a galvanizing conversation. A growing literature has shown the ongoing 
relevance of the sea after the sixteenth century as a dynamic and volatile theater in which early 
modern states still, one one hand, sparred for economic, cultural, religious, and maritime 
supremacy. On the other hand, scholars have characterized the sea as a permeable membrane 
across which ideas, goods, cultures, and individuals interacted, changed, and collaborated as 
states utilized the sea to maintain, cement, or augment authority.48 
 No one would contest the primacy of the sea in the history of the Republic of Venice. 
However, scholars have lamented and, in turn, began to remedy a relative inadequacy in 
depictions of the sea’s role in the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. For 
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decades it was assumed that after the “Age of Exploration” and into the later centuries of the 
early modern period that the Atlantic Ocean came to dominate Western European states’ - inter 
alia French - naval, commercial, and colonial interests. The Mediterranean was allegedly 
“marginalized.”49 Discussions of this marginalization followed Braudel’s “Northern Invasion “ 
thesis arguing that the Dutch, French, and English “swarmed into the Mediterranean” destroying 
the ancient socio-cultural diversities and trade networks in vigor from Gibraltar to the Levant.50 
Reappraisals of the varied French interactions and experience in the nearer and further 
Mediterranean Sea reveal that France was but one of many states in the seventeenth century 
seeking dominance in the sea, but French commercial hegemony was far from confirmed until 
the mid-eighteenth century.51 Even then the French were forced to contend with the British navy 
to protect their short-lived commercial dominance in the sea. 
Later French ascendance in the Mediterranean could not have occurred, however, without 
the shifts in French international, institutional, commercial, and maritime policies that occurred 
in the late seventeenth century as my study suggests. I show that, at least in the context of 
Franco-Venetian relations, in the early 1660s Jean-Baptiste Colbert used ambassadors to import 
through espionage Venetian artisanal and industrial resources that had already made the republic 
rich for centuries throughout the Mediterranean and Europe. France had to steal from the small 
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republic at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule. French commercial and maritime 
interests in the Mediterranean in the 1660s and 1670s still lagged far behind those of other 
European states as Colbert dealt with consular reforms, the augmentation of the merchant 
marine, North African piracy, and the tempering of existing Dutch and English authority in the 
sea during the Dutch War.52  
I concur that it was not until the 1680s and after that French hegemonic interests in the 
Mediterranean developed sufficiently that ambassadors were finally expected to negotiate with 
the Venetian senate for the protection and respect of French merchant vessels. Likewise, they 
lobbied to safeguard the fair treatment of French merchants and their wares in Venice’s stato da 
mar dominions and the sealanes over which the republic was sovereign. Louis XIV rhetorically 
claimed commercial primacy above other European states in the sea after the renewal of the 1673 
capitulations with the Ottomans and the 1684 diplomatic triumph of the “affair of the sofa” at the 
Ottoman court, but it would not be until 1702 that the king could boast with some accuracy that 
he had discomfited Venice as one competitor in the Adriatic lending a further boost to the French 
commercial ascent that occurred by mid-century. I argue that individual ambassadors and 
consuls across the Mediterranan in states like Venice were critical instruments in constructing 
the foundations for later French advantages in the sea.     
The “New” Diplomatic History: Ambassadors as Individual Agents Provoking Political 
Developments 
My study’s focus on five ambassadors contributes also to the “new” diplomatic history. 
This “new” study argues in part for investigations of individual diplomatic actors as agents of 
political change in the broader institutional frameworks within which they functioned. Their 
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experience as vehicles of the political process at the international level is critical.53 
Ambassadors’ stories allow us to understand how broad geopolitical and historical narratives 
developed. Traditional histories of early modern diplomacy of the early twentieth century, 
handmaiden to political history and the study of international relations, focused upon the 
development of the “balance-of-power” theses of scholars such as Garret Mattingly and Harold 
Nicholson that posited the emergence of diplomacy as a means toward the maturation of modern 
nation-states.54 Frequently, in these narratives, ambassadors as individuals and their 
contributions were lost in discussions surrounding the titles denoting them - ambassador, 
plenipotentiary, envoy, etc.55 The political developments that ambassadors’ labors and 
weaknesses helped to construct overshadowed them as individual on-site builders affecting 
change in international designs of Louis XIV as chief architect. Their quotidian lives and efforts 
had lasting effects in this process. 
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With the linguistic and cultural turn that occurred among historians from the 1980s, 
conventional political and diplomatic history faced a decline. Historians saw older 
metanarratives of diplomatic history as teleological arguments lacking nuance in regards to 
diplomats and the methods they employed in their professions. As scholars of the history of 
international relations, and diplomatic history in particular, have since brought the nature and the 
development of the nation-state in the early modern period under scrutiny, studies have appeared 
in which the cultures of the diplomatic process within the “society of princes” emerge.56 Such 
studies have initiated a varied understanding of the importance of social networks to individual 
diplomats and the institutional pressures affecting their work at the international level. As one 
scholar of international relations, Paul Sharp, has pointed out, diplomats were in a binary 
“predicament,” and, he concluded: 
For this, we must look to more imaginative accounts that focus on what I 
shall refer to as the subjective and objective articulations of this predicament. By 
subjective, I mean how diplomats appear both to themselves and others from 
vantage points within societies sending them and receiving them. By objective, I 
mean how their predicament appears when they look at each other, or we see 
them, as a class of people situated between those they represent.57 
I acknowledge this predicament, and I seek to situate the five ambassadors I examine 
within the socio-cultural confines of the louisquatorzien dynastic state and its systemic 
expectations both from the vantage of the ambassadors themselves and the monarch they served. 
Moreover, I consider the ambassadors from the perspective of the Venetian government with its 
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sometimes-violent reaction to the methods French ambassadors employed as the Other in its 
domestic environment. These ambassadors’ individual experiences indicate that international 
processes not of their making and their own personal advancement required their expedition to 
Venice. However, succeeding stages in the ever-changing international and domestic evolution 
of Louis XIV’s policies resulted from their efforts in the republic in conjunction with those of 
ambassadors at other posts and ministers back at the French court. This, in turn, effected the 
progression of louisquatorzien dynastic policies and, thus, the nature of the king’s authority.  
Dissertation Chapters and the Rationale Behind the Choice of Ambassadors 
 Chapter One sets the stage in Venice for the ambassadors examined. I describe the tightly 
controlled Venetian socio-cultural and political context in which ambassadors functioned. I 
consider the roles and tasks expected of ambassadors to give some idea of what they physically 
did in service to Louis XIV. I describe the spaces in which ambassadors lived and worked 
evoking their quotidian physical, emotional, and physiological trials and pleasures. The chapter 
includes ambassadors’ testimonies regarding their private lives including the expenses they 
accrued and how financial turmoil affected performance. Contextualizing ambassadors’ 
circumstances illuminates the developments in high politics described in the chapters of Parts 
One through Three.  
 Following Chapter One I divide the dissertation into three distinct chronological Parts. 
Vignettes introduce chapters and also signify the unpredictability inherent in an ambassador’s 
experience and how events led directly to or demonstrated shifts in Louis XIV’s foreign policies 
and international affairs. Part I’s chapters consider two embassies in Venice during the early 
decades of Louis XIV’s “personal rule.” In the early 1660s Louis XIV and his ministers hoped to 
take advantage of a period of peace in Western Europe to stabilize France’s domestic 
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administration and flagging economy. In these decades ambassadors functioned within 
relationships established prior to the moments in 1661 when Louis took up the reins of 
government. In Chapter Two I investigate the embassy of Pierre de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers. 
Bonsy was the first ambassador Louis XIV posted to Venice at the beginning of the “personal 
rule.” Bonsy’s embassy in Venice elucidates the varied roles that ambassadors were meant to fill 
beyond the kingdom in the early 1660s through social networks at the court established under 
Cardinal Mazarin.  
The chapter explores ways in which diplomats were connected with ministers, most 
notably Jean-Baptiste Colbert. The bishop’s interventions in the war-wracked republic extends 
our view of what French ministers just after Mazarin’s death considered matters of high foreign 
policy as Louis and Colbert indicated the direction of a centralizing bureaucracy. Functioning 
within an emerging administration, the bishop’s ministrations provoked considerable changes in 
commercial, cultural, and international facets of Ludovician bureaucracy at Venetians’ expense. 
The results of the bishop’s diverse connections in the administration provided the genesis for 
embittered relations between the two states. 
 Chapter Three. the embassy of the Abbé d’Estrades, opens a window onto the effects that 
the accompanying anxieties of a burgeoning aristocratic career occasioned in foreign policy. The 
expenses associated with diplomatic service in Venice elicited errors of judgment in his service 
to Louis XIV. Estrades cultivated a robust and far-reaching intelligence network among spies 
throughout Italy. His personal appropriation of these networks, although expected in the system 
of patron-client relations in vigor in the French bureaucracy, exhibited the inherent difficulties 
and opportunities that mixing personal interests in Crown affairs could occasion in the Crown’s 
international affairs. 
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The Bishop of Beziers’s collaboration with various ministers back at the French court 
deliberately obtained important benefits during the initial solidification of Louis XIV’s state 
programs. Estrades, while forming intelligence links to benefit French politics, employed these 
webs to insure his personal advancement in exchange for favors. One such favor, the abbé’s 
undeclared abuse of royal authority in the attempted murder of a profligate composer, inspired a 
diplomatic furor threatening Louis XIV’s reputation and Estrades’s future career. The chapter 
culminates with Estrades’s frantic and penitent revelation of a further secret diplomatic 
negotiation with consequences for his future, the possible expansion of French territory, and the 
growing fear of Venetians for the dynastic and military intentions of Louis XIV in the shadow of 
the peace of Nijmegen. 
Chapters in Part II evoke the negative shift in Franco-Venetian diplomatic relations 
throughout the 1680s. In this decade Louis XIV’s geopolitical dominance incited fear and 
retaliation across Europe culminating in the War of the League of Augsburg. French ministers in 
Venice experienced the government’s opprobrium toward the king’s bullying military and 
diplomatic expansionism. Moreover, the republic’s senate entered the First Morean War through 
which it began an aggressive reclamation of its Mediterranean empire. Naval successes against 
the Ottomans and alliances through the Holy League added confidence to Venetians’ obliquial 
treatment of French ambassadors.  
Chapter Four demonstrates the extent of Venetian dissatisfaction with Louis XIV’s 
foreign policies just after the Congress of Nijmegen. Through the complicated and tumultuous 
embassy of the Sieur d’Amelot from 1682-1685 I consider the aggressive use of confidenti on 
the part of the Venetian state inquisitors and the Council of Ten to harass Amelot and his 
household. This signaled a violent repudiation of French foreign policy. The Venetian senate’s 
32 
overt alliance with Leopold I in 1684 laid bare the contradictions in Venice’s traditional politics 
of neutrality from the French perspective. I use Amelot’s embassy to suggest the emerging role 
of ambassadors as functionaries comprising and manifesting the praxis of centralizing 
administrative developments in Louis XIV’s ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of the 
marine.  
Chapter Five examines how the collaboration of Denis II de la Haye-Vantalet and the 
French consul, Le Blond, illustrated the extent to which the role of the ambassador by 1688 
further emerged as a professionalized function in concert with the increasingly similar role of the 
consul. The changed interactions of these ministers in Venice to one of near equality by 1688 
demonstrates the evolution in French bureaucratic institutions while highlighting the effects of 
the Colbert clan’s dominance over the separate ministries of foreign affairs and the marine. The 
chapter indicates the French government’s preoccupation with Louis XIV’s hegemonizing efforts 
in Mediterranean commerce as the members of the Holy League repulsed and weakened the 
Ottoman sultan’s maritime authority.  Taken together, Chapters Four and Five, emphasize the 
inability of French ambassadors to intimidate the Venetian government away from its 
increasingly anti-French and pro-Habsburg foreign policies.  
Part III considers the diplomatic circumstances that evolved between France and Venice 
during the escalation of the War of the Spanish Succession. Chapter Six focuses on the 
extraordinary embassy of Cardinal d’Estrées in 1701-1702. I examine the ways in which the 
Venetian government betrayed its rhetoric of neutrality from the French perspective through 
covert support of imperial armies in Northern Italy and the Adriatic Sea. Estrées attempted 
during many months of secret negotiations in 1701 to persuade the senate to ally outright with 
France to expel Leopold’s armies from Italy. I assert that Estrées utilized a politics of fear 
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capitalizing upon the double execution of two French operatives ordered by the Venetian state 
inquisitors in 1702 to assert Louis XIV’s dominance over Venetian politics and traditional 
lordship of the Adriatic Sea.  
I contend that circumstances during Estrées’s embassy further facilitated the advent of 
French dominance in eighteenth-century Mediterranean commerce. Estrées’s exploitation of a 
seemingly trivial event, I argue, altered eighteenth-century diplomatic relations between France 
and Venice. Furthermore, I argue that scholars should examine the diplomatic stagnation 
between Venice and individual European states like France to question Venetian diplomatic and 
political “decline.” I argue for investigations of “decline” in specific diplomatic rapports rather 
than the acceptance of retrospective narratives of Venice’s international diminishment.    
Sources 
 This dissertation is not a dual history of French and Venetian diplomatic relations in the 
late seventeenth century. Its focus, rather, is the evolution of French foreign and domestic policy 
as seen through the example of individual ambassadors who crafted Louis’s ties to Venice. 
Readers will find, therefore, that an analysis of the French perspective dominates throughout the 
narrative. I explore, however, the Venetian government’s motivations in foreign, commercial, 
and maritime politics with Louis XIV’s government.  
Much of this work relies upon ambassadors’ correspondence with Louis XIV and the 
French ministry of foreign affairs contained in the correspondances politiques of the Archives du 
ministère des affaires étrangères at La Courneuve. Dispatches from ambassadors and the 
responses from the king and secretaries of foreign affairs provided the material through which to 
reconstruct Louis’s official and unofficial politics regarding the republic. These sources indicated 
the king’s judgment in regards to ambassadors’ personal performance and independence of 
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action while serving in Venice. Documents contained in the mémoires et documents at La 
Courneuve proffered copies of letters sent from the king and foreign ministers to ambassadors or 
directly to the Venetian senate not necessarily found in the registers of dispatches. The mémoires 
et documents also provided complete Italian transcriptions of Benedetto Capello’s accounts of 
confidential meetings held with Cesar d’Estrées for Chapter Six as well as various travel 
accounts and memoirs describing conditions in Venice and Northern Italy.   
Paris’s Bibliothèque Nationale de France houses the Mélanges Colbert containing 
ambassadors’ correspondence with Jean-Baptiste Colbert. These sources open a window onto the 
commercial and cultural tasks that Louis’s minister expected ambassadors in Venice to undertake 
in the reinvigoration of French commerce and the king’s cultural programs in the 1660s. Private 
letters from the Abbé d’Estrades and his father, the Marshal d’Estrades, found in the BnF’s 
Clairambault series flesh out the personal motivations of Estrades in his role as ambassador. The 
Archives Nationales’ affaires étrangères and marines yielded the sources to reconstruct French 
Mediterranean commercial and maritime interests as well as the evolution of the collaborative 
relationship between French ambassadors and consuls in Venice in the 1680s. Finally, the 
archives at the Service historique de l’armée de terre at the Chateau of Vincennes provided 
further insights into French military preoccupations in Northern Italy and the Mediterranean. 
Contained in the official French diplomatic record were copies or original versions of the 
Venetian senate’s responses to French ambassadors’ audiences and requests as well as copies of 
the ambassadors’ statements to the senate. I also used copies of the king’s direct correspondence 
with Venice’s government found at La Courneuve. This being the case, while in Venice’s 
Archivio di Stato, I examined sources that offered insight into the republic’s classified concerns 
and strategies in its dealings with Louis and his envoys. I utilized three particular classified 
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intelligence trails found in the series of communications of the Venetian inquisitors of state with 
ambassadors in Paris and with confidenti – spies – in Venice and Northern Italy. First, the 
communicazioni degli ambasciatori and lettere dagli ambasciatori in Francia to the inquisitors 
provided an understanding of Venetian ambassadors observations and ministrations from Paris to 
the highest levels in the Venetian government. Secondly, the inquisitors’ lettere agli 
ambasciatori in Francia detailed the inquisitors’ prompts and instructions to ambassadors 
regarding matters of state security. Finally, the riferte dei confidenti and avvisi contained the 
often-daily surveillance reports of intelligence operatives in Venice and Northern Italy set to spy 
upon French ambassadors, their households, and their intelligence networks. It is hoped that the 
conversation between these French and Venetian sources provides a clear depiction of a thorny 
geopolitical rapport through the eyes of French ambassadors. This, despite Amelot de la 
Houssaie’s ambiguous 1676 appraisal that “It is admitted...France is a little more in favor in 
Venice than Spain, less than one might consider for anything concerning its (France’s) 
ambassadors, more is to be desired there.”58 
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 “...S’en allant ambassadeur du Roy à Venise”1:  
French Ambassadors and the Late-Seventeenth-Century Diplomatic Cityscape of Venice  
 
 A cavaliere della stola d’oro – a Knight of the Golden Fleece – and sixty senators of the 
highest rank clad in scarlet velvet received Louis XIV’s arriving resident ambassador to Venice. 
The reception occurred in the Eremite church on the Island of Santo Spirito.2 After a ritual 
invitation to enter the church the cavaliere and senators strode two-abreast to the center of the 
nave where they found the French ambassador attending them. The church was filled with the 
new ambassador’s entourage and many French guests living in Venice. The cavaliere greeted the 
French envoy in Italian on behalf of the doge and senate. The ambassador responded in French 
whereupon the Venetian extended his right hand to the ambassador positioning him on his right 
flank; the senators similarly paired with a member of the French delegation.  
The company progressed to ornately sculpted gondolas making the eight-mile voyage 
back north to the city winding to the French embassy. Once at the ambassador’s domicile, the 
troupe entered the building in similar fashion as it had left the church with the new ambassador 
the last to exit his gondola. Following a ceremonial reception in the embassy the Venetian 
delegates departed and the French ambassador extended his right hand assisting the cavaliere to 
mount a gondola. The first day of the entrée ended with the embassy doors and gardens thrown 
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open for Venetians of all classes to admire the latest in French interior adornments and to partake 
of wine, candied fruits, iced creams, and music into the night. 
The following day the cavaliere and senators returned early to the French embassy to 
invite the ambassador to accompany them to the palazzo ducale. Once there, the cavaliere led 
the ambassador through the open door of the sala del collegio to the doge and the twenty-two 
assembled members of the collegio. The doge rose removing his cornet and the other members 
followed suit. The French ambassador traversed the hall making nine révérences – low bows – as 
he approached the tribune. Mounting to a seat beside the doge he doffed his hat, sat, and 
pronounced an introductory harangue in French. A secretary of the collegio repeated the same in 
Italian after which the envoy delivered lettres de créances – credentials - through which the king 
of France acknowledged him as royal representative to the republic. The doge conversed briefly 
with the ambassador before the envoy rose, donned his hat, and exitted the sala backwards 
performing again nine révérences. The ritual return to the embassy was repeated except the doge 
sent along rich gifts of pastries, liqueurs, and wines. Finally, the ambassador opened the embassy 
for another evening feteing the Venetian public. The entrée ended; the French ambassador was 
officially in residence. 
The ceremonial entrée provides a fitting introduction. This chapter describes some of the 
quotidian physical, socio-cultural, and psychological circumstances that French ambassadors 
experienced upon arriving in Venice. The choreography of an ambassador’s official entrée into 
the Most Serene Republic was engineered to welcome and acknowledge his status. The entrée, 
however, also targeted the ambassador as the official representative of the French - foreign - 
Other.3 Both cases were distinctly political.4 
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As the rituals illustrate, the French ambassador as an individual was officially recognized 
in a Venetian socio-cultural context. He was expected to adapt quickly to the functions his royal 
master demanded.5 The pressure was on. As Ellen McClure described, “the ambassador would 
seem to be a figure occupying the liminal space not just between two sovereigns but between the 
universals of rational precepts and the infinite contingencies of international events.”6 They were 
foreigners thrown into long hours of work punctuated with taxing state ceremonial and audiences 
before the Venetian collegio and populace. They were the public image of the French king and 
people. It must not be forgotten, however, that diplomatic sources do not always tell the whole 
story, and here personal letters, memoirs, spies’ reports, and gazettes reveal that diplomats 
enjoyed the pleasures of the republic as well as its perils.  
This study asks the reader to consider five French ambassadors as independent, 
individual actors.7 Like everyone, ambassadors were creatures of biological and historical 
circumstance. They were prey to physical, environmental, and institutional constraints, 
conventions, and prejudices. The five ambassadors whose embassies I study digested, adapted, 
and reacted to the broader international webs into which they became enmeshed. They were also 
expected to make critical decisions while enduring the day-to-day experiences associated with a 
foreign socio-cultural milieu.8  
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The present work investigates how the Bishop of Beziers, the Abbé d’Estrades, the Sieur 
d’Amelot, the Sieur de la Haye-Vantelet, and the Cardinal d’Estrées adapted to and negotiated 
within the Venetian context. This chapter aspires to the reification of similar circumstances 
ambassadors encountered in Venice in contrast to the distinct political moments each addressed. 
Ambassadors’ adaptational capacities illuminate facets of the evolution in louisquatorzien 
domestic and foreign politics. Ultimately, from within the closed Venetian environment, these 
men assisted in the construction of broader developments characterizing the histories of France, 
Venice, and the Mediterranean Sea.   
Spaces of Representation, Mediation, and Negotiation in Venice 
 Ambassadors were restricted in Venice, or, as Amelot de la Houssaie alleged in his 1676 
Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, foreign emissaries were considered “hidden enemies and 
honorable spies.”9 It was illegal for Venice’s patricians to fraternize with foreign envoys, and the 
city’s embassies were off limits to Venetians.10 Official sources suggested that foreign envoys 
spent much of their time in the embassies and government structures to which the Venetian 
government invited them. The French embassy in the late seventeenth century was a discretely 
imposing sixteenth-century palazzo in the sestiere of Cannaregio.11 Although the late-
seventeenth-century embassy was little more than a mile from the palazzo ducale it seemed far-
                                               
9 Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, Tome I, 33. 
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provides an invaluable perspective on Venetian society and culture. Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 
254; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 151. 
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30121 Venice, Italy. The hotel’s website boasts of its former diplomatic tenants. For some idea of the sumptuous 
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removed from the city’s spaces of political authority. Traveling by foot, sedan chair, or in one of 
Venice’s reputed “thirty thousand gondolas” through labyrinthine canals, bridges, or rios 
required time.12 The location of the residence of Venetian ambassadors in Paris changed at least 
twice in the decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule, and they rented the spaces.13 The French 
embassy in Venice, contrastingly, remained in the same rented palazzo until later in the 
eighteenth century.  
The designated area delineating the extraterritorial space associated with the French 
embassy was sometimes referred to as the lista dei Francesi (see Fig.1).14 This included the 
embassy proper, outbuildings attached to the ambassador’s household, and the walkways 
surrounding these structures. Originally constructed for the Paloral family the palazzo opened in 
front onto the rio della Madonna dell’Orto. Behind was a private garden laid out in the French 
manner; beyond this the boundary of the fondamente nove with the island of Murano in view. 
The embassy was situated almost equidistantly between the church and convent of Sant’Alvise to 
the left of its portone – the main entrance - just beyond the rio de’ Zecchini and the church and 
gardens of the Madonna dell’Orto to the right.15 Moving past the Madonna dell’Orto’s piazza 
one arrived at the sacca della misericordia. The sources mention the Madonna dell’Orto 
frequently as a space ambassadors used for devotion, negotiation, and espionage.16 The lista dei 
                                               
12 Misson, Lettre XVI, à Venise 20 Janvier 1688, 201; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 115.  
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Jean-Pierre Babelon, “La Maison du bourgeois gentilhomme: l’Hotel Salé, 5, rue de Thorigny, a Paris,” in Revue de 
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Francesi stretched traditionally from the rio de’ Zecchini to the wall where the piazza della 
Madonna dell’Orto began.17 
Unfortunately, I have found no sources detailing the floorplan or number of rooms in the 
embassy. It is clear that there were reception rooms on the pian nobile including a sumptuous 
audience chamber. Here stood a respectfully vacant armchair – fauteuil – elevated on a dais 
symbolizing the presence of Louis XIV.18 Below the dais sat an additional two fauteuils where 
the ambassador received guests. The chamber included a royal portrait that changed over time 
with fashion and as the monarch aged. Additionally there were portraits of members of the royal 
family.19 Flanking the dais were two mirrors of solid silver inlaid with crystals above two silver 
tables. Looking at ambassadors’ lists of wares accompanying them reveals that the other public 
spaces of the embassy were richly appointed; furnishings, plate, and fabrics showcased the best 
in French luxury production and artistry.20  
Of the nine official ambassadors posted in Venice from 1662 to 1715, Cardinal d’Estrées 
alone did not to reside in the embassy proper. The cardinal remained incognito throughout his 
twenty months of service preferring to lodge at the Franciscan monastery of Santa Maria 
                                               
17 Colbert de Torcy, Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Sieur Abbé de Pomponne, Conseiller du Roy en Ses 
Conseils, l’un des Aumosniers de S. M. allant à Venize en qualité de Son ambassadeur du 28è Janvier 1705 à Marly, 
in Du Parc, 138. 
18 Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe, 247; The French used the portego of the palazzo as the antichambre for the 
audience hall. Alliette de Pracomtal, Un ambassadeur de Louis XIV à Venise, 1679-1682 (Luneray, France: Éditions 
Bertout, 1989), 34; For the important role of the portego to Venetian patricians’ status and domestic expectations 
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2013), 90-91. 
19 For example, in her study of the Sieur de Varangeville, successor in Venice to the Abbé d’Estrades, Aliette de 
Pracomtal noted that, at that time, a copy of Pierre Mignard’s 1677 equestrian portrait of the king before the siege of 
Cambrai was on display. (see Fig.2 for a similar portrait). Ibid., 34-35. It is unclear if ambassadors carried portraits 
of the king with them in their wares or if the court sent them regularly. 
20 Amelots’s list of furnishings provides the best example of rich items ambassadors took with them to their 
embassies in Venice. AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108, Mémoire des Hardes et des vaiselles d’argent et choses dont le Sr. 
Amelot s’en allant ambassadeur du Roy à Venise envoy a son sortie du Royaume, 1 April 1682, passim Fs. 57r-59r; 
Rule and Trotter, A World of Paper, 361. 
43 
Gloriosa (known colloquially as ai frari).21 The Venetian Reverend-Father General of the 
Franciscans, Vincenzo Coronelli, a long-time associate of Estrées, leant the cardinal his 
chambers in the monastery. Residing in a space beyond the embassy allowed Estrées more easily 
to maintain his incognito status. Moreover, the position of the frari in the heart of Venice with its 
proximity to the ducal palace facilitated negotiations the cardinal undertook with the savvio del 
consiglio, Benedetto Cappello. Estrées negotiated foreign policy too at Cappello’s bedside in his 
home when Cappello’s gout made travel impossible for him.22  
Beyond the embassy ambassadors participated in state functions like the festa della sensa 
during which the annual sposalizio del mare – marriage of the sea – occurred. Dogal feasts, 
public processions, and the celebrations surrounding Christmas took ambassadors to the Basilica 
of San Marco, the doge’s palace, and onto the ducal gondola or bucintore.23 For Louis XIV it 
was to be understood that French ambassadors outranked all others at these events save the papal 
nuncio.24 Attendance at state functions allowed the diplomat access to the doge, senators, fellow 
foreign envoys, and government officials affording opportunities to collect and pass intelligence.  
Individual ambassadors thrived in different contexts. The ministers informally mingled 
often wearing masks with Venetian patricians to avoid the censure of either party. The Bishop of 
Beziers attended private gatherings and enjoyed the company of women whereas the Sieur de la 
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Haye preferred going to mass routinely.25 Both attended public operas.26 None of the 
ambassadors’ sources explicitly mentioned opera houses as locations for the collection of 
information or unofficial negotiation. Neither did they mention the politically themed elements 
of Venetian operas although recent scholarly work indicates that opera houses were undeniably 
political spaces.27  
Operas were dedicated to ambassadors during geopolitical turbulence in which Venice 
aligned with different European states. During the last decade of the Candian War, for example, 
Venice regarded Louis XIV as a potential ally against the Turks. The librettist and owners of the 
theater San Luca dedicated the opera La Dori to the Bishop of Beziers on 1 January 1663.28 Later 
in the early 1680s, when Venetians entered into an alliance with Leopold I and shunned French 
ambassador Amelot, German princes were frequent opera dedicatees.29 Additionally, one of the 
franchises accorded to French ambassadors in 1664 and thereafter was the privilege to rent boxes 
in any of the city’s opera and commedia theaters.30 This might seem like a hospitable gesture. 
Given the political nature of Venice's seventeenth-century opera houses and operatic narratives, 
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27 Dennis Romano, "Why Opera? The Politics of an Emerging Genre,"in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
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Venetian Opera, 89, n. 50. 
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Venise,” in Duron, 23; Selfridge-Field, 155. 
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and the close surveillance of ambassadors in general, designated boxes provided confidenti of the 
inquisitors of state other means to supervise diplomats. That the doges drew lots for the 
allocation of boxes for ambassadors to guard against problems of precedence too demonstrated 
the political associations entertainments carried.31 
No discussion of Venice would be complete without reference to carnevale.32 There are 
only limited descriptions of the events associated with carnevale in their papers, but ambassadors 
made numerous references to the celebrations and the many foreign princes and dignitaries 
drawn to the city for them.33 Carnevale provided ambassadors with opportunities to engage with 
Italian princelings like the Duke of Mantua and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The atmosphere of 
the carnevale afforded French diplomats a brief respite from the constraints that spatial and 
ceremonial restrictions imposed upon them, and Venice’s culture of the mask would have freed 
ambassadors from the restraints of their formal duties.34 
The sanctioned space of diplomatic negotiation in Venice was the palazzo ducale 
specifically the sala del collegio. It was only with the collegio that ambassadors officially 
interacted.35 The palazzo’s physical spaces have been described elsewhere; suffice it to say they 
were hard to access. Ambassadors did not have freedom of movement in the doge’s palace; for 
an ambassador to enter he either had to be invited or to request audience.36 Pages and secretaries 
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relayed messages between the Venetian government and the French embassy.37 Ambassadors 
and their secretaries included originals or copies in dispatches. Ambassadors informed Louis 
XIV that it irritated the collegio if they requested secretaries to come to the embassy, and, unlike 
in France, there was no Venetian minister of foreign affairs with whom ambassadors 
communicated on a more informal basis.38 Diplomats asked to address the collegio for a range of 
issues: to present and negotiate complaints or propositions regarding commercial and foreign 
policy; to announce royal births, deaths, and marriages; and to vaunt international events such as 
military victories.  
The collegio utilized restricted access to avoid thorny decisions and to alienate 
ambassadors in heated diplomatic moments. Michel Amelot and César d’Estrées noted that the 
Venetians refused or delayed sending secretaries to them or to receive theirs during turbulent 
circumstances.39 Others, like Bonsy and la Haye recorded punctually their rather more frequent 
audiences and alleged private discourse with doges during ceremonies. These details 
demonstrated to Louis XIV individual capacities to maneuver within the Venetian political 
system and ambassadors’ skills of persuasion and sociability.40 Moreover, ambassadors 
contended with the long absences of the Venetian aristocracy from the city from 12 June to the 
end of August. They exited the city again on the 4 October until early November. During these 
periods patricians resided in their terraferma villas to escape the heat and humidity of the lagoon 
                                               
37 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, 259r. Ambassadors sent their pages to the 
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38 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, F. 259r. 
39 See the subjects of Chapters 4 and 6 for fuller discussions of these issues. 
40 Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, 351. 
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while overseeing the harvest on their estates.41 They returned just before the beginning of 
carnival the 10 December. 
The last formal interaction ambassadors had in Venice was the audience de congé –
taking leave. When an ambassador finished his tenure in the republic he took leave of the 
Venetian government in the sala del collegio. In a ceremony similar to the entrée, ambassadors 
read speeches of departure. At the end of the ceremony the ambassador received a golden chain 
and a letter of congé from the collegio.42 He then departed. Normally a departing ambassador 
awaited the arrival of his replacement who remained incognito until the next entrée. The 
departing ambassador apprized his successor of the points of protocol - les formes ordinaires - 
requisite in the city. Additionally, the outgoing ambassador informed the new envoy of relevant 
information for negotiation providing - or bequeathing - the names of trusted informants.43 
Domestic Arrangements: Ambassadors, Households, and Individual Experience in Venice  
 
  French ambassadors' households in Venice varied in size and the types of staff each 
included. The rank of the diplomat did not necessarily affect the size and dynamic of his 
household and staff. Of the five, three were ecclesiastics and two were drawn from the noblesse 
de robe. Ambassadors-ecclesiastic were unmarried, whereas, Michel Amelot's wife accompanied 
him to the republic, and Denis II de la Haye had wive(s) and children in the embassy with him. 
The sources communicate that both of these ministers' French wives detested life in Venice away 
from the court and Paris.44 Only Venetian spies' reports record that Amelot's consort was 
                                               
41 Francesco Monicelli, Ville Venete: The Villa Civilization in the Mainland Dominion (Verona, Italy: Arsenale 
Editrice, 2005), 17. 
42 See AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 110, Amelot to Louis XIV, 20 Jan. 1684, F. 408r. Amelot noted that his gold chain 
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43 Benoit Maréchaux, “L’Impossible Alliance: L’Ambassade Extraordinaire du Cardinal D’Estrées à Venise (Janv.-
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44 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Badoer to state inquisitors, 2 Sept. 1685. 
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allegedly involved in espionage and that she played the organ.45 La Haye's second wife, Catarina 
Groppo, an Italian, was the widow of the Signor Beatiano, a spy for the French; the links 
between ambassadors and the world of espionage became closely enterwined.  
 Of the sources I surveyed, only the Bishop of Beziers provided a summary of the 
members of his suite. Detractors in Venice and Paris accused the bishop of being parsimonious 
in his service to the king, but he defended himself with a detailed list of his staff. The Liste des 
Domestiques de Monseigneur l'Evesque de Beziers, Ambassadeur de S. M. à Venise, recorded 
that forty-one individuals worked at the embassy: 
    A chamberlain……………1 
    2 Secretaries……………...2 
    An under secretary……….1 
    2 clerics………...………...2 
    An equerry……………….1 
  A Maistre d’hostel……….1 
  2 chamber valets…………2 
  1 Tailor….……………….1 
  1 Surgeon….……………..1 
  4 Pages…………………...4 
  2 Little Turks.……………2 
  8 footmen……..…….……8 
  2 Swiss guards……….…..2 
  2 Cooks…..………….…...2 
  A kitchen page……..…….1 
  2 Someliers………………2 
  Eight Gondoliers…………8 
                                            4146 
 
Bonsy boasted that he paid for more domestics than any French ambassador to Venice “in the 
last thirty years.”47 Other ambassadors did not leave such accounts. Michel Amelot, however, 
                                               
45 ASV, IS-AF, Busta 153, state inquisitors to Foscarini, 2 April 1683.  
46 BnF, MC, vol. 126bis, Liste des Domestiques de Monseigneur l’Evesque de Beziers, Ambassadeur de S. M. à 
Venise, Beziers to Colbert, 20 Dec. 1664, F. 506r. Bonsy and later, Amelot, commented on their gondolieri. In the 
Venetian context gondolieri became close associates of their employers. Misson remarked that they knew all of the 
secret places of Venice and how to get to them. They could be paid to do any job no matter how onerous, and they 
often formed a sort of bodyguard. Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 247; 
47 BnF, MC, vol. 126bis, Beziers to Colbert, 503r-503v. It appears the bishop’s household in Venice exceeded the 
norm for seventeenth-century French aristocrats that averaged “between twenty and thirty servants.” Such excess 
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noted in 1683 that he employed six gondoliers.48 This being the case, I deduce that each 
ambassador’s household varied in size and dynamic but included probably no fewer than forty-
one people. Ambassadors also purchased and paid for the upkeep of at least two if not more 
stately gondolas for transportation.49 
  It is clear that each diplomat maintained at least one secretary who wrote dispatches and 
organized the details of the ambassadors’ households. Secretaries also facilitated the clandestine 
acquisition of intelligence.50 Scholars of early modern diplomacy have commented on the 
importance and problematic nature of ambassadors’ secretaries.51 Michel Amelot’s secretary, 
Roger de Piles, became a target for the Venetian senate’s ire as there was ample proof that he 
organized a contreband ring paying spies for the collection of Venetian state secrets.52 Besides 
the French secretaries who accompanied and served them, ministers who did not speak Italian 
employed Italian secretaries. Amelot in particular did not speak Italian, and he included an 
Italian secretary, Signor Bartolomeo Franceschini, among his household.53 The other 
ambassadors all either spoke Italian fluently or employed a translator without mentioning him.  
A noteworthy minister working in Venice with whom ambassadors interacted was the 
French consul. Consuls theoretically mitigated and facilitated French commercial interests in the 
city and states belonging to Venice, but during the embassies of Bonsy and Estrades the consul 
appeared more as a functionary and advisor with access to the knowledge of the formes 
                                                                                                                                                       
may have been employed for diplomatic prestige. Dennis Romano, Housecraft and Statecraft: Domestic Service in 
Renaissance Venice, 1400-1600 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), xx.  
48 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan, 1683, 262v; Many of Amelot’s troubles with the 
government revolved around the actions of his gondoliers. See Chapter 4. 
49 Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 249. 
50 Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 93-94. 
51 Ibid., 92-93; Rule and Trotter, A World of Paper, 363. 
52 See Chapter 3. 
53 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Mémoire servant seulement pour éclaircir quelques dates et details dont Mons. 
Foscarini n’a pas ésté bien instruit, sent in dispatch of Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, Fs. 261v-262r. Amelot 
paid Franceschini one-thousand livres per annum for his services besides foodstuffs. AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 109, 
Amelot to Louis XIV, 8 July 1684, F. 223r.  
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ordinaires - as seventeenth-century diplomats called protocol - and as attaché in the interims 
between ambassadors in residence.54 Throughout the 1660s and 1670s the French consul in 
Venice was Paul Vedoa. Ambassadors in Venice considered themselves superior to the consul as 
the example of Michel Amelot indicated; Amelot included Vedoa among the members of his 
household as well as Monsieur Comel, the vice-consul.55  
The relationship between Louis XIV’s ambassadors and the consul changed, however, in 
the 1680s. Denis de la Haye-Vantelet and Consul Jean-Guillaume Le Blond collaborated almost 
as equals. The nature of this collaboration reflected the elevation of consuls as consequential 
ministers in the French ministry of the marine serving similar functions as the ambassador for the 
secretary of the marine.56 From 1688 onward, ambassadors and consuls in Venice worked in 
tandem updating ministers in Louis XIV’s conseil d’en haut of political and commercial affairs 
from Venice and the Mediterranean. The shift in their relationship, as I argue farther along, 
reflected the rise and entrenchment of louisquatorzien bureaucratic practice beyond the borders 
of the kingdom.  
From their correspondence the personal lives of these five men and the pressures the 
office and the environment exerted upon them became clear. The difficult requirements of the 
role of ambassador, namely to represent, mediate, and negotiate, emerge through their frequent 
communications with Louis XIV and the ministers of foreign affairs. Beyond their official tasks, 
however, emotional and physiological experiences in Venice stood out. These men benefitted 
from the king’s call to serve, but it also battered them.   
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56 See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of this shift. 
51 
Although not every ambassador mentioned personal struggles, some left strong 
indications. The young Abbé Jean-François d’Estrades described homesickness. In January 1677 
Estrades wrote to Cardinal d’Estrées, “I do not mind seeing the snowy streets here as they 
remind me of those in Paris; I must admit that I would be overjoyed if I could but hope to return 
there as soon as your Eminence will.”57 Estrades maintained a regular correspondence with his 
father, the Marshal d’Estrades suggesting his close ties with his family. Homesickness was not 
the only hardship. There is also evidence that Estrades’s nostalgia may have resulted from 
lovesickness. The Marquise d’Uxelles wrote the young abbé that she heard of the magnificence 
of his entrée into Venice adding the cryptic verse: “but lost is the time/ that one does not spend 
loving.”58 Ambassadors may have faced loneliness as free conversation was restricted between 
ambassadors and most Venetians, as Maximilien Misson remarked in 1688, “what hardness, that 
a Government cannot be happy without destroying the connections and the communication of 
Society, these are among the most tender things in life!”59 Furthermore, Estrades faced the death 
of his brother in battle while la Haye experienced the death of a partner.60 Adding to the 
emotional fatigue of their tasks, Venetian ambassadors in France occasionally harassed the 
French ambassador’s family members. This was the case with Michel Amelot whose mother at 
the French court was threatened with her son’s ultimate ruin if she did not pressure him to 
change his attitude toward the Venetian government.61 
                                               
57 BnF, CL, vol. 585, Estrades to Estrées, 16 Jan. 1677, F. 32r. 
58 BnF, CL, vol. 584, the Marquise d’Uxelles to Estrades, 12 May 1676, F. 199r. 
59 Misson, Letter XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 254, see Ibid., 235 as added evidence of how foreigners were 
avoided. Colbert de Torcy, Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Sieur de Pomponne, in Du Parc,147. 
60 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Pomponne to Estrades, 6 Jan. 1678, F. 7v; The senate condoled with Estrades, BnF, 
CL, vol. 585, senate to Estrades, 4 June 1678. Le Mercure Galant, Février 1690 (Paris: Galerie Neuve du Palais), 
238-239. 
61 ASV, IS-DAF, Busta 437, Foscarini to state inquisitors, [date unclear] early 1683. 
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Aside from loss, nostalgia, and threats ambassadors dealt with illness. The humid climate 
of the Republic of Venice was considered insalubrious, and ambassadors commented that it was 
necessary to exit the city occasionally for their health.62 Adding to the pressure was the 
knowledge that the Venetian government considered an ambassador’s departure for illness or 
religious contemplation, even for short periods, as indications of nefarious activities.63 Both la 
Haye and the Cardinal d’Estrées were septuagenarians, and their health concerns figured in their 
dispatches. Not surprisingly gout and the infirmities of age were noted in these two ambassadors’ 
correspondence. La Haye begged the king to allow him to retire in 1700 after serving in various 
posts for forty years.64 Estrées, in particular, mentioned that he could not walk and take stairs as 
well he used to. Gout afflicted his right hand affecting his writing that the tortured script of his 
letters confirmed.65  
Other facets of ambassadors’ lived experience included moments of respite from their 
tasks. Ambassadors mentioned the hunt, promenades, soirées, and religious retreats to the shrine 
of the Madonna di Loretto.66 Ambassadors shopped. They purchased gifts for patrons, friends, 
and family back in France.67 Despite royal legislation forbidding the purchase and entry of 
Venetian glass into France after the 1665 establishment of the royal glass manufactury, Amelot 
and la Haye remarked that they purchased quality Venetian mirrors and glassware for family 
                                               
62 See BnF, CL, vol. 584, Estrades to Senate, 19 Sept. 1676, F. 387r; BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to 
Estrades, 5 Nov. 1677, F. 695r. In his history, Saint-Didier spent one chapter describing and commenting on the 
remarkable character of Venice’s difficult “air”. Saint-Didier, La Ville et la république de Venise au XVIIè siècle, 
84-85, 86, 86; Venice’s weather and acqua alta contributed not only to problems of health but also to to the 
expedition of information, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 111, la Haye to Louis XIV, Fs, 116v-117r. Misson did not exactly 
agree with Saint-Didier on the point as he said some Venetians lived long lives, bad air notwithstanding. Misson, 
234. 
63 Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, Tome II, 536. 
64 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 129, la Haye to Louis XIV, 25 May 1700, Fs. 171v-172r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 129, la 
Haye to Torcy, 25 May 1700, Fs. 173r-174v. Louis XIV accorded the retirement, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 129, 15 
June 1700, F. 175r. La Haye did not depart for France until September 1701; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 122. 
65 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 135, Estrées to Torcy, [exact day unclear] Sept. 1702, F. 332v.  
66 Misson, Lettre XVIII, à Lorette 26 Février 1688, 307. 
67 Roosen, 178. 
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members or patrons.68 The ambassadors likewise collected Venetian artwork, books, textiles, and 
gondolas.69 Acquisitions and the upkeep of their households and health cost them. Ministers’ 
finances added constraints to their tasks and comfort.    
The Cost of Serving Louis XIV in Venice 
The everyday costs of functioning in a foreign environment as an ambassador were many. 
The requisite outlay for pomp and the collection of information from informants added to 
everyday expenses.70 Venetian patricians often refused their election as ambassadors precisely 
because of the immense finances required. They were either fined or exiled ignominiously for 
refusing the call of civic duty.71 The ambassadors of Louis XIV to Venice, however, did not turn 
down the king’s nomination to the embassy with the hope of augmenting their prestige in the 
aristocratic hierarchy and their personal fortunes through later rewards.72  
French ambassadors used their own incomes and the stipends paid them from the Crown 
to survive in their posts. A precise reconstruction of the income and outlay of ambassadors in 
Venice is difficult. It is possible, however, to note that annual stipends from the Crown began at 
eight thousand écus in 1662 and remained relatively unchanged at twenty-four thousand livres in 
                                               
68 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Mémoire servant seulement pour éclaircir quelques dates et details dont Monsr. 
Foscarini n’a pas ésté bien instruit, sent in dispatch of Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, F. 263r; AAE, CP, 
Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to the Marquis d’Arès, 28 Feb. 1688, F. 56r; Saint-Didier, La Ville et la République de 
Venise, 22, Misson, Lettre XVIII, à Venise 15 Février 1688, 277 
69 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Mémoire servant seulement pour éclaircir quelques dates et details dont Monsr. 
Foscarini n’a pas ésté bien instruit, sent in dispatch of Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, F. 263r.  
70 In an age when “baroque representations of power” demonstrated authority, ambassadors were ridiculed if they 
lived frugally. Picavet, "La 'Carrière' Diplomatique en France," 398; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 87; Rule and 
Trotter, A World of Paper, 361; Giovanni Careri, Baroques (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 151. A 
prime example was the papal nuncio, Pompeo Varese, in Paris from 1676-1678. Varese was stingy and lived 
shabbily contributing to the failure of his embassy as he appeared disrespectful to Louis XIV.  Bruno Neveu, “Un 
Rival de l’Avare : Le nonce Varèse à Paris (1676-1678),” Journal des Savants, no. 1 (1982), 59-60. 
71 Andrea Zannini, “Economic and social aspects of the crisis of Venetian diplomacy in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries,” in Frigo, 118, 121-122. 
72 Roosen, 126. 
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1698.73 The government paid stipends erratically in the 1660s, but by the close of the century 
they were paid biannually. Ambassadors sometimes received advances before their departure to 
purchase necessary furnishings for the embassy.74 It is telling that the Bishop of Beziers and the 
Abbé d’Estrades wrangled with Jean-Baptiste Colbert to receive the installments of the stipends 
owing them and the pressures this placed upon their own personal finances.75 Repaying the 
expenditures they accrued in Venice troubled them; although neither ambassador fully specified 
what each of these costs entailed.  
One expense was the rental of the embassy. According to Consul Vedoa, Bonsy paid 
seven hundred livres annually for the building.76 The bishop defended himself to Colbert against 
accusations that he was unwilling to use his personal fortune to pay for the expenses accrued in 
the king’s service. He claimed “there has not been an ambassador of the king who lived with 
more magnificence and expense in all things than myself: be it at table, furnishings, livery of 
gondolas and the number of domestics.” He allegedly paid for all of this from his personal 
income to the tune of seven thousand écus annually as he waited for the Crown stipend.77 
Estrades allegedly ruined himself in debts to Venetian bankers as he fought for the conferral of 
                                               
73 Bonsy was the first ambassador posted to Venice during Louis XIV’s “personal rule.” The post had been vacant 
since early 1661. Bonsy remarked to Colbert that he would like to receive the same sum of eight thousand écus as 
his predecessor, the Archbishop d’Embrun. BnF, MC, vol. 109, Beziers to Colbert, 10 June 1662, F. 205r; In 1692 la 
Haye made 24,000 livres per annum. AAE, MD, France, vol. 45, Éstats des Appointments des Ministres Éstrangers 
pour les 6 derniers mois de l’année 1692, Fs. 100r; La Haye drew the same sum in 1698, AAE, MD, vol. 305, 1698, 
[untitled], F. 171r; AAE, Comptabilité, Finances du Ministère, vol. 1, En 1698 les ambassadeurs que le feu Roy 
tenoit dans les Cours Étrangères avoient les appointments marquez cy après, F. 9r. 
74 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108 supplément, Ordre de 8,000 Livres pour le Sr. Amelot nommé ambassadeur de Venise 
pour son immeublement, 26 Janv. 1682, F. 11r. 
75 For examples of their financial difficulties with Colbert see the following, BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades 
to Estrades, 5 Nov. 1677, F. 691; BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 18 March 1678, F. 833.  
76 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 81 supplément, Vedoa to Lionne, 16 Feb, 1665, F. 52r. Vedoa reported that the Savoyard 
ambassador occupied the embassy briefly until a new French ambassador arrived there. The ambassador of Savoy 
paid one thousand two hundred and fifty livres for the palazzo. Ibid. 
77 BnF, MC, vol. 126bis, Beziers to Colbert, 20 Dec. 1664, Fs. 503r-503v. 
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the income of the abbacy of Moissac from the pope.78 That I am aware, later ambassadors, - 
Amelot, la Haye, and Estrées - expressed less financial concerns than Bonsy and Estrades.79  
Funds sent to the ambassadors and consuls in Venice were expedited as letters of credit 
that they delivered to Venetian bankers in exchange for ducats.80 In Venice the ambassadors used 
the bank of the signori GioGalli, Samelli, and Piatti. Piatti’s bank was continuously used until 
the end of the century to provide credit.81 From the funds exchanged ambassadors certainly paid 
the members of the embassy household and for necessary supplies. Ambassadors and consuls 
also used these funds to secure spies and informants who provided political and military secrets 
relayed to the court.82  
Money was not the only currency ambassadors used to reimburse their households. 
Michel Amelot recorded that he paid staff members with the wine and flour that he accessed 
through the privileges of the franchises.83 The wine and bread of Venice were apparently so 
                                               
78 See Chapter 2 for an analysis of how Estrades’s financial concerns influenced his work. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-
Simon and the Court of Louis XIV, 206. Estrées, however, had already faced financial distress earlier in the 1680s in 
diplomatic service in Rome. How and if his personal finances ameliorated by 1701 remains unclear. Saint-Simon 
reported at his death in 1714 that Estrées had no debts, but Pelletier notes that this may not have been the case. 
Monique Pelletier, “Scientific Connections, Ambitions and Financial Difficulties of the D’Estrées Family,” Globe 
Studies, no. 55/56, Papers, Read at the 11th Symposium, Venice 2007, and other contributions (2009 (for 
2007/2008), 158-159.  
79 La Haye asked for his stipend in 1688 after lacking it for three years, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to 
Louis XIV, Fs. 15v-16r. This was the last mention of income in the volumes of dispatches I read. 
80 For mention of the bills of exchange see: BnF, MC, vol. 121bis, copy of a bill of exchange from the notary 
Angelo Maria Piccino attesting to the exchange of twenty-five thousand écus through the bank of GioGalli, Samelli, 
and Piatti, notarized 6 June 1664, sent from Beziers to Colbert, F. 1000r; AN, MA, B1 Venise, vol. 2, la Haye to 
Seignelay, 5 June 1688, F. 70v. 
81 Bonsy was the first to name these Venetian bankers. BnF, MC, vol. 121bis, Beziers to du Pont de Saint Pierre, 7 
June 1664, F. 997r; In 1688 the consul, Le Blond, and Ambassador la Haye spoke of Giovanni Piatti still as banker 
to the French. AN, MA, B1, Venise, vol. 2, Le Blond to Seignelay, 27 March 1688, F. 37r; AN, MA, B1, Venise, vol. 
2, la Haye to Seignelay, 5 June 1688, F. 70v. 
82
 For evidence that Crown salaries were used to pay spies and informants see: AN, MA, B1, vol. 2, Le Blond to 
Seignelay, 1 May 1688, 45r-45v; Roosen, “The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV,” 319-320; Bély, 
Espions et Ambassadeurs, 98-99. 
83 For a full description of the controversial franchises ambassadors received in Venice see: AAE, MD, vol. 45, 
Venise, Des droits et prérogatives utiles, 1664, F. 180r-180v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Mémoire servant 
seulement pour éclaircir quelques dates et details dont Monsr. Foscarini n’a pas ésté bien instruit, sent in dispatch 
of Amelot to Louis XIV, 26 Jan. 1683, Fs. 261v-262r, 262v, 263v. Amelot claimed he fed the gondolieri “day and 
night” through the franchises. 
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“disgusting” to foreign ambassadors that they were spared the horror. Misson noted that 
Venetian wines were “terribly disagreeable” and of the bread that the “paste was so hard...that 
you had to break it like biscuits, thumping it like a hammer.”84 The franchises allowing 
ambassadors to import better wine and flour for their tables benefited their domestics too.  
Amelot allocated ten barrels of wine and thirty sacks of flour each to the consul, Le 
Blond, and vice-consul, Comel. Additionally, he gave his six gondolieri each twenty-four sacks 
of flour and one hogshead of wine. Sometimes servants in turn sold these goods illegally to 
augment their income.85 The acquisition and distribution of the commodities allowed as 
franchises became a source of tension for Amelot and other foreign ambassadors as the Venetian 
government frequently alleged that they abused these privileges for lucre. In Amelot’s case, the 
abuse was real. The fallout regarding the ambassador’s misuse of diplomatic privilege and the 
violence of his gondolieri formed a considerable portion of his official correspondence.86   
The Culture of Diplomatic Correspondence and Types of Intelligence 
Lucien Bély remarked when one approaches diplomatic correspondence to beware “that 
it can drag on.”87 It is only by closely following ambassadors’ long and often personal 
correspondence, however, that one can become acquainted with them as distinct individuals and, 
                                               
84 Misson, Lettre XVII, à Venise 14 Février 1688, 235. Misson opined that he was luckily treated and ate well in 
Venice’s “Auberges Françaises.” Ibid. 
85 Saint-Didier remarked that French domestics had often been the most heinous offenders in this “sordid” trade. 
Saint-Didier, La Ville et la république de Venise au XVIIè siècle, 251. 
86 Although the embassy of the Seigneur de Charmont is not analyzed in this work, it is relevant to note that 
Charmont returned from Venice in shame in 1704 after being caught illegally using the privileges of the franchises 
to bolster his own fortune. See Colbert de Torcy, Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Sieur Abbé de Pomponne, in 
Du Parc, passim 140-145; Picavet, "La 'Carrière' Diplomatique," 407. 
87 Lucien Bély, interview by author, Paris, France, Paris IV: La Sorbonne, 4 Oct. 2012. His caveat soon made sense 
to me. There are fifty-six volumes of dispatches and supplemental correspondence from Venice alone between the 
years 1662 to 1702 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ correspondance politique. I read thoroughly twenty-three 
volumes of communication from the five ministers examined here. Each of these volumes ranged normally from two 
hundred to six hundred recto-verso folios. Excluded from these are the various volumes of administrative papers and 
documentary mémoires contained in the same archive’s Mémoires et documents. Beyond the official volumes in the 
foreign affairs archives, I read personal correspondence at the Bibliothèque nationales. Additionally, the Archives 
nationales contain the communications of ambassadors and consuls with the secretaries of the marine.  
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as Gordon Craig opined, “only someone who is insensitive to the role of the individual in history 
could be bored by this kind of literature.”88 The matters discussed in correspondence revealed 
that ambassadors relayed a wide range of information to the court.89 Four areas of 
communication stood out: Internal Information, External Information, Practical Information, 
and Information of Potential Interest. First, what I refer to as Internal Information related to 
knowledge ambassadors relayed concerning the Republic of Venice itself. Information regarding 
the republic internally and its foreign policies was the ambassador's primary concern.90 This 
information regarded the internal socio-political, military-naval, and economic-industrial 
institutions of the republic. Internal Information included important points vis-a-vis the Venetian 
government's foreign relations and policies towards European powers such as the Holy Roman 
Emperor, the popes, Italian and German princes, the Ottomans, the Knights of Malta, the 
Republic of Ragusa, and Louis XIV. Ambassadors reported their alleged interactions with the 
Venetian doge and senate sending along copies of responses or complaints from the senate to 
their inquiries and concerns.91 Additionally, the senate’s commentaries upon the deaths of royal 
family members, military victories, and royal births figure in this category. If the Venetian senate 
published laws that might be of particular interest copies were sent to France.92  
                                               
88 Craig, “On the Pleasure of Reading Diplomatic Correspondence,” Journal of Contemporary History 26 (1992), 
382. I add that carefully read diplomatic correspondence reveals the personality of the writer. It became clear early 
on, for example, that the Bishop of Beziers had a robust sense of humor tinging his political reportage with Italian 
witticisms. In the letters of the novice Abbé d’Estrades the fear of professional and financial ruin surfaced. 
Similarly, anxiety over personal safety, psychological insecurities, and anger emerged in the dispatches of Michel 
Amelot. The exhaustion of age, constant fatigue, and a sincere devotion to Louis XIV materialized in the writings of 
La Haye and Estrées. Such detail peppers the pages of official intelligence.     
89 Roosen delineated three categories of information ambassadors were to send: “personal,” “military,” and 
“miscellaneous.” I do not believe that these three categories describe adequately the Venetian context. For Roosen, 
for example, personal information referred to the lives of prominent political actors. In my estimation such news 
belongs in the internal socio-cultural and political institutions of the state. Roosen, “The Functioning of 
Ambassadors under Louis XIV,” 316-317, 318; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 129, 143. 
90  Roosen, 315. 
91 Each of the following five chapters provides ample evidence of this. 
92 For example see AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 97, Proclama Publicato d’Ordine dell’Illustriss. et Eccellentiss. Signori 
Sopra Provveditori alle Biave, De 15 Febraio 1676, In Materia, che non si possi vender, ne comprar Pane, cosi 
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The second category, External Information, comprised relevant news and points of 
interest ambassadors acquired regarding the states surrounding Venice. The Ottoman Empire was 
one example. Ambassadors regularly communicated with their counterparts in Constantinople 
waiting for and then sending along packets of dispatches and letters from the ministers there 
along with their own.93 In Venice, ambassadors learned much about the geopolitical aims of the 
Viennese and Roman courts, the Duke of Mantua, the Knights of Malta, Polish kings, and 
various German princes visiting the republic. This list is in no way exhaustive, but it illustrates 
the wealth of international intelligence ambassadors relayed. Both Internal and External 
Information were linked, but they were distinct types of classified intelligence as close reading of 
the sources confirms. 
Third, unlike the categories above, Practical Information was not necessarily classified. 
Ambassadors sent along reports, memos, and mémoires that they or others wrote concerning 
information not directly linked to politics. Some detailed the ministers' impressions of the 
Venetian people while others outlined items such as international weights and measures, current 
international exchange rates, and prices for commodities in Italy like grain and hay.94 Finally, 
Information of Potential Interest, delineated intelligence that provided the Ludovician 
bureaucracy insight into foreign socio-political and cultural perspectives and attitudes. 
Ambassadors collected and sent letters that Venetian subjects favorable to Louis XIV wanted 
                                                                                                                                                       
Forestiero, come Fabbricato in questa Città, fuori delle pistoie ordinarie, sent in dispatch from Estrades to 
Pomponne, 12 Feb. 1676, Fs. 63r-64r. 
93 For evidence of this see, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 13 March 1683, F. 313r. 
94 I note only a small range of the ample literature here. Bonsy sent a record of exchange rates in Venice, BnF, MC, 
vol. 121bis, In Venetia, Adì 6 Giugno 1664 - Ieri Dì, sent in dispatch from Beziers to Monsieur du Pont de Saint 
Pierre, 7 June 1664, F. 999r. The bishop added a discussion relative to the purchase of grain in Venice. This made 
sense given the passage of French troops through its lands, BnF, MC, vol. 119, Mémoire du Prix, poids, et mésure 
des bleds de l’Estat de Venise envoye au Sieur Robert par Monsieur l’Evesque de Beziers, Le 6 Février 1664, F. 
255bis; Relative to the franchises of flour in Venice, Estrades sent the following: AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 98, 
Mémoire sur la nouveauté que le magistrat qui a l’intendance des grains en cette ville a voulu éstablir a l’égard du 
privilège qu’ont Les ministres des Princes de faire vendre du pain du fonzine, sent in dispatch of Estrades to 
Pomponne, 6 March 1677, Fs. 45r-47v. 
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delivered to the king. Some asked to be made knights of Saint Michel while others asked if they 
could name their son after the king. Newly printed or as-yet-unpublished political pamphlets, 
histories, or tracts that demonstrated the prevailing geopolitical mood in Venice or Italy were 
sent along95 At times Venetian subjects wrote histories of France dedicating them to Louis XIV 
or the Dauphin. They expedited complimentary copies and letters of introduction by way of 
ambassadors to the court. These writers received a letter of thanks from the dedicatee, a small 
sum of money, and the occasional diamond for their trouble.96 Included in all of these categories, 
however, were pieces of information acquired through the extensive intelligence networks 
ambassadors spearheaded. 
Ambassadors as Intelligence “Case Officers” 
 The chapters that follow illustrate the importance of espionage to ambassadors.97 Not 
every ambassador proved adept at managing webs of intrigue. Becoming a master "case officer" 
was challenging.98 Of the ambassadors examined, those with prior experience, Bonsy, la Haye, 
and Estrées demonstrated patience and discretion in this role. Dealing with sensitive information 
and “intelligence agents” providing information demanded exposure to the process of espionage 
and its contingencies. F. M. Begoum, a former trainer of CIA agents, observed “a human being 
in a stress situation is a complicated personality, and the interviewing officer must penetrate 
                                               
95 Two such examples were a book and pamphlet Amelot sent. See: AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108, Compendio del 
Libro intitolato La Bilancia di Marte overo Ragione per le quali la Serenissima Republica di Venezia deve 
Stringersi l’Alleanza con l’Augustissima Casa, 1682, sent from Amelot to Louis XIV in Dec. 1682, passim Fs. 127r-
150v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108, Discorso per la confederazione della Serenissima Republica di Venetia con 
l’Augustissima Casa e Suoi Alleati, passim Fs. 145r-150r; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 149; Levillain, Vaincre 
Louis XIV, 31. 
96 See the following for one such exchange: AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Estrades to Pomponne, 23 Jan. 1677, F. 19r; 
AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Pomponne to Estrades, 24 Feb. 1677, F. 40v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Estrades to 
Pomponne, 5 June 1677, Fs. 128r-128v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Pomponne to Estrades, 9 June 1677, F. 130r.  
97 Roosen, “The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV,” 319; Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 116-117. 
98 A case officer is considered to be an intelligence agent who leads, organizes, and collects information gleaned in 
a system of espionage. Based upon the ambassadors’ correspondence I have read, I contend that seventeenth-century 
ambassadors’ were expected to fulfill this more recently defined role. F. M. Begoum, “Observations on the Double 
Agent,” Studies in Intelligence Journal, 1962 (Declassified and released 18 Sept. 1995), 61. 
60 
below the surface, sensing the man’s emotions and mental processes.”99 Seventeenth-century 
ambassadors were undoubtedly no different. Their roles demanded a proficiency in penetrating 
below the surface of the intentions of their many informants. 
It could be argued that the inexperienced Abbé d'Estrades demonstrated subtlety as a 
"case officer." He managed and protected spies and information with relative ease and genuine 
concern. His financial struggles, however, as discussed in Chapter Six, led him to make a 
number of precipitous personal errors of judgment regarding patrons he believed instrumental to 
his personal advancement. Fear of ruin contributed to the missteps he took by withholding 
sensitive intelligence from the king. Begoum noted, “only timely and full reporting to your 
headquarters will permit it [information] to help you effectively.”100 Estrades learned this before 
it was too late. Ultimately, the secret negotiations he was forced to divulge to the king secured 
him further diplomatic appointments. His skills, despite the personal blunders, paved the way for 
the French purchase of the important enclave of Casale in 1681. 
Michel Amelot was inexperienced in espionage and the sang froid required to manage 
stressful situations out of which intelligence gathering arose. Amelot’s service in Venice was the 
most personally brutal of the five diplomats examined here. His case revealed how diplomacy, 
like most human endeavors, required exposure to circumstance, calm under pressure, and a 
personality adapted to the demands of the particular profession. Amelot was unable to hide from 
the Venetian inquisitors of state the close interpersonal ties he formed with informants and their 
families as well as the illegal means that he and his secretary facilitated to pay them. When this 
shortcoming became problematic vis-a-vis his official role as royal representative, his credit in 
Venice crumbled.  
                                               
99 Begoum, “Observations on the Double Agent,” 61; Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 152-153, 155-156. 
100 Ibid., 61. 
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Amelot tried to mask his insecurities and inexperience by demonstrating an offensive 
haughtiness towards the Venetians. His correspondence suggested an upwardly mobile aristocrat 
self-satisfied in his nomination to the Venetian embassy. It seemed he went to Venice assured of 
his own primacy as Louis XIV’s man.101 When the stressful realities of diplomatic service and 
espionage surfaced he was shocked that the king and Colbert de Croissy left him to suffer the 
fallout of his own mistakes.102 Estrades and Amelot learned that diplomacy required patience and 
circumspection under strain. They became aware that they were relevant to Louis XIV only in so 
far as they facilitated Bourbon dynastic aims through their reportage. Independence of action was 
lauded so long as it succeeded. 
Conclusions 
The examples of Estrades and Amelot prove that Venice could harden novice 
ambassadors. Despite the controversies they faced in Venice, these ambassadors went on to serve 
in other diplomatic posts. The services of the experienced Bonsy, la Haye, and Estrées, however, 
demonstrated that the Republic of Venice continuously merited the presence of highly skilled 
diplomats from the French court. The embassies of Bonsy and Estrées in particular contradicted 
the idea, pace Picavet, that the louisquatorzien foreign ministry only sent robe nobility to 
Venice.103 The tenures of the bishop and the cardinal in the republic, almost like bookends for 
this study, revealed that Venice commanded ambassadors of superior status, high clergy in this 
case, until the dawn of the eighteenth century. As I argue, the Venetian government remained an 
important factor in French-qua-European geopolitics. The formation and ministrations of 
ambassadors in Venice was another crucial facet of this reality. Time spent in the Serenissima 
tested the personal resilience of French ambassadors - experienced or not. 
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I cannot say with certainty whether or not Louis XIV and his secretaries of foreign affairs 
sent some ambassadors to Venice for an “education” in diplomacy and espionage. Amelot de la 
Houssaie had concluded in his history: 
An Embassy in Venice is not ordinarily of great importance for negotiation, as the Senate 
applies all its force to maintain Peace; however, it is the most difficult, as well as the 
most idle, of all [posts], and that which demands the most intelligence, because there one 
treats with Mutes, and one only learns through enigmas. Because of this one calls Venice 
the school and the touch stone of Ambassadors, for it is there that Princes put their 
subjects to the test, to know the just cost [of service].104  
 
Such sources suggest that the king and the foreign ministry understood the Most Serene Republic 
to be a difficult environment capable of sharpening and “professionalizing” ambassadors-cum-
“case officers.” The ministers’ social networks in France and their abilities recommended them; 
Venice’s rough geopolitical climate sharpened them or demanded that they mature. Keeping 
these ideas in mind, the following chapters endeavor to tell the stories of one Italian and four 
French ambassadors representing Louis XIV. 
 
 
  
                                               
104 Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, Tome I, 143. 
63 
PART I: 
 
Structuring Franco-Venetian Diplomacy, 1662-1679 
64 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Fig. 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
Pierre II de Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1662-1665):  
The Fabrication of French Dynastic Prestige from One Mediterranean State  
 
 
  Fig. 7 
 
Venice’s senate presented Louis XIV with a gift. The French ambassador, Pierre II de 
Bonsy, Bishop of Beziers (1631-1703), informed Jean-Baptiste Colbert and Hugues de Lionne 
that the senate offered Paolo Veronese’s Feast in the House of Simon to the king.1 This news 
came at the end of thirteen months of clandestine negotiations on the part of the bishop to 
purchase the master’s painting from the Venetian Servite friars who owned it.2 Other princes 
vied for the canvas, but they could not afford the price tag the indebted friars demanded for it. 
That the republic’s senate requisitioned the piece from the Servites, however, came as a surprise 
to Bonsy and the king.3  
                                               
1 BnF, MC vol. 122, Bonsy to Colbert, 5 July 1664, F. 186r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 85, Bonsy to Lionne, 2 Aug. 
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Louis XIV’s reign.  
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Scholars have discussed some aspects of Venice’s gift to Louis XIV, but none sketched 
fully the political contexts framing the Serenissima’s calculated gesture.4 The giving of gifts was 
a critical part of early modern diplomatic praxis, but it is necessary to understand why the senate 
commanded the friars to sacrifice the costly painting rather than allow its purchase to pay their 
debts to the state.5 The circumstances that brought illegal secret negotiations for a painting into 
the realm of high politics illuminates Franco-Venetian relations at the outset of Louis XIV’s 
personal rule. The episode underscored the relevance of cultural politics in louisquatorzien 
foreign policy just after the death of Cardinal Mazarin to be sure, but it highlighted much more 
than simply the importance of art to Louis XIV’s prestige.   
In particular the senate’s gesture corresponded with its early interactions with Louis XIV 
as he undertook to rule France alone.6 As such, an analysis of Franco-Venetian politics during 
Bonsy’s embassy from 1662 to 1665 adumbrates the relationship between French dynastic 
expansionism that historians have recently explored.7 The growth of louisquatorzien 
centralization depended upon extant domestic and international contexts. The rapport between 
                                               
4 Dumesnil argued Venice offered the painting in exchange for French Gobelin tapestries, but he said no 
correspondence existed to prove his hypothesis. Baschet’s 1868 article parsed the details of the acquisition of the 
painting primarily from the perspective that Louis XIV and Colbert were searching for a Veronese for the royal 
collections. In the 1666 memoir of Michel-Angelo Mariani, secretary of Venetian Ambassador Alvise Grimani, in 
Paris from 1661-1663, Mariani indicated the king’s collection already contained works of Veronese. Marguerite 
Allain-Launay described the transaction most recently. She believed the scandal surrounding the April 1664 “affaire 
des domestiques” of Ambassador Alvise Sagredo prompted the republic’s gift. These studies, while valuable, did not 
consider the complicated web of international and domestic circumstances examined in this chapter. See cited above 
Dumesnil, Histoire des plus célèbres amateurs français et de leurs relations avec les artistes, tome II, Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert (Paris: V. Jules Renouard, 1857), 223; Baschet, “De l’hommage d’un tableau de Paul Veronese que fit a 
Louis XIV la République de Venise en 1664” 282; BnF, LB, vol. 37, 5200, Michel-Angelo Mariani, Il piu curioso e 
memorabile della Francia di Michel-Angelo Mariani all’Illustrissimo, et Eccellentissimo Signor Cavalier Antonio 
Grimani Procurator di S. Marco. Con il sommario degli avvenementi et l’indice delle cose notabili, in Venezia, M. 
DC. LXXIII. Presso Gio:Giacomo Hertz, 111; and Allain-Launay, “Un gage de l’amitié franco-vénitienne,” in Le 
Repas chez Simon, Veronèse: Histoire et restauration d’un chef-d’oeuvre (Paris: Alain de Gourcuff, 1997), 70-71.  
5 Ibid., 61. 
6 Alvise Grimani, Relazione, 1664, in Le relazioni degli stati europei lette al senato dagli ambasciatori veneti nel 
secolo decimosettimo, serie II, vol. III, Francia, eds. Nicolo Barozzi & Guglielmo Berchet (Venice: Naratovich, 
1865), 103; Alvise Sagredo, Relazione, 1666, in Barozzi & Berchet, 132, 147; John B. Wolf, Louis XIV, 184-185; 
Treasure, Mazarin, 259. 
7 Ibid., 48-49; Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 1, 8-9, 48-49, 
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France and the Republic of Venice illuminates the French government’s drive to hegemonize the 
Mediterranean world. Louisquatorzien dynastic politics did not rest solely upon adaptations 
between the crown and domestic elites. It contended with a plurality of sovereign states beyond 
France’s borders whose international engagements acted upon Louis XIV’s foreign policies.  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in relations between France and Venice. These two 
states, moreover, competed in the Mediterranean in regards to their historical attachments to the 
Ottoman Empire. France maintained a privileged commercial relationship with the Turks since 
1536. Over time Franco-Ottoman relations became more complex through commercial and 
diplomatic accommodations.8 But Venice’s rapport with the Turk preceded those of France.9 The 
republic built its wealth upon Mediterranean commerce in conjunction with the Sublime Porte. 
By the time that Louis XIV began to rule, Veneto-Ottoman relations soured. The republic warred 
with Mehmet IV over the island of Crete and, ultimately, for the survival of its stato da mar. 
Louis XIV’s expansion into the Mediterranean and in Italy materialized in the context of the last 
stages of the protracted Candian War (1645-1669).  
The republic’s reputation among European states as a Mediterranean power rested upon 
the struggle for Crete. At the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule Venice believed the young 
monarch might furnish the resources necessary to repulse the Turk in the Mediterranean. 
Venice’s senate lobbied for French support to maintain the island, and in exchange, Louis XIV 
and his ministers gambled on Venetian cooperation in French Italian and Mediterranean 
policies.10 In Italy the king particularly lobbied for Venetian support against the papacy. As 
Bonsy arrived in Venice in 1662 a diplomatic furor raged between the king and Pope Alexander 
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10 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 82, Paul Vedoa to Lionne, 23 April 1661, F 10; AMAE, Venise, vol. 82, Bonsy to Louis 
XIV, 16 Dec. 1662, F 195r. 
68 
VII. Louis and his ministers hoped that Venetian pressure could persuade the pope to bend to 
French demands.  
Louis XIV worked under a dynastic imperative inherited from the late Cardinal Mazarin 
to extend Bourbon authority in opposition to the Habsburgs.11 The lure of dynastic expansion 
and the commerce that could facilitate it motivated the king as the 1660s opened. The 
fragmented Italian peninsula offered one theater where the king tested his strength against 
Habsburg authority.12 French might bore down upon the states of Italy in the fallout of the 
Corsican Guard Affair in Rome wedging Northern Italian princes between Louis XIV and the 
pope. French military advancement into the peninsula menaced Venice’s terraferma possessions 
and incited anxiety that its crisis with the Ottomans might tempt Louis XIV to expand French 
authority in Italy.  
Venice feared French expansion into Italy. To a large degree the Candian War drew the 
attention and resources of Venice’s government away from the peninsula and prompted a 
willingness to mitigate the king’s expansionism rather than provoke his ire in refusing.13 The 
Bishop of Beziers was the vehicle in the republic through which Louis XIV sought 
accommodation for dynastic politics. He was the first ambassador Louis’s government deployed 
to Venice, and his dealings there set the tone for all subsequent interactions between the king and 
Venice’s senate. Bonsy dangled possible French military and financial aid against the Ottomans 
before the senate, and he negotiated Venetian acquiescence in French policies in Italy.14  
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Furthermore, Louis’s emergent international authority depended upon commercial and 
industrial expansionism. The French economy stagnated and fought for survival when the king 
took up the reins of power in 1661. The image of a prosperous and thriving absolutist state 
characterizing France in later decades was yet to materialize as Bonsy arrived in Venice, but his 
role was tied distinctly to the monarchy’s plans for commercial growth. In France, Louis’s 
minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, undertook the revitalization of almost every aspect of the French 
economy. Critical to Colbert’s program was the overhaul of French commercial and maritime 
interests in the Mediterranean. Colbert’s investigations indicated that French interests in the sea 
were severely compromised through the neglect and malfeasance of French consuls and the 
instability of French commercial links with the Ottomans provoked through the ongoing Cretan 
war. The paltry fifty-six French vessels on the seas as Louis’s personal rule began placed the 
kingdom far behind states in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean like the United Provinces, 
England, and Venice. French commercial vessels had little protection then from the Crown, and 
the French navy would have to wait more than a decade before it was adequate enough to 
achieve maritime victories.15 French ministers and consuls around the Mediterranean were 
increasingly to participate in the Crown’s bid to increase commercial enterprises and revenue 
that the sea could afford. 
Louis XIV and the foreign ministry manipulated and avoided responding to the Venetian 
senate’s repeated calls for French aid in the Mediterranean to enhance France’s own relations 
with Mehmet IV. Louis’s administration sought to demonstrate to the Turk that he was unwilling 
to attack France’s time-honored commercial partner in an effort to renew the privileged status of 
the French monarchy and its merchants. Additionally, Colbert set Bonsy the task of industrial 
espionage. The bishop already proved adept at this in his prior service to France in 1661 while in 
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in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Colbert’s program in the early 1660s included the development 
of domestic French luxury industries, and he charged Bonsy with tasks in Venice related to the 
expansion particularly of the French glass and lace industries.  
The bishop facilitated the defection of Venetian artisans and their expertise that helped 
diminish Venice’s “industrial supremacy.”16 Richard Rapp argued that the enervation of 
Venice’s leadership in industries like lace and glass manufacturing contributed more to its 
“decline” than the traditional narrative of Mediterranean-wide commercial decay.17 In fact, 
Colbert’s interest in redefining a strong French presence in the sea against that of states like 
Venice, England, and the United Provinces with stronger trade networks in the sea revealed the 
extent to which Mediterranean commerce remained paramount as French commercial endeavors 
in the Atlantic and the New World foundered. Bonsy’s embassy underscored the role of the 
ambassador as a critical link through which one Western European state’s industrial capacities 
benefitted from and then superceeded those of the republic.18 Louis’s government filched 
Venice’s industrial secrets while simultaneously striving to expand its own commerce in the sea.  
This chapter aims to highlight the extremities in which both France and Venice found 
themselves in the 1660s. Louis XIV’s government faced the difficult reorganization of the 
kingdom’s domestic economic and cultural institutions alongside its post-mazarine political 
stature on the international stage. The Republic of Venice faced the unknown outcome of an 
ongoing war that could redefine its traditional maritime role. The embassy of the Bishop of 
Beziers demonstrated that the king wanted to draw Venice’s government close as an ally in 
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attempts at an hegemony over Italian politics while waiting to see the outcome of Venice’s 
Mediterranean conflict to gauge better how to proceed with mercantilist expansion and Ottoman 
relations.  
Ultimately, Bonsy’s reportage and mediation facilitated royal maneuvers during the 
Franco-papal feud; the transfer of French troops across Venetian territory as the feud came to an 
end; and the successful establishment of two nascent French industries to the benefit of 
colbertisme and royal prestige. Such varied tasks amplify our view of what the role of French 
ambassadors comprised as Louis’s personal rule began. Moreover, Colbert instructed the bishop 
to acquire Venetian art to expand the royal collection and to contribute to a growing 
louisquatorzien cultural machine. Thus, along the way Bonsy manipulated Venice’s war-
weariness to procure an artistic masterpiece. The gift of the Veronese painting symbolized much 
as Louis XIV received it at the Louvre later in 1664.19 The canvas signalled the Republic of Saint 
Mark’s willingness to accommodate Louis XIV to a point. The gift served though as a reminder 
that Venice was a sovereign state controlling its domestic affairs and honor despite one French 
ambassador’s infiltrations. The republic, too, could still choose upon whom it bestowed its 
favors.20  
The Bishop of Beziers and the Venetian Political Context 
  Cardinal Mazarin bequeathed a dynastic vision to Louis XIV. On the surface, Mazarin’s 
final achievement, the Peace of the Pyrenees, brought France and Spain closer while laying 
foundations for French ascendance among European states.21 Louis XIV used the momentary 
peace in Europe in the early 1660s to assert authority within France. Furthermore, the monarch 
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demonstrated his resolve to command international affairs. The king quickly enacted his personal 
approach to foreign policy through the affair of the Spanish ambassador in London (1661), the 
Treaty of Montmartre with the House of Lorraine (1662), and the affair of the Corsican guards in 
Rome (1662).22 
He then moved to expand Bourbon authority against Habsburg preponderance in Italy. 
The Spanish Habsburgs long controlled much of the peninsula dominating, for instance, papal 
politics in mid-seventeenth century Rome.23 To test his neighbors the king struck at the papacy in 
the fallout of the Corsican Guard affair (20 August 1662) in a moment when neither Felipe IV 
nor Emperor Leopold I could afford to challenge him. French measures against Pope Alexander 
VII could not ignore other Italian sovereigns. Of Italian states Venice was unique in its reputed 
neutrality in the affairs of its European neighbors. The republic lay sandwiched between the 
states of the Habsburg reichsitalien.24 Although “neutral” it was often amicably inclined toward 
France in the early decades of the century as a countermeasure against the Habsburgs 
surrounding its terraferma frontiers.25 
Matching Habsburg and papal authority required robust diplomacy with the Serenissima. 
To prevent the republic from allying itself outright with either the papacy or Habsburg princes 
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Louis XIV dispatched Bonsy as his first ambassador to Venice since Mazarin’s death. The 
bishop entered the republic officially on 21 December 1662. His instructions were to assure the 
republic of royal support as Venice languished in the Candian War.26 Upon closer examination 
the intent of the ambassador’s embassy clearly indicated that the king wanted a compliant 
republic willing to cooperate with him.27 Venice’s context required a minister skilled in the web 
of Italian politics. Of Florentine descent, Bonsy was reared under his uncle, the late Bishop of 
Beziers. Saint-Simon averred decades later that Bonsy “pleased Cardinal Mazarin at an 
opportune time.”28 Through his clientage to Mazarin, Bonsy succeeded in his uncle’s bishopric. 
He was soon engaged in the 1661 negotiation of Marguerite-Louise d’Orléans’s marriage to 
Ferdinando II de’ Medici’s heir, Cosimo.29 In Mazarin’s circle Bonsy became attached to 
Hugues de Lionne and Jean-Baptiste Colbert ensuring the prelate’s entrée further into French 
politics.30 Both ministers depended upon Bonsy.  
On one hand, the Italophile Lionne appreciated his diplomatic skill and loyalty; the two 
ministers worked especially well together. Their dispatches evinced a deep knowledge of and 
affinity for Italian politics.31 The ministers’ correspondence revealed that they shared a ribald 
humor aimed often at Alexander VII.32 On the other hand, Bonsy’s letters to Colbert 
demonstrated formal but no less loyal attachments. Colbert required information related to 
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cultural and industrial programs, and he knew the bishop would punctiliously oblige.33 Venetian 
artistic treasures, notably the Feast in the House of Simon, arrived in France because of Colbert’s 
collaboration with Bonsy. The ambassador received instructions and requests from Lionne and 
Colbert with equal attention and as correlatives to their triangular dedication to the king’s glory. 
The collaboration of these ministers revealed shared horizontal negotiations and the collection of 
information characterizing French ministries at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule. This 
system would change across the decades as ministries increasingly centralized under their 
respective secretaries who in turned answered to the king in the crucible of the conseil d’en haut. 
France, Venice, and the War of Candia 
 
 Bonsy entered a republic on the defensive. Analyzed in conjunction with the Franco-
papal crisis unfolding in Rome, the Candian War proved critical in leveraging Venetian 
accommodations to Louis XIV’s foreign policies. I will consider these concomitant crises 
separately.  Since 1645 Venice warred with the Ottoman Empire for the island of Crete. In spite 
of its size, the republic maintained an aggressive front against Ottoman attacks and earned the 
admiration of Europe. Conflict was mostly on the seas in a number of spectacular maneuvers that 
left the governments of Mehmet IV and Venice in a momentary stalemate and the city of Candia 
under siege.34 The reign of Venice’s doge, Domenico II Contarini (1658-1675), had only recently 
begun. The duke presided over a republic whose factionalism the war exacerbated.35 The crisis 
provided a moment of historical redefinition for Venice, and, though protracted and costly, it 
allowed the republic to cast itself as protector of Christian values against Ottoman invasion. The 
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immediate question for Venice in 1663 was how to sustain the war and whether retaining Crete 
was worth further expenditure.36  
 Venice’s patriciate warred within itself as much as it did against the Ottomans. 
Increasingly the nobility quarreled over the authority of government institutions. Would Venice 
remain a republic over which its aristocracy ruled in toto through the councils or devolve into a 
limited oligarchy tyrannized through privileged, powerful entities like the Council of Ten and the 
state inquisitors? The crisis of identity rocking the Serenissima gained momentum as the war 
progressed. The state required nobles and cities of the terraferma to pay heavy taxes, and many 
cities and villages there were forced to sell regional properties to lagunal patricians to fund the 
war.37 The nobility’s ranks swelled with new land, and new families bought titles to offset 
Venice’s wartime financial crisis. Many patricians found themselves enriched through state 
purchases of war material, its transport, and profiteering.38 The alleged loss of traditional 
liberties and the degeneration of government further into the hands of the giovani offended many 
traditionalist patricians. European states spoke not of a doomed republic as the war progressed, 
but they watched with interest to see how far the war would alter the republic’s famed conciliar 
stability.     
The debate among the old patrician families raged over Crete and impacted diplomatic 
relations with France. In the senate neutralisti patricians believed that Venice should cede the 
island to the Ottomans or even to France in order to consolidate its resources and focus on 
governing the terraferma and territories like Dalmatia in the Adriatic.39 They maintained that the 
                                               
36 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 82, Bonsy to Lionne, 5 Jan. 1663. 
37 Gaetano Cozzi, Repubblica di Venezia e Stati Italiani: Politica e Giustizia dal Secolo XVI al Secolo XVIII (Turin: 
Giulio Einaudi, 1982), 177-178. 
38 Candiani, “Conflitti di intenti,” 157, 159-160. 
39 Ibid., 152-153; AMAE, CP, Venise, vol. 82, Bonsy to Lionne, 5 Jan. 1663; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 84, Bonsy to 
Louis XIV, 22 March 1664, F 113r-113v. 
76 
republic might partially conserve the stato da mar and prosperous Mediterranean commerce this 
way. Detractors of this view –the attivisti — believed that losing the status the kingdom of Crete 
conferred upon it in the Mediterranean would irreparably damage Venice’s international 
reputation.40 It should also be noted that many attivisti were in clans either newly ennobled 
because of the war or belonged to those older families profiting from it.  
Terraferma nobles of ancient lineage often refused to acknowledge the hegemony of the 
lagoon, and many of them baulked at the further diminution of liberty the war caused.41 Some of 
these approached the French ambassador offering friendship to Louis XIV. Bonsy alerted the 
king to a significant number of terraferma nobles with Francophile loyalties. Dispatches from 
Bonsy demonstrated that Louis XIV, who recently reinstated the Order of Saint Michel, 
bestowed the order on interested Venetian nobles. Bonsy reported that the French government 
profited in the past from such honors and the king should continue to do so.42 As in Rome 
cardinals of the French faction could sway the Sacred College to French interests, so too a 
divided patriciate might ease Venetian policy towards France. 
The war stretched the republic’s financial limits.43 It underwent a noticeable economic 
crisis as the war continuously sucked immediate finances and military resources, yet, according 
to economic historians like Richard Rapp Venice’s domestic economic prosperity did not suffer 
irremediable decline as a result.44 Historians like Sanchez and Rapp reveal that Venetians feared 
a potential loss of status among European states if Crete fell to the Turk more than the loss of 
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commerce in the 1660s.45 Mehmet IV menaced the stato da mar with every indication that he 
intended to prosecute the war and, more ominously, to extend hostilities into the Adriatic against 
the Dalmatian coast.46  The senate scrambled to secure financial and military assistance to avoid 
losing its territory by recalling domestic debts and importuning European neighbors.47  
 In Rome the Venetian ambassador, Basadona, lobbied for a league of Catholic princes to 
counter the Ottomans that was to include the empire, the papacy, France, and Spain.48 In Paris 
Venetian ambassadors pressed Louis XIV and his ministers to support either the league or the 
republic outright.49 Shortly before his death Mazarin had sent four thousand French troops and a 
number of galleys to assist the Venetians in Crete. French efforts affected little, and the 
Ottomans routed and enslaved a number of them.50 This turn of events damaged the potential for 
further French participation in the war, and in counsel the king stipulated that he would aid 
Venice only when it could afford offensive measures.51  
The late Cardinal Mazarin gave Venice two hundred thousand livres meant to assist in the 
war and bequeathed six hundred thousand more in his will.52 He stipulated that the pope was to 
decide if the bequest should be given to Venice or to Leopold I whose Hungarian borders 
Mehmet IV’s troops ravaged.53  Louis XIV determined that Alexander VII should accord Venice 
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the full amount so that Leopold would struggle against the Ottomans.54 The king wrote Cardinal 
Antonio Barberini that he would publicly consider a league against the Turk, but he secretly had 
no intention of committing to it.55 He wanted to weaken the emperor, and he wanted to maintain 
cordial relations with Mehmet IV. Mazarin’s money would be more strategically spent assisting 
Venice — the republic could save enslaved French troops besides. 
Mazarin’s bequest set in motion a conflict of interests threatening Franco-Venetian 
relations throughout 1663. After his death his fortune and the fulfilment of his testament were 
left to the crown.56 As relations between Louis XIV and Alexander VII deteriorated, the 
disbursal of funds from France trickled; the crown still owed fifty thousand écus of the cardinal’s 
subsidy. Departing Paris in early 1663, the Venetian ambassador Alvise Grimani noted in his 
dispatches to the senate that he petitioned the king and his ministers for the remaining money. 
Grimani reported that Colbert confirmed that the money would be paid.57 Grimani remarked 
upon the king’s desire that Venice secure the release of enslaved Frenchmen.58 The crown 
demonstrated that assistance for the republic required reciprocity.   
Grimani soon sped south to Lyon to arbitrate in the mounting crisis between Louis XIV 
and Alexander VII.59 The “formal and dry” Nicolo Sagredo replaced him in Paris.60 Ultimately, 
Sagredo’s embassy procured little more than equivocations from the king in regards to the war.61 
The king and Lionne learned from Bonsy that funds already sent to Rome were secretly 
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disbursed to the Venetians with the understanding that they in turn subsidize Leopold I’s possible 
military intervention against the king in his struggle with Alexander VII.62 The king’s rapport 
with the republic tensed as the initial roots of an affinity for Leopold I appeared.  
The king alluded to the betrayal in an audience with Sagredo adding that all French funds 
were expressly for its war.63 According to Lionne, the ambassador assured the king that it was 
so, but Louis XIV rejoined, “No, Monsieur Ambassador, you do not seem well to understand 
me.”64 Sagredo misapprehended that the king now held the pope and Venice responsible for the 
misuse of monies given to Leopold I.65 If Venice wanted more money the king resolved that it 
would have to solicit it from Rome.66 Sagredo continued to lobby for the remaining fifty 
thousand écus, and Bonsy relayed that honoring Mazarin’s will would elevate Venetian public 
opinion toward the king benefitting maneuvers against the pope.67 Lionne wrote Bonsy noting 
that the king sanctioned the payment honoring his debt, but Venetian and papal collusion would 
have to change “if wisdom guides the stars.”68 Louis XIV paid the remaining fifty thousand écus, 
but it was more politic to make Venice beg for it as the fight with Alexander VII reached fever 
pitch.  
Venice’s cooperation with Alexander VII provided an excuse to delay provisions for the 
republic and another accusation the king could level at the pope. The monarch remarked to 
Bonsy: “sooner or later I will find a way of shoving this down the Chigis’ throats.”69  News of 
the Veneto-papal misappropriation of French money in a bid for imperial reinforcements against 
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the French contributed to the king’s subsequent invasion of the papal enclaves of Avignon and 
the Comtat Venaissin in July.70 The French annexation of papal lands appalled the republic, but 
it hoped the pope would be persuaded finally to negotiate a peace.71 Bonsy noted that Venice 
could be excused slightly due to its dire circumstances in the war.72  
Louis XIV played a double game with Venice. While initially eschewing Venetian 
diplomatic intervention in the Roman affair the king manipulated Venetian ambassadors and the 
republic’s fear.73 He instructed Bonsy to remind the Venetians that their only concern should be 
events in the Mediterranean.74 Sending further aid to Leopold I or taking directives from 
Alexander VII would ruin the possibility for further French intervention. This proposition 
seemed unlikely anyway as the king believed “it would be easier to send fifty thousand men to 
any other place than to send even one thousand to Candia.”75 
The king jeered at the inability of the Venetians’ “long Pregadi” to resist getting involved 
in what he believed was his business with Rome.76 The republic should save its energies for their 
war. It appeared too that Venice intentionally prolonged the fight for Crete; Bonsy accused 
patricians of sustaining the war solely to increase private fortunes.77 He believed that any further 
assistance France might send to the republic would procure only mediocre recompense.78 Venice 
could not be trusted to use French funds, and it seemed the Venetians stubbornly prosecuted a 
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lost war for gain rather than necessity. Bonsy’s reportage indicated that Louis XIV would be 
foolish to send either men or money in the foreseeable future.79  
Increasing Venetian acquiescence was the imminent descent of a French army into 
Northern Italy as Louis XIV menaced an invasion of the Papal States. Although the king 
reassured the republic through Bonsy that French troops would not come into contact with 
Venetian territories, the senate remained alarmed.80 The republic was in no position to defend its 
western borders in the event that the monarch opted to do more in the peninsula than humble the 
Chigi. Throughout 1663 Bonsy suggested to the Venetians that French assistance would be 
forthcoming as soon as the pope honored the king’s demands, and Venetian ambassadors in 
Paris, Lyon, and Rome labored to convince Alexander VII.81 Although afraid of the French 
military presence crossing the Alps, the republic appeased the king beginning negotiations with 
Bonsy for supplies of grain and hay from the terraferma as had the Republic of Genoa.82  
Louis XIV stated: “Venice depended upon me more than any other prince.”83 His boast 
reflected the republic’s diplomacy vis-a-vis France toward the end of 1663. The Candian War 
was at a standstill throughout the year, but intelligence reports arriving from the Mediterranean 
warned that, not only were the Turks continuing the siege of Candia, but they were also set to 
attack the coast of Dalmatia. 84 Because many patricians believed Louis XIV to be the only 
Christian prince strong enough to assist them, ultimately, they made little effort to block French 
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policy aimed against Alexander VII. In later decades Venice would not forget the king’s 
obstinacy when it held the upper hand.               
Louis XIV, Venice, and the Affair of the Corsican Guards  
 The attack on the French embassy in Rome on 20 August 1662 plunged France and the 
papacy into eighteen months of open hostility. The violence that occurred in Rome between 
Louis XIV’s ambassador, the Duke de Crequi, and the pope’s Corsican Guard are described in a 
detailed literature elsewhere.85 Mazarin undoubtedly passed onto Louis XIV a personal antipathy 
for Alexander VII and his papacy.86 Mutual Franco-papal obstinacy fueled a series of events that 
ultimately led to the passage of French troops in Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, the Milanese, 
Modena, Parma, and Monferrato.87 Throughout the crisis of 1663 the king used Venetian 
ambassadors and the Veneto-Ottoman gridlock to further demands in regards to the pope. 
On the surface the attack on the French embassy violated the ius gentium, but the king 
saw it as an opportunity to increase French authority in Northern Italy and in Rome against that 
of the Habsburgs and a Hispanophile pope.88 Abbé Regnier-Desmarais, secretary to Crequi, later 
remarked that Felipe IV knew and feared Louis XIV’s actions would diminish Spanish authority 
in the peninsula, but there was little the aged king could do as his resources were engaged in a 
war with Portugal.89 Bonsy reported that no one in Venice believed that the peace of the 
Pyrenees would hold; the French king would seek to supplant Spanish authority with the 
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potential to expand French influence among Italian princes or acquire territory there as his 
ancestors had done.90 The monarch sought diplomatic preferment over the Habsburgs in London 
and in Venice and received satisfaction in both instances. Royal actions undertaken against the 
pope and in favor of the Francophile dukes of Parma and Modena attested to the king’s resolve 
to countermand Spain’s interests in Italy first through an attack on the papacy.  
Louis XIV stressed that he was not attacking Alexander VII as head of the universal 
church. Instead, the king claimed he sought the satisfaction of dynastic honor from the House of 
Chigi. Be that as it may, the Chigi were attached to the Spanish crown.91 They, like the Medici 
cardinals, vetted Spanish policies at the papal and other Italian courts.92 With the accession of 
Alexander VII in 1655, Felipe IV rejoiced that Spain’s dominance in the peninsula would be 
reinforced through the pro-Spanish pontiff.93 Louis XIV needed only a reason to force his hand 
across the Alps to vindicate French obligations to the Este and the Farnese. Mazarin’s desire to 
strengthen a French presence in Italy spurred the king and Hugues de Lionne. Louis and Lionne 
shared in the late cardinal’s belief that Italy was a springboard for further expansion. The 
personal hatred for Alexander VII of Mazarin and Lionne continued to underscore official 
policy.94  
Governments often precipitate crises to achieve desired political outcomes. Crequi, the 
French ambassador in Rome, was reputedly arrogant and obstinate.95  The king knew this, and 
yet he sent Crequi to the most difficult diplomatic post in Europe to deal with a pope who was 
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equally intractable and Francophobe. Crequi’s insolence toward the pope and his Chigi relatives 
and the unruliness of the papal bodyguards provoked a firestorm. The ensuing attack of the 
Corsican Guards on Crequi’s household at the Palazzo Farnese, the new French embassy in 
Rome, proffered a pretext for French intervention in Italian politics.  
Louis XIV immediately demanded reparations. Initially the king aimed his demands 
mostly at members of the Chigi clan and the pope’s Corsicans. Louis ultimately stipulated that 
the pope disincamerate – disgorge – states annexed into the Roman Camera to their original lords 
– the territories of Castro and Ronciglione to the Duke of Parma and Comachio to the Duke of 
Modena.96 Mazarin earlier tried in vain through short embassies undertaken by Lionne and the 
Président Colbert (future Colbert de Croissy) to affect the return of these lands to Parma and 
Modena, and the Peace of the Pyrenees obligated Felipe IV to defend the dukes’ rights to the 
lands.97 Louis XIV believed his reputation hinged on honoring Mazarin’s stipulations.98 If the 
king successfully bullied the pope, the Este and Farnese would be obliged to sustain French 
policies. These conditions had nothing directly to do with the attack on the embassy in Rome, but 
they represented elements of the king’s Italian policies for which the incident afforded 
advantage. 
Accords with Parma, Modena, Mantua, and Savoy provided a strong counterbalance in 
Northern Italy against Spanish predominance there in the Milanese, Genoa, Rome, and Tuscany. 
Unrest in the Kingdom of Naples already saw the arrival in France of pleas to assist in an 
overthrow of Spanish power there.99 In 1663 only the Republic of Venice refused officially to 
commit to either Alexander VII or the king. The republic vacillated claiming publicly that it 
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desired peace and would act as a neutral arbiter.100 In private Venice entertained Alexander VII’s 
approaches to Leopold I in exchange for papal aid against the Ottomans and in fear of French 
entry into Italy. This plan infuriated Louis XIV who wanted Leopold I occupied with the 
Ottomans to benefit domestically from a protracted era of peace in Europe.101 The king wanted to 
give Colbert time to reinforce French commerce, and he would not compromise the Franco-
Ottoman rapport that could guarantee commercial advantages in the Mediterranean.102 
Bonsy negotiated the republic’s role in the king’s policies with the papal court. Louis 
XIV expected Venetian relations with Alexander VII in no way to hinder the disincameration of 
Castro, Ronciglione, and Comachio.103 Initially Louis XIV rejected Venetian and Spanish offers 
to arbitrate over the conflict with Mehmet IV.104 In Rome, however, the Venetian ambassador, 
Basadona, obtained a private promise from Alexander VII to reconsider the disincamerations if 
French troops did not march into Italy. Basadona sent this information to Grimani in Paris, and 
the ambassador, thinking he held the upper hand, offered once again to arbitrate along with the 
Spanish ambassador Iturietta.105 The Venetians did not know that a Maltese agent in Rome had 
already passed the news of the pope’s promise along to French intelligence, and Louis XIV 
prepared a trap.106 Grimani and Iturietta signed a letter of intent to arbitrate based upon the papal 
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promise to disincamerate.107 The honor of Spain and the papacy, as well as Venice’s reputed 
neutrality, were now implicated should the pope’s word prove false.108  
Royal troops marched on Northern Italy as the pope stalled to fulfill his private promise 
to disincamerate.109 All of Italy feared the potential for French conquest; echoes of previous 
French invasions of Italy abounded. Rumors circulated in Venice that the king intended to 
occupy the Mantuan enclave of Casale or the Spanish Milanese.110 Venetians’ anxiety intensified 
because they had no resources to counter the French. As the months of 1663 passed so did 
conferences between the respective emissaries.111 The pope tergiversated, but, finally, pressure 
placed upon Alexander VII from Venice and Spain in conjunction with the presence of the 
French army in Italy weakened papal pride. A conference of the involved parties ensued in Pisa 
in February 1664.112 The resolutions were humiliating for Alexander VII who finally conceded to 
all of Louis XIV’s demands in the Treaty of Pisa signed on 12 February.113 The pope 
disincamerated Castro, Ronciglione, and Comachio to the dukes of Parma and Modena, and the 
personal apologies of the papal nephew and legate, Cardinal Flavio Chigi, given to Louis XIV at 
Fontainebleau on 29 July 1664, concluded the crisis.114  
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Many in Venice’s senate believed that the end of the tensions between the pope and the 
French king would benefit Venice militarily and financially in the Mediterranean. Neither Louis 
XIV nor Alexander VII, however, committed to the republic regarding the conflict over Crete. 
The pope denied the republic more money complaining of the prohibitive expense of Cardinal 
Chigi’s extraordinary embassy to France, and Louis XIV believed it more politic to show slim 
solidarity with Leopold I as the Ottomans menaced Hungary.115 As 1664 opened, Venice had no 
assurances from the king, and the republic soon experienced French troops crossing its 
terraferma to fight with Leopold I’s armies against Mehmet IV. 
Bonsy, Venice, and the Habsburg-Ottoman Crisis 
 Europe’s attention in 1664 turned to Western Hungary where the Ottoman forces 
invaded.116 Louis XIV had been careful not to ally openly with Venice against Mehmet IV, but 
as the crisis with the papacy ended in February he decided to send a small contingent of men to 
assist Leopold. On one hand, he wanted to reaffirm that the recent papal feud had been with the 
House of Chigi and not against the pope. On the other hand, the king saw a vacuum of power 
among the Transylvanian princes of Hungary as an opportunity to position a member of his 
family as an alternative ruler there. From Venice, Bonsy, echoed that if the king had any interest 
in ruling Hungary the unrest there was timely.117 
 In the spring of 1664 the ambassador achieved Venetian approval to move royal troops, 
facilitating their organization under the suspicious eyes of the senate. The republic feared the 
entry of a French army into its lands. Some suspected Louis XIV of using Italy as a stepping 
stone toward universal monarchy.118 Senators suggested that a possible partition of the Milanese 
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between France and Venice could profit the latter if the king decided to move openly against 
Spanish authority in the peninsula.119 The king’s troops were in Italy because of the Affair of the 
Corsican Guards, but, as the ink on the Treaty of Pisa dried, it was time to remove them.120 
 Twenty-six companies were to march north to Hungary.121 Leopold I wrote to the senate 
and to the Duke of Mantua for permission for free passage of French auxiliaries across their 
boundaries. Bonsy petitioned the senate’s approval in April for the passage.122 The senate 
approved, but it required details of the number of troops, their route, and provisions. The bishop 
acquired these details, and negotiated for Venetian observers to accompany the army. The 
companies passed through the Friulian lands. The army then joined imperial forces at Marsburg 
in Styria proceeding into Hungary where it fought with Raimondo Montecucculi at the River 
Raab.123  
Franco-Imperial forces defeated the Ottomans in the Battle of Saint Gotthard on 1 
August.124 Like other European rulers, the settlement Leopold I accepted with Mehmet IV at 
Vasvar shocked Louis XIV.125 French efforts to acquire the Hungarian crown in the interval 
proved futile, but the king could claim his willingness to help — although only minimally — his 
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fellow Christian prince against the infidel. Bonsy ably mitigated Venetian concerns in favor of 
Louis XIV. The republic reluctantly opened its frontiers to French troops headed to fight the 
Ottomans as a maneuver in the Cretan conflict. Bonsy noted that the republic still hoped to have 
Louis XIV’s assistance now that the Franco-papal feud was over and as the king appeared 
willing to counter Mehmet IV in Hungary.126  The senate’s generosity was to solicit the king’s 
good will and influence with the Ottomans. Bonsy capitalized on this, even while counseling the 
king that it was more politic to let the republic lose Crete to the Turk.127 
Bonsy, Colbert, and the Subversion of the Venetian Lace and Glass Industries  
Bonsy’s interventions in industrial politics illuminates yet another facet of the 
ambassador’s role in the mid-seventeenth century. The bishop proved himself a valuable 
impresario in industrial espionage in 1664. He was instrumental in the expansion of French lace 
and glass production as Colbert marketed French luxury goods abroad. The ambassador’s actions 
demonstrate how exportation of industrial knowledge and production, more than the shift in trade 
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, doomed the republic’s monopoly over these products.128 
In short, Bonsy stole Venetian industrial secrets for Colbert. 
It is well known that Colbert intended to improve French luxury textile manufacturing. 
Prior to the 1660s France relied on imports of brocade, damask, silk, and fine point lace. French 
elites — including the royal family — purchased brocades and other cloths from Venice. Royal 
orders became matters of state as Venetian artisans demonstrated their skill and quality 
abroad.129 Bonsy brokered royal purchase of five hundred “brasses” of Venetian brocades to 
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cover the canopied beds of queens Marie-Thérèse and Anne of Austria.130 Colbert made royal 
wishes for cloth known to Bonsy who commissioned and oversaw production of the fabrics.131  
Bonsy and the French consul arranged the delivery of these textiles to France; two cases 
were sent along later with Paolo Veronese’s painting as it crossed the Alps by wagon. Other 
royal parcels did not leave the republic until after Bonsy’s departure from Venice.132 His 
discussion of expense and Colbert’s hesitancy to pay gave an idea of the amount of capital that 
the monarch himself provided to Venetian weavers. Paul Vedoa informed Colbert that one parcel 
of fabric cost fifteen hundred écus de France.133 Cole asserted that, “900,000 livres to 1,200,000 
livres was spent each year in Venice.”134  
The example of royal expenditure alone for luxury cloth no doubt contributed to 
Colbert’s promotion of domestic textile production. His initiative to regulate and increase French 
cloth production intersected with Bonsy’s involvement in appropriating Venetian artisans and 
their products.135 He confirmed to Colbert in December that he would export Venetian artisans to 
France. Venice’s expert female workers were in high demand abroad.136 Bonsy and his 
household came into contact with female cloth and lace makers.137 “What I can do,” the 
ambassador wrote, “is send the girls of some of the best workers who can instruct those in France 
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not neglecting at the same time my efforts to find some glassmakers.”138 In August 1665 Colbert 
declared the creation of the Manufacture royale des points and in 1666 prohibited importation 
and even the donning of foreign lace.139 Glass soon followed lace. 
While a loss for the republic, lace drew far less outcry than did the ongoing dissolution of 
its “state-of-the-art” glass industry.140 The republic’s specchieri – mirror makers – were the 
acknowledged European experts in the creation, refinement, and exportation of quality cut 
crystal and large-scale plate glass and mirrors.141 Victor Tapié alleged that  “the interior of any 
house above the borderline of poverty included a Venetian mirror, whether large or small,” while 
Frémy observed that the French imported two hundred caisses of glass, mirrors, and wrought 
crystal annually from Venice.142 The few French glass workers profiting from the initial forays 
into the industry of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert paled in comparison to the Venetians.143 As 
early as 1662, Colbert planned to entice Venetian specchieri to France to teach French 
apprentices. Paul Vedoa informed Hugues de Lionne as early as 1661 that France contained 
suitable sand for the Venetian process.144 In 1664 Colbert asked Bonsy to learn exact information 
about the industry with the aim of establishing state manufacturies.145  
                                               
138 BnF, MC, vol. 126bis, Bonsy to Colbert, 20 Dec. 1664, F 502r. 
139 Cole, Colbert, 239, 241-242.  
140 Rapp, 109, 137. 
141 Scholars have detailed the emergence of the French plate-glass industry and the history of the expatriate 
glassworkers’ sojourn in France. They were repatriated after exasperating Colbert and the Venetian ambassadors 
Sagredo and Giustiniani. What is emphasized here is Bonsy’s instrumentality in the birth of the manufacture royale 
des glaces. Most accounts regrettably mention Bonsy peripherally. See Émile Levasseur, Histoire des Classes 
Ouvrières et de L’Industrie en France avant 1798, tome II (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1901), 257; Elphège Frémy, 
Histoire de la Manufacture Royale des Glaces de France au XVIIe et au XVIIIe Siècles (Paris: Librarie Plon), 4-5; 
Cole, Colbert, 304; Warren C. Scoville, “Large-Scale Production in the French Plate-Glass Industry, 1665-1789,” 
Journal of Political Economy 50, no. 5 (1942), 669.  
142 Tapié, France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu, 262-263; Fremy, 17 
143 Ibid. 
144 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 81 supplément, Vedoa to Lionne, 20 Feb. 1661, F 2v. 
145 Paul-M. Bondois, “Les Verreries Nivernaise et Orléanaise au XVIIe Siècle, Jean Castellan et Bernard Perrot 
(1647-1709),” Revue D’Histoire Economique 20, (1932), 77; Frémy, 19.   
92 
Venice imposed strict legislation against the alienation of industrial knowledge, and the 
republic’s economy could not withstand more economic loss as the Candian war progressed.146 
In his initial response to Colbert, Bonsy asserted that he had thought “for some time now to 
propose to you the manufacture of mirrors for the good of the kingdom’s economy (commerce) 
having noted that a few workers already in France have achieved success.”147 He indicated that 
Venetian glass production impressed him. Bonsy researched glass manufacturing and the artisans 
who knew it best through his access to the republic’s Muranese glassworks, Bonsy researched 
glass manufacturing and the artisans who knew it best.148 His remarks revealed a prescient 
understanding of Colbert’s commercial objectives and his participation in state-sanctioned 
industrial piracy. 
Colbert sought specchieri willing to place themselves and their families in danger for 
leaving the republic. The ambassador described the menaces specchieri faced if they left Venice. 
He assured the minister “given the necessary expertise needed to avoid angering the republic…I 
will not falter in doubling my efforts to overcome all of the obvious obstacles for the success of 
this very glorious enterprise that you inspire for His Majesty and for the good of the 
kingdom.”149 In 1664, Bonsy contacted four glassworkers willing to go to France.150 He enticed 
them with promises of wealth and privileges — including exemption from the droit d’aubaine.151 
The Muranesi specchieri Della Rivetta, Barbini, Civrano, and Marasse absconded to Paris where 
they established ovens in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine.152 It became increasingly common 
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throughout the century for glassworkers to be drawn to the higher income that foreign states 
offered.153 
Colbert’s interactions with the Venetians were tedious due to the specchieris’ demands 
for money and privileges, but the glassworkers finally agreed to teach French apprentices.154 
Their Venetian gastaldo, the warden of the glassmakers’ guild, feared this the most. The 
renegades taught successfully. Letters patent of 8 October 1665 established the manufacture 
royale des glaces.155 The monarch’s tour of the manufactory legitimized the trade.156 The 
cooperativo degli specchieri was horrified that its countrymen betrayed artisanal secrets; they 
lodged formal complaint to the inquisitori di stato on 3 July 1665.157 By the time Venetian 
Ambassador Marc-Antonio Giustinian succeeded in luring them back to the lagoon in 1667 they 
had made France a competitor in the glass industry.158 
Muranesi specchieri identified themselves with their specialized knowledge. But the 
specchieris’ gastaldo identified the trade with Venice lamenting to the inquisitors: “One of the 
most precious gems that crown the diadem of the Republic is the glassmakers’ peculiar art 
belonging solely to this city, of which the ovens of Murano are recognized as one of its major 
foundations.”159 He added that the renegade workers’ actions destroyed “our art and took away 
one of the major privileges that our Lord God entrusted to this Holy City.”160 The loss threatened 
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the republic’s economy and reputation, and the effects of their expatriate colleagues contributed 
to the long-term relative decline in the Venetian markets that Richard Rapp described.161  
These long-term effects were not yet clear to contemporaries, and the republic could only 
lodge strong complaints. Arguably the greatest symbol of Venice’s industrial loss was the later-
constructed Hall of Mirrors at Versailles that reflected French dominance in European glass 
production and Venice’s defeat.162 Despite its irritation Venice’s government could not risk 
overtly offending Louis XIV. For his part, the French king agreed in 1669 to send troops and 
ships led by the Duke de Navailles to assist in the war for Candia, but the King’s procrastination 
proved too little too late for the Serenissima.163 Bonsy the industrial pirate had assisted in 
engineering Venice’s misfortune. He facilitated the concerted alienation of industrial secrets 
from Venice. By the time the specchieri returned to Murano the bishop was in Poland. In 1670, 
his successor, ambassador Saint-André, would continue receiving the senate’s complaints about 
the theft of industrial secrets.164 
Bonsy, Colbert, and Venetian Art: The Politics of Culture     
While Bonsy secretly enveigled Venetian artisans to contribute to French commerce, he 
also engaged in secret cultural politics. Although a small state, the republic’s cultural prestige, 
like its maritime and commercial prestige in the Mediterranean, loomed above that of the young 
Louis XIV. The king and Colbert took keen interest in Venice’s artistic and industrial resources 
both from the perspective of economic supremacy as well as the push for cultural dominance 
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over the Italian aesthetic.165 These facets of the ambassador’s role emerged clearly through 
Bonsy’s correspondence with Colbert, who soon after became Superintendant of Buildings and 
Manufacturies (1664) and then Comptrolleur General of Finance (1665), had spurred the 
ambassador to collect Venetian art.  
Letters between the two ministers invoke the breadth of a French ambassador’s 
obligations as a cultural and commercial attaché that was critical to foreign relations in the mid-
seventeenth century.166 Some scholars downplay the cultural interventions of ambassadors as 
ancillaries to the “real work” of high politics.167 Bonsy’s involvement in the cultural aspects of 
the arcana imperii, however, expands our understanding of what Louis XIV and his ministers 
considered pertinent foreign policy as the personal rule began. Ambassadors’ involvement in the 
relay of artistic and musical culture from Italy was critical to the extension of the state’s prestige, 
and these interactions reinforce recent scholarship regarding the relevance of cultural politics to 
the expression of louisquatorzien glory.168  
Bonsy, as Colbert’s protégé, proved himself as adept at cultural espionage as in 
commercial intelligence when he served as extraordinary ambassador to Florence in 1661. He 
accompanied the difficult Princess Marguerite-Louise d’Orléans to her groom in that year.169 
Aside from his duties during the nuptials, Bonsy secretly investigated the grand ducal court.170 
He provided construction details, costs, and manpower required to operate Tuscan galleys, and 
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he recruited trainers of “ferocious beasts” for the Duke de Mazarin at Colbert’s behest.171 The 
bishop returned to France in great favor, and he was soon dispatched to Venice because of 
“his…great experience…acquired…through the management of…various important tasks that 
have been confided to him both within and out of the kingdom.”172 En route to Venice Bonsy 
continued to supervise Colbert’s commissions from the grand ducal fabbriche delle pietre dure – 
workshops of precious stones – through Florentine connections.173 Passing through Montpellier 
Beziers ordered two tables “of the most beautiful stones and ornaments to have sent to France to 
have them modeled for the service of the King.”174 Institutions like the Gobelins manufactory 
benefitted from the interventions of ambassadors in cultural politics.  
Bonsy was one of a number of agents researching Italian art and expertise.175 The bishop 
located Venetian paintings that could be bought for the king.176 Colbert’s art expert, Potestà, 
journeyed to Venice, and along with Bonsy’s associates, scoured the republic and its environs for 
suitable chef d’œuvres.177 The ambassador told Colbert on 21 April 1663 that he would serve as 
“director and guide for the market paying the most attention possible to secure the best price one 
can [for several paintings]….”178 By May Bonsy described three of the most coveted canvases of 
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Veronese and Titian.179 One of these, Veronese’s famed Feast in the House of Simon, caught 
Colbert’s attention.180 Ambassador Sagredo quipped that Colbert’s counsel to the king in such 
matters went unchallenged, observing “that when Colbert has driven the nail, there is no 
imaginable motive or persuasion that can withdraw it.”181  
Venice’s Servi di Maria commissioned the Feast in the House of Simon from Veronese in 
1573, and it hung in their refectory at Cannaregio not far from the French embassy.182 The friars 
were indebted to the state, and the republic recalled debts in 1663 as it struggled to cope with a 
new levee of ten thousand troops to succor Candia, to reinforce Dalmatia, and strike against 
convoys to Constantinople from Alexandria.183 In November, Venice’s provveditori sopra li 
monasteri – superintendents of monasteries – reinforced legislation from 1657 prohibiting 
religious houses from making profit without declaring it to the state; they surely took notice too 
of unreported foreign appeals to the Servites for the Veronese.184   
Louis XIV was not alone in his interest in the painting. Other Italian princes and 
ambassadors were unable to muster the resources to pay what the Servi asked.185 They refused 
the Spanish Ambassador de la Fuentes’s offer, the Duke of Modena’s proffered ten thousand 
ducats, and the large sum of twenty thousand ducats that the Duke of Mantua offered to pay.186 
Cosimo III de’ Medici too made overtures for the canvas revoking his offer when he learned of 
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Louis XIV’s interest.187 The purchase would not be easy, as the senate would also have its honor 
to consider.188 Communications from Bonsy to Colbert regarding the canvas ceased for some 
months as affairs in Rome dominated. After the signing of the Treaty of Pisa in February, the 
feud with Rome came to an end.  
The conclusion of Bonsy’s successful negotiations for the movement of French troops 
across Venetian territory in the spring of 1664 revealed that the king’s desire for the Veronese 
was not forgotten. Venetian concessions to Louis XIV characterized Franco-Venetian relations in 
1664. The feud with Rome over, Louis XIV’s troops marched across the terraferma, and the 
ambassador devoted time again to Colbert’s commercial and cultural interests. The king 
reminded the ambassador of his desire for Veronese’s painting.189 A major work of Venice’s 
cultural patrimony, however, was not something it would willingly surrender as it had come to 
appreciate its cultural prestige among Europeans.190 Venetian law forbade the Servite friars to 
negotiate without its permission with foreigners. In fact, the republic was right to be suspicious 
of commerce between religious houses and foreign emissaries as the Servites were later 
implicated in the exchange of secret information with the French — Bonsy’s negotiations with 
the brothers in 1663-1664 procured more than just the painting.191  
Meanwhile, Bonsy would not risk Venetian ire through negotiations that could be 
considered acts of espionage. Three issues compelled Venice’s senate to cede the canvas. First, 
and most urgent, was the Venetians’ war with the Ottomans. Louis XIV was still considered the 
key donor for troops and money. The king’s flagrant concessions to Leopold I rather than to the 
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republic in 1664 against the Turk pressed the senate further to oblige him. The loss of a major 
masterwork, while unsavory, was far more palatable in this moment than was the risk of further 
irritating Louis who could provide them resources and men in the Mediterranean.192 The 
consignment of the painting represented a means to ensure the king’s continued goodwill. The 
gift could remind the king of the republic’s war against Mehmet IV. The masterpiece could serve 
too as thanks and reward to Louis XIV as the senate permitted a disciplined French army to pass 
through its territories without incident during the early summer. 
Venice’s second motive was the republic’s honor. Art historians comment on the sale of 
valuable works of art in the early modern period and the connection between gift giving and the 
honor of the donor in diplomatic rapports.193 The king of France was no ordinary collector, and 
the Republic of Venice, especially in its wartime circumstances, could not afford to appear in 
such distress as to be dependent upon the price of a painting. The gift then became attached to 
the republic’s honor as a sovereign power willing to gratify the desire of an equal as a matter of 
friendship and good faith rather than duress in a moment of distress.194 While state secrecy and 
policy would be compromised if the purchase were left in the hands of the foreign emissary, 
Bonsy, the Republic of Venice’s show of generosity to the French monarch would communicate 
confidence and stature. 
A tertiary incident in Paris recommended the gift. Ambassador Sagredo alleged that royal 
horsemen menaced and humiliated him and members of his household in the street on 16 April. 
He made an internationally publicized ultimatum to Louis XIV calling for their execution.195 A 
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194 Ibid.  
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royal inquest found the men innocent of the charges leaving Sagredo and Venice’s government 
embarrassed before a young king who proved exacting when his reputation was threatened. 
According to Allain-Launay, the “affair of the domestics” was the impetus for Venice’s decision 
to offer Louis XIV the painting. The affair, however, while annoying to the king, was not 
substantial enough alone to explain such a high profile gift.  
Sagredo’s allegations certainly played a role, however, as it presented an opportunity for 
Bonsy to petition the senate for the sale of the painting. The bishop sought to persuade the 
government to negotiate the sale as he would negotiate other foreign policy. Cultural politics 
were high politics in the mid-seventeenth century. The ambassador renewed the king’s 
assurances of friendship for the republic after the Sagredo debacle in an audience before the 
collegio. In a well-placed concluding remark at the end of his speech Bonsy added that the king 
had taken notice of the Servites’ Veronese. He requested that the senate allow negotiations with 
the friars for its purchase.196 Seeing a more advantageous opportunity the senate soon after voted 
with a majority to satisfy royal desire.197 Bonsy penned a letter to Colbert on 5 July: “the 
Republic is delighted to make a gift of [the painting] to His Majesty.”198 Bonsy’s own rhetorical 
maneuver again produced results for his master. 
The senate and the Council of Ten supervised negotiations with the Servites after the 
vote.199 The senate penned the legislation to take the painting from the friars. The bishop 
informed Colbert of the task of dismantling the fragile three-piece canvas. It was delivered to the 
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embassy on 23 September, and he detailed news of its subsequent transport across the Alps by 
wagon from Venice to France.200 Bonsy kept abreast of the painting’s journey seeming genuinely 
relieved when it finally arrived in Paris in November.201 News of Bonsy’s success pleased Louis 
XIV.202 Other Venetian masterpieces followed, but none received the same attention as the Feast 
in the House of Simon. The king received it at the Louvre in December — twenty-one months 
after Bonsy first informed Colbert that it was for sale. Although critical of the painting, Louis 
XIV sent a letter of thanks to the republic that Paul Vedoa delivered to the collegio in January 
1665.203  
Cultural politics were important facets of diplomatic negotiations. That the republic 
forbade the sale provided an opportunity for Colbert and the ambassador to demonstrate the 
king’s clout in international circles. Venice’s troubles left it willing to gratify royal wishes in 
cultural affairs where others had gone away empty handed.204 For its part, Venice took control of 
the negotiation to curb further uncontrolled interactions between the French embassy and 
Venetian subjects. Such unsanctioned communications between foreign ambassadors proved to 
compromise state knowledge and security. The French undercut Venetian industries, but the 
republic retained the right to control its artistic heritage. 
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Conclusion 
Bonsy left Venice for Poland in January 1665. The republic’s regard for Louis XIV, 
while officially amicable, would never again prove as accommodating as during the final phase 
of the Candian War. The French embassy remained vacant until 1668. Subsequent French 
ambassadors reckoned with the mistrust that Bonsy engendered while benefitting from 
communication networks such as those within the convent of the Servite friars. On the surface it 
appeared that the Republic of Venice accommodated Louis XIV’s every need throughout 
Bonsy’s embassy. This analysis suggests that policies and circumstances of other states affected 
louisquatorzien pretensions international and economic hegemony that began to appear in the 
early years of the personal rule. Venice toiled in a long and costly struggle with Mehmet IV. The 
Candian War threatened its economic and naval vigor, sovereignty, and prosperity. Venice was 
under duress, but it was not irrelevant. As Bonsy relayed at his departure that Venice would 
“take all possible precautions to reassure itself of Your Majesty’s intentions…and give with care 
and ‘esclat’ visible examples of its fidelity.”205 In its turmoil Venice reluctantly accommodated 
the king’s emergent policies. 
Louis XIV could not disregard the republic. His foreign policy toward Pope Alexander 
VII and the growth of a French hegemonic authority in Northern Italy required that French 
ambassadors maneuver with a regard to Venetian interests. The king boasted that Venice 
depended upon him more than any other prince in Europe, but his policies in Italy rested upon 
the republic’s uncertain context. The senate could very well have allied with the pope and the 
Habsburgs to thwart French pretensions. Alexander VII invited Venice to do so, but the senate 
refused further collusion against Louis XIV.206 The king did not run roughshod over either 
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Venetian sovereignty or territory. French policy in Italy throughout 1663 and 1664 adapted to a 
series of international contexts. Once in Paris, it seems Veronese’s Feast in the House of Simon 
languished at the Gobelins throughout the king’s reign.207 The gift was far from the king’s gaze, 
but the evolution of what many states feared were louisquatorzien designs to construct a 
universal monarchy that would include Italian territories would have to contend with the 
embittered republic that sacrificed a part of its cultural heritage.    
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Chapter Three 
 
 
 
         Fig. 8 
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Conducting Louisquatorzien Hegemony from Venice: The Abbé d’Estrades, Alessandro 
Stradella, and the Outing of Negotiations for Casale, 1675-1678 
 
   
Assassins pummeled composer Alessandro Stradella on 10 October 1677, leaving him for 
dead in the streets of Turin. Alvise Contarini, the musician’s Venetian employer, had ordered the 
assault in retribution for Stradella’s elopement with his mistress, Agnese van Uffelle. Leaving 
Venice to pursue the composer, the assassins carried a letter of protection from the Abbé 
d’Estrades, the French ambassador in the republic.1 In the missive Estrades enjoined the Marquis 
de Villars, Louis XIV’s ambassador to the Duke of Savoy, to lodge the Venetians. Private 
revenge became scandal when it was learned that Contarini’s henchmen sought asylum at the 
French embassy after their attack on Stradella. The Duke of Savoy in turn demanded 
explanations from Louis XIV for the attempted murder of the composer in his state. The attack 
contravened the duke’s sovereignty, and the unusual involvement of French ambassadors in a 
personal affair without his foreknowledge outraged and embarrassed Louis XIV.2 
After the king rebuked the Abbé d’Estrades for overextending his authority without royal 
consent, the ambassador feverishly defended his actions in letters to his master and to 
colleagues.3 In his explanation to Louis XIV, the abbé revealed another secret negotiation that he 
was spearheading with the Duke of Mantua for a French purchase of the stronghold and territory 
of Casale in Northern Italy.4 Explanation for the Stradella affair read in conjunction with the  
Casale negotiations highlight the complex networks the ambassador cultivated from Venice to 
serve Louis XIV and his own burgeoning career. Estrades sought to demonstrate to the king that 
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the untoward interventions in the life of a mere musician should not vitiate his character as royal 
representative. To deflect attention from the Stradella affair, Estrades offered a diplomatic 
morsel to Louis XIV that soon led to the French acquisition of another Italian enclave. The 
ambassador aimed to vindicate his role in the republic. His independent actions in Louis XIV’s 
name required response and resolution from the Crown. That the monarch should have to react to 
rather than generate policy speaks to the difficulties of the absolutist bureaucracy in managing 
ministers at great distances from the centers of royal command.  
Estrades’s story contributes to our understanding of the international context of 
louisquatorzien centralization and expansionism. Historians have considered absolute monarchy 
as a politics of collaboration and accommodation between the monarch and the various entities 
and individuals within the kingdom vying for authority. I stress that foreign relations represented 
another context in which accommodation materialized externally; louisquatorzien centralization 
was forced to adapt to contingencies occurring far from the center of royal authority. Using 
Estrades as a lens, the reversal of center and periphery in relation to traditional views of 
absolutism comes clearly into focus. Embassies like that of Estrades in Venice revealed the level 
of adaptation that foreign affairs and ministers to foreign courts demanded from the Crown. 
Rather than a solely domestic project whereby the monarch imposed royal will upon the 
periphery, Estrades’s story highlights how events outside of the kingdom necessitated response 
from the seat of the absolute monarch-qua-periphery. Foreign affairs acted upon Louis XIV’s 
aspirations to centralized authority while providing unforeseen opportunities to hegemonize 
beyond France. 
The ambassador’s involvement in scandal was not an example of personal malfeasance. 
The affair demonstrated, rather, Estrades’s able – if overzealous – cultivation of constituents 
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sympathetic to France. Using the scandal as a point of departure we discover that Estrades was a 
crucial and strategic conduit in an information system linking Venice and Rome to 
plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Nijmegen (1675-1679) and Louis XIV’s foreign ministry. 
Estrades aligned himself with members of the Venetian nobility and the Roman curia in service 
to Louis XIV. The scandal represented the level of involvement French ambassadors to Venice 
could attain among Venetian government officials and others like gazeteers. Similarly, it 
underscored the continued role of Venice as a diplomatic outpost and Venetian politics and its 
patricians in determining those of France. Estrades’ complex communication networks and his 
relationship with French allies among the Roman and Venetian nobility, like the Contarini, 
created the strands linking him to the attempted murder of Alessandro Stradella.  
The Abbé d’Estrades’s service in the republic amplified the process of cooperation the 
monarchy employed among nobles filling state offices while Louis’s international dominance 
grew during the Dutch War (1672-1679). Ambassadors in Louis’s government utilized their 
appointments to further personal careers as clients of ministers close to the crown. Sara Chapman 
noted that horizontal associations between “allies” of “political and social equals” existed within 
the hierarchy of the centralizing state. Embassies like Estrades’s in Venice revealed that such 
connections among nobles seeking preferment crossed states’ borders through international 
networks.5 The Stradella affair resulted from the creation of such horizontal alliances as a royal 
minister, and an examination of the events surrounding Estrades’s involvement in the attempted 
murder of Stradella illustrates how a well-connected French ambassador melded personal interest 
with that of the Crown.   
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International Aims of France on the Eve of the Congress of Nijmegen (1678-1679): 
Framing the Stradella Affair 
 
The Bishop of Beziers was instrumental in distinguishing the French monarch’s 
reputation and dynastic objectives in the Serenissima, and in the early 1660s Venice had 
represented an embassy through which to augment French authority in Italian affairs. The 
Franco-Venetian rapport provided a counterpoise against the papacy and in so doing also a tool 
to weaken Spanish preeminence in the peninsula. Moreover, the bishop promoted economic and 
cultural growth through negotiation and subterfuge. Upon Beziers’ departure in 1665 a chargé 
d’affaires, Pailleroles, and Paul Vedoa, the French consul, kept the foreign ministry abreast of 
events in Venice. New resident emissaries returned again in 1668 when the President de Saint-
Andre (1668-1671) and then the Comte d’Avaux (1671-1675) served as resident ambassadors.  
During these years Louis XIV’s dynastic pretensions generated the War of the 
Devolution (1667-1668) and the so-called Dutch War (1672-1678) as the king sought to 
incorporate lands in the Spanish Netherlands into France’s borders. Carlos II had formed an 
alliance with the United Provinces in 1673, and belligerents were obliged not only to fight on 
land but also in a number of sea battles. The Spanish king ruled the southern Italian peninsula 
and Sicily, and cities such as Naples and Messina were key to Spanish commerce and strategy as 
well as to their Dutch allies.6 French naval victories from 1674 to 1676 further established the 
bid for French hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea, and they promised the continued possibility 
of French ascendance over Spain in Italian affairs and the progress of French commerce in the 
sea amid the Venetians, Dutch, and English.7 The wood to be found in forests in the Sicilian 
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interior drew French interest also as it was necessary for the construction of galleys.8 
Additionally, the naval successes of Admirals Vivonne and Duquesne against Spanish and Dutch 
fleets, led by the formidable Admiral de Ruyter, pushed the Messinese and Neopolitans to 
encourage Louis XIV to release them from Spanish rule.9 The Italians’ importunements to the 
king and the hatred of the Messinesi for Spain enticed Louis XIV to strengthen his forces in the 
waters around Southern Italy.10  
By 1675 European states already pressed to end the war. Plenipotentiaries set off for the 
city of Nijmegen to negotiate a peace. The outcome of the congress meeting at Nijmegen and of 
the king’s policies in the Mediterranean depended to some extent upon French advances in 
Southern Italy.11 The French presence there and along the Barbary Coast foreshadowed the 
commercial and diplomatic enterprises that developed in later decades. Bourbon foreign and 
commercial policies across the sea and Europe required a constant diplomatic and consular 
presence in the port cities encircling the sea and to the systems of knowledge they afforded as the 
Congress of Nijmegen began. French emissaries and commerce would later stretch from Tangier 
to Jerusalem and beyond to trade routes onto which the Mediterranean gave access as far afield 
as Persia and Siam before the close of the century. French ministers in port cities such as the 
Republic of Venice helped to lay the groundwork for these contacts providing a buffer of 
political representation as Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s commercial legislation encouraged the vast 
maritime networks that would develop in the late 1680s and 1690s. This was not yet fully 
realized in the late 1670s.  
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For the French the republic remained an outpost from which to press Mediterranean 
economic and political interests. Venetians saw France as another competitor in Mediterranean 
commerce during Estrades’s embassy. The republic already vied with Dutch merchants in the sea 
who outnumbered those of France and Venice in the early 1670s. Dutch diplomats, trading 
companies, and merchants established relations with the Ottoman Sultan first in 1612. 
Capitulations with the northern republic were renewed in 1634. The confirmation of French 
trading privileges with the sultan in 1673 and then of the English in 1675 saw Venice further 
discomfited from its role as the chief European state with links to the sea.12 As Louis XIV’s 
navies threatened to establish permanent French authority in Southern Italy through the war, 
Venetians warily witnessed its northern neighbor pressing further into its former spheres of 
authority.  
The Troubles of a Novice Ambassador: Estrades Balances the Friction of Family-qua-
Personal Interests with Louisquatorzien Politics  
 
Constant communication then from Venice with French envoys at Nijmegen attested to 
the utility of the Mediterranean and Italian theaters to Bourbon policies as Jean-François 
d’Estrades, Abbé de Conches and Moissac and the “Persona” of Heerlen (1647-1705) traveled to 
the republic13 The abbé’s father, Godefroy, Marshal d’Estrades (1607-1686), Louis XIV’s chief 
plenipotentiary at Nijmegen, averred to his son, “the word you send to us of the advantages we 
have in Sicily is very considerable, and I hope that the conquest of that kingdom will be assured 
for the king.”14 Moreover, Estrades’s instructions from the foreign ministry were to cultivate the 
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“good disposition” of the Marcian Republic toward the king; a disposition that had been 
continued overtly since the loss of Candia through gifts such as gondolas and gondoliers for the 
canal of Versailles given earlier in 1673.15 No doubt such gifts were to dispose the king 
favorably to the republic as his armies swallowed up territory and as his navies grew under 
Colbert’s reforms threatening to move further eastward into Venetian maritime spheres 
throughout the war. The recent rehabilitation of French commercial links with the Ottomans 
through the 1673 capitulations contributed to the Venetian senate’s apprehensions toward the 
king. Louis promoted aggressive representation in Venice to utilize its renown as a reputedly 
neutral state, its location, and Venetian politicians to advantage while re-assuring the republic 
that he had no greater designs in Italian affairs; a point far from true that still required royal 
abnegation.16 
Estrades arrived in Venetian territory on 24 December 1675 remaining incognito and 
learning of protocol from Pailleroles and Vedoa who acquainted him with spies and Francophile 
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Venetians that his predecessors used to gather information.17 Estrades’s initial months incognito 
allowed him time to find the “habits and channels” that would provide critical intelligence to 
send to the court. He connected with diplomatic colleagues throughout Italy writing to 
Pomponne “to make him aware of the things of which he needed to be informed.”18 He began 
accessing sources of information immediately passing much of 1676 forming relationships and 
relaying the knowledge that he gleaned through them.   
Estrades made his ceremonial entrée on 14 April 1676, and according to Armand 
Baschet, “the more the reign of Louis XIV advanced, the more pomp and outlay in all that could 
strike the viewer and denote grandeur was applied to the expense of these solemnities.”19 
Following the example of previous ambassadors, Estrades’s entry into the city was no less 
ostentatious. “I can assure you, Monsieur,” the abbé remarked to the secretary of state, “that by 
the richness and number of the gondolas and those of my household and the other things that 
happened everywhere, I maintained the honor that the King bestowed upon me and that you 
procured for me by sending me here.”20 All of this expense, however, soon took its toll on 
Estrades’s finances and consequently decisions he made in his work. 
News of Estrades’s first audience in the collegio reached Paris and his father at 
Nijmegen.21 His friend in Paris, the Abbé de Marcillac, remarked, “the gazettes recounted for us 
the magnificence of your entrée, but there has been no word from you. I have always noticed that 
you are truly a subject of virtue and that you are above such small things.”22 On 15 April, the day 
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following his entrée, as was customary, the ambassador was brought before the collegio to 
present lettres de créances and to pronounce the first speech.23 The language of the harangue 
complimented Venice. Estrades remarked that the king could leave the repose of Europe “in no 
more sure hands” than those of the republic.24 He made it plain that Louis XIV agreed with the 
choice of a Venetian envoy as mediator at Nijmegen: “in this way,” he said, “all of Europe will 
well enjoy a profound rest through your happy participation if the holy intentions of the King, 
my master, go unopposed.”25     
Estrades became a strategic conduit for intelligence. He was only twenty-eight years old 
upon becoming ambassador to Venice, but the abbé’s diplomatic pedigree and ability to acquire 
intelligence for the king, Pomponne, and his father soon proved accomplished.26 Estrades’s 
embassy differed from that of the Bishop of Beziers remarkably as the abbé represented Louis 
XIV when the king’s international political and military authority advanced briskly.27 Certainly 
among contemporary observers the king’s reputation throughout the 1670s became ominous to 
international observers. Commentators such as the Venetian ordinary ambassador to France from 
1676 to 1679, Domenico Contarini, distant kinsman of Alessandro Stradella’s Venetian patron, 
later remarked of the king that, “Fortune, favoring Louis XIV, who reigns gloriously, opened the 
way for him to progress towards European domination, making him arbiter no less in peace than 
in war.”28 
The success of Bourbon dynastic politics in Europe emerging as the congress opened can 
be credited, in part, then to Estrades’s talent for utilizing intelligence networks. The broader 
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25 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 97, Estrades’s harangue before the senate, 15 April 1676, F. 125v. Italics mine. 
26 Cornette, Chronique du règne de Louis XIV, 243.  
27 Rudolph Vierhaus, Germany in the Age of Absolutism, 120-121. 
28 Domenico Contarini, Relazione, 1676-1680, in Le relazioni degli stati europei lette al senato dagli ambasciatori 
veneti nel secolo decimosettimo, serie II, vol. III, Francia, in Barozzi and Berchet, 311. 
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international connections of the Estrades clan, diverse and rich through his father’s long service 
to the crown, benefitted the young abbé.29 His father had a colorful diplomatic and military 
career that began under Cardinal Richelieu. Godefroy d’Estrades and his family continued as 
clients of high-ranking members of the court including Louis XIV’s brother, Philippe, Duke 
d’Orléans, who personally recommended the Abbé d’Estrades to the Venetian senate.30 The 
Estrades clan was closely connected to secretary of state Simon Arnould de Pomponne to whom 
the abbé owed his position as ambassador and to whom he spoke affectionately in his 
dispatches.31  
For as much as the Estrades clan was ingratiated into Pomponne’s circle of clients, they 
were often annoyed with members of the Colbert dynasty – enemies of Pomponne – as the 
correspondence of the abbé and the marshal attested.32 Work required that both ministers interact 
with Colbert and members of his family, but neither the seasoned plenipotentiary nor his son 
cared for the Colbert clan. The Estrades languished under the financial burden of diplomatic 
service. Both were subject to Colbert’s tight reign on Crown finances and remuneration of 
personal expenses used in royal service.33 Friction between great ministers close to the monarch 
posed difficulties – especially regarding finance – for their creatures.34  
                                               
29 Letters from the Duke d’Orléans to the Republic of Venice and exchanged between him and Estrades testify to 
their close ties. See BnF, CL, vol. 584, Fs. 18, 163, 172, and 236-237; La Haye, “Un Bénéfice aux Pays Bas,” 3-4. 
30 For an account of the Marshal d’Estrades’s full career see, Eloge du Comte d’Estrades in Ambassades et 
Négotiations de Monsieur le Comte D’Estrades, en Italie, en Angleterre, et en Hollande depuis l’Année 1637 
jusqu’en l’Année 1662 (Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1768); François Bluche, “Estrades, Godefroy, Comte de’,” in 
Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle, ed. François Bluche (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 554; BnF, CL, 584, Duke d’Orléans a la 
République de Venise à Saint Germain en Laye le 24eme de Novembre, 1675, F. 18.  
31 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 97, Estrades to Pomponne, 18 April 1676, F. 134v. 
32 Rule and Trotter, A World of Paper, 192.   
33 For examples see, BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 3 July 1676, F. 71v-72r; BnF, CL. Vol. 582, 
Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 6 Nov. 1676, F. 186r; BnF, MC, vol. 175, Estrades to Colbert, 25 Nov. 1677, F. 
466r-466v. 
34 Rule, “Louis XIV: Roi-Bureaucrate,” in Rule, 55, 68. 
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The Estrades’ complaints about the Comptroller General of Finances showed no 
sympathy for the strain that expenditure for the war provoked. Both ambassadors complained of 
Colbert’s slowness in paying Crown stipends and the embarrassement arrears caused them with 
creditors. Marshal d’Estrades worked closely with Colbert’s brother, the Marquis de Croissy, 
who served with him as plenipotentiary at the congress. The Marshal complained to his son that 
the Comptroller ignored his requests for funds, and remarked of Colbert’s brother, Croissy, “he 
is a man of incompatible humor and I get along with him only because the King expressed his 
desire for me to do so….”35  
Financial difficulties aside, the Marshal d’Estrades warned his son that his career 
depended upon his performance as ambassador in Venice saying, “You must do everything 
possible to remain in service because you will have no other opportunity than that in which you 
find yourself to advance your fortune.”36 During the abbé’s years in the republic, his father 
reminded him of familial obligations and the effect his role as ambassador might have on his 
relations. The abbé’s younger brother, Jacques, Chevalier d’Estrades, was a maitre-de-camp in 
the royal army. He was imprisoned in the Bastille in January 1677 “for malversations committed 
in his regiment” the marshal wrote to the abbé, “this greatly worried me for a number of 
considerations of which you can well judge the consequences.”37 Estrades’s tenure in the 
republic positioned him to succeed in further royal service, and his success could provide a 
buffer against embarrassing mistakes within the Estrades family when ministerial clans vied 
                                               
35  BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 6 Nov. 1676, F. 186. 
36  BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 9 July 1677, F. 548.  
37 The archbishop of Cahors, Estrades’s uncle, brought a court case against the abbé regarding the revenues and 
jurisdiction of Estrades’s rights to the abbacy of Saint Melaine another of his benefices. The bishop believed the 
abbacy should fall under his jurisdiction. The marshal believed that the chevalier’s indescretion could negatively 
affect his younger son’s – and the family’s – affairs with such legal and financial difficulties pending. BnF, CL, vol. 
582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 19 Jan. 1677, Fs. 271-272; AAE, CP, Venise, Pomponne to Estrades, 6 Jan. 
1677, F. 7r. 
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against one another for royal favor at the council level and when his own relatives looked for 
preferment through them.  
His father importuned the abbé on a number of occasions to assist members of their 
family through his position in Venice. The marshal asked Estrades to find military employment 
in the republic’s armies for his older brother, Louis, and a family cousin, the Marquise de 
Saumerdik, niece of the former French ambassador to Venice, the Comte d’Avaux. The marquise 
was engaged in a costly court case against her mother and for whom it was thought the abbé 
could use his influence to procure funds Venetian creditors owed former Ambassador d’Avaux 
to assist the family in the case.38 Neither request proved possible to fulfill, but it was believed 
that the abbé might help in these matters. The pressure was on the ambassador from his father to 
pursue family interests as well as those of Louis XIV when he entered the republic.  
Estrades and the Failed Election of Giovanni Battista Nani as Arbitrator to the Congress of 
Nijmegen 
 
An important facet of Louis XIV’s “holy intentions” for Venice and partially underlying 
Estrades’s visit was facilitating the choice of emissary Venice might send to Nijmegen as a 
neutral arbiter for the talks. He was also to warn Venice’s senate against collusion with Spain as 
Louis XIV’s military successes during the ongoing war intimidated the republic.39 
Plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen asked the senate to consider sending one of its patricians as an 
intermediary at the congress, and the senate nominated the procuratore di San Marco, Giovanni 
Battista Nani, for the duty. Louis XIV highly approved the choice.40 Nani served as 
                                               
38 BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal d’Estrades to Estrades, 2 Sept. 1677, Fs. 603-604; BnF, CL 582, Estrades to Marshal 
d’Estrades, 17 Sept. 1677, Fs. 655-656, 657. 
39 Pomponne, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d’instruction, 78-79; The marshal also reminded Estrades of the 
importance of persuading Venice to break its ties with Spain in favor of France. BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal 
d’Estrades to Estrades, 10 May 1676, F. 31. 
40 BnF, CL, vol. 584, Pomponne to Estrades, 6 Jan. 1676, F. 33; Pomponne, Mémoire du Roy pour servir 
d’instruction, 78.   
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extraordinary ambassador to France from 1659 to 1660 showing himself pro-French and 
staunchly anti-Spanish in subsequent foreign affairs upon his return to Venice.41  
Carlos II and Leopold I attempted to recruit Venetian sympathy against Louis XIV’s 
incursions into Spanish dominions throughout the Italian peninsula toward which the republic 
too nourished a definite fear.42 Both powers, however, blamed Venice for Spain’s ongoing 
defeats in Sicily and Naples because the republic, in its neutral posture, denied imperial troops 
passage through the Adriatic to fight the French. Spanish and imperial ambassadors argued 
against Nani’s nomination, but their objections to the Francophile Nani were as much political 
reprisals for Venice’s political choices as they were biases against the procurator’s approval of 
the French.43  
Estrades’s father strongly pressed his son to encourage Nani’s nomination among 
Venetian patricians, and he reminded the abbé of the procurator’s qualities and experience and 
the benefits for French policies he could provide in the negotiations.44 Venice’s senate used the 
prospect of Nani’s nomination to rebuff the emperor and the Spanish while pandering to the 
French making certain that his nomination was publicized but not a fait accompli. Estrades wrote 
in March to Cardinal César d’Estrées, “the senate seems completely resolute to uphold its choice 
[of Nani] in case it is obliged [to act], being dissatisfied with the House of Austria, whose 
conduct could not be more imprudent and more advantageous to His Majesty’s interests.”45 As 
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Pomponne, 22 Feb. 1676, F. 70r; Cozzi, Repubblica di Venezia e Stati Italiani,193. 
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with many matters of foreign policy, the neutral republic dangled possible favors before the 
states that most threatened it.  
Venice’s losses to the Ottomans in 1669, however, caused the Venetians to turn inward in 
succeeding years to deal with inevitable domestic conflict in the fallout.46 In the years following 
Venice’s defeat to the Ottomans many nobles were censured for their personal gains in the war, 
and the former Venetian commander, Francesco Morosini, faced an embarrassing trial for his 
failure. Furthermore, the acerbic political climate inspired a debate over the limited number of 
patrician families dominating the powerful Council of Ten and the tribunal of the inquisitors of 
state.47 There had been controversial “corrections” – correzioni – of the Ten since the sixteenth 
century, but the most recent came on the heels of the Candian War in 1668 and again in 1671. 
The correction of the council was a means to limit the types of state prosecutions – many aimed 
at patricians – that could fall under the Ten’s jurisidiction and, more importantly, to prohibit the 
same noble families from repeated access to seats in the council and as inquisitors.48 A small 
oligarchy of powerful patricians repeatedly held the offices abusing their influence and wealth 
while fueling patrician grudges.49 Throughout 1676 factions in the maggior consiglio, jealous of 
inequalities of wealth and access to the highest state offices, pressed for another correction. Soon 
those in the consiglio calling for the correction convinced the body, and names were put forth for 
elections as correttori.50 Giovanni Battista Nani was prominent in the debate, and despite 
                                               
46 Louis, Comte de Voinovitch, La Monarchie Française dans l’Adratique: Histoire des relations de la France avec 
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venerable service to the republic, his reputation among the partricians fell by the end of 1676 as 
he lobbied against the Ten’s authority.51  
Meanwhile, as the tumult in the Venetian government continued, other facets of 
Estrades’s embassy related to French foreign policy in Italian and Mediterranean affairs emerged 
bringing Estrades closer to the intervention in the life of Alessandro Stradella. Stradella’s 
misfortune would occur almost two years into Estrades’s tenure in the Serenissima, and, 
uncharacteristic of Estrades’s judgment as it was the affair demonstrated the abbé’s loyalty to 
constituents sympathetic to France and to his career that he was constructing throughout 1676.  
The roots of the scandal lay in 1676 as Estrades pressed for Nani’s election as a mediator. 
The French offensive against the Dutch and the Spanish off the Southern Italian coasts provided 
leverage for the French at the congress as the war dragged on. Estrades’s father remarked in June 
1676 that his son’s communiqués regarding French success there “will help me not a little to 
influence affairs for peace.”52 Estrades also became convinced throughout the year that Venetian 
senators were favorable to the French cause and thus also to Nani’s election. Secret meetings 
with patricians led Estrades to suggest an open alliance between Venice and Louis XIV who, in 
turn, promised renewed access to port cities that the republic had lost during the war if they 
would raise no objections to his continued offensive against Spain and the United Provinces in 
the south. The king and Pomponne agreed that such offers — easily revoked — would dissuade 
Venice from siding with the Spanish who pressured Italian states to rebuff Louis XIV.53  
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Estrades was to insinuate this offer in private conversation with Venetian senators rather 
than make overt statements to the senate as he had proposed.54 The ambassador reported his 
compliance using circumstances like a private audience accorded to the outgoing Venetian 
ambassador to France in 1676, Domenico Contarini. Contarini, having a “great inclination for 
France used all of his credit to go there out of the fear that he had that he would be sent to 
Spain.”55 Estrades flattered Contarini even further, remarking to him “that his house was already 
well-considered, and that his person would be much esteemed [in France].”56 Such flattery was 
hoped to inspire assistance in Nani’s election and to entice republican politicians away from 
France’s enemies. 
While Venice’s senate considered the position of mediator and officially nominated Nani 
to attend the congress, the senate’s confirmation of the procurator to the post was hindered 
through the objections of Leopold and Carlos. Through their ambassadors they refused to begin 
peace negotiations until Nani’s nomination was either withdrawn or mitigated through the 
election of a co-mediator with less sympathy for the French. Finally, Estrades regretfully wrote 
to Pomponne in December that “no one speaks any more of the departure of Monsieur le 
Procurator.”57 If French enemies had not succeeded in blocking Nani’s nomination outright, their 
prostrations in conjunction with the senate’s manipulation of its possible intervention in the 
congress, impaired the election beyond hope. 
The refusal to elect Nani as a mediator was a slight setback for French influence at the 
congress to be sure, and it can also possibly be explained because Nani was a proponent of 
limiting the Council of Ten during the months in which his election was debated. His subsequent 
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inclusion as one of the five patricians elected in February 1677 to correct the Ten possibly 
provides further insight as to why the factions in the government may have denied him another 
prestigious international appointment.58 The republic responded to the geopolitical threats 
materializing around it in the late 1670s seeking to distance its internal political structures and 
state secrets from foreign emissaries through the surveillance of the same Council of Ten and the 
state inquisitors whose authority “troubled” Venetian patricians and for which the 1677 
correction materialized.59 As domestic political debates continued, Venice still remained 
uncertain of the objectives of neighboring states in Italy – especially those of Louis XIV. The 
Venetian government could not be certain of the complete allegiance of its own aristocracy like 
Contarini who maintained affinities for foreign courts.60 Estrades’s efforts to sweeten the ears of 
Venetian politicians for Nani’s election had failed, but he had gained allies among patrician 
households like the Contarini clan and the access they provided to state secrets.   
Estrades as “Case Officer:” Webs of Intelligence Within Venice 
The republic’s formalized yet porous government institutions left the ambassador to rely 
more heavily upon clandestine sources of intelligence, as Filippo De Vivo asserted, “In practice, 
it proved impossible to stop informal communication.”61 The king’s international successes 
during Estrades’s embassy in conjunction with negotiations at Nijmegen exacerbated Venetians’ 
fear of the French. Informants working for the Abbé d’Estrades confirmed royal successes in 
Messina and Naples and provided intelligence from within the Venetian goverment. Similarly, 
Venetian spies reported rumors of Louis XIV’s initial movements to supplant Spanish rule in the 
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Milanese adjoining the terraferma.62 The industrious confidente, Camillo Badoer, apprised the 
inquisitors of these rumors and the names of numerous agents supplying Estrades data.63 Badoer 
seems to have made the French embassy his particular concern over the next decade, and he 
cultivated an affable and familiar relationship with anti-French informants detailing intimate 
conversations with the Spanish ambassador and with associates in the English and imperial 
embassies as well.64 Badoer’s focus, however, was the lista dei francesi where had no less than 
seven contacts in the French embassy proper including one of Estrades’s secretaries.65 The 
majority of Badoer’s reports revealed a distinct distrust for the French ambassador, his 
household, and his network of informers ranging from prostitutes to high-ranking Venetian noble 
houses like the Contarini.66 Badoer’s evidence reflected the role of the ambassador himself as a 
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spy who on one hand represented officially the image of Louis XIV while on the other hand 
labored as the purveyor of secret and privileged information that could only be acquired through 
espionage.    
For this reason Venice maintained tight scrutiny through the inquisitors informants of 
those whom De Vivo called “professionals of intelligence” interacting with foreign 
ambassadors.67 Estrades became an important patron and protector of sources useful to French 
needs, entertaining spies from across Italy who brought information to share with colleagues in 
Rome, his father at the Congress, and with the foreign ministry. Spies informed the inquisitori di 
stato that through myriad intermediaries the abbé received constituents in Venice such as the 
Messinese Don Domenico, who relayed “secret letters that he had from Rome and Messina” 
containing “many notable avvisi.”68 Writers of anti-Spanish memoirs in favor of the French 
seizure of Sicily and known informants like the Jesuit Father Francesco Maria Leone, a priest 
bringing frequent news of Spanish actions from his native Messina, looked to Estrades for 
safety.69 Pomponne’s dispatches relayed the king’s pleasure at such resourcefulness, and the 
inquisitors’ domestic agents’ riferte – referrals – corroborated the scale of information exchange 
that fed the abbé’s dispatches to the foreign ministry and the plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen who 
continually requested more.70  
Spain aimed to silence Estrades’s sources in Venice. Through the influence of their 
ambassador, the Marquis de la Fuentes and the Hispanophile papal nuncio, Airoldi, Spain 
                                                                                                                                                       
Constantino] kept far away from Venice.” It seems though that his brother returned to Venice by February 1676. 
ASV, IS-RC, Busta 566, Nizza to the Inquisitors of State, 9 Jan. 1676.    
67 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 75. 
68 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 566, Nizza to the Inquisitori di Stato, 12 Jan. 1676. 
69 For evidence of Estrades’s interactions and exchanges of information with Father Leone regarding Messina and 
Naples see the following: AAE, CP, Venise, vol.97, Estrades to Pomponne, 6 Feb. 1676, F. 65r; AAE, CP, Venise, 
vol. 97, Pomponne to Estrades, 4 March 1676, F. 80; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 97, Estrades to Pomponne, 9 April 
1676, F. 107v. 
70 BnF, CL, vol. 582, Plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen to Estrades, 3 Jan. 1677, F. 255; BnF, CL, vol. 582, Marshal 
d’Estrades to Estrades, 9 April 1677, F. 377. 
124 
employed spies and pamphleteers in the republic for its use or to sequester them and to have 
them expelled. When the marquis himself failed to bribe Leone he engineered the priest’s arrest 
and interrogation before a Jesuit tribunal.71 In a demonstration of loyalty to his source, Estrades 
petitioned the senate to allow the priest to leave Venice. Highlighting Louis XIV’s protection of 
him and his own seeming attachment to the father, Estrades stated that the king regarded Leone 
“as his own true subject,” adding that, “neither justice nor reason, nor any type of right can 
permit me to suffer that anyone disturb the well being of Father Leone.”72 The ambassador’s 
interventions went unheeded, however, and the republic, usually so caustic where the Jesuits 
were concerned, deferred to the Company, drolly commenting that it never interfered in their 
internal affairs.73  
Sensing possibly that favors extended to Louis XIV might prove useful in its clashes with 
the papacy and given French success in the south, Venice’s senate allowed the priest to leave for 
Ancona.  Exchanges between Estrades and Pomponne revealed that Louis XIV granted the priest 
permission to take refuge in France should he believe himself safer there than in Rome.74 The 
priest did not waste the opportunity accepting the invitation. He opted for an indefinite sojourn 
there after boarding a vessel from Messina.75 Estrades informed Pomponne of the informant’s 
decision for asylum in France on 24 October 1676 after receiving a last letter from him. The king 
showed no special sympathy for the Jesuit despite his service, but Estrades’s persistance 
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demonstrated a considerable concern for the elderly prelate who was one of his earliest sources 
of information after arriving in the republic.  
Venice, as much as Spain, considered Estrades’s sources dangerous because of their 
involvement in French interventions in Italy.76 The Venetian government recognized a long-term 
threat in the exchange of clandestine information. Informants maintained careful surveillance not 
only of spies but also of authors writing anti-Venetian propaganda and gazetteers in the city that 
praised foreign authority and publicized sensitive information in the many avvisi and gazettes to 
be read there. Printing houses and published works were of special concern to the inquisitori di 
stato who collected evidence of memoires impugning the republic and its government.  
The French ambassador encouraged and sustained some of these authors.77 In December 
1676, Badoer asserted: “Venetian liberty, which permits authors to write what they want in its 
[the republic’s] periodicals, in the circumstances of the present wars, has made them increasingly 
venal, to such a degree that no one expects them to write the truth, but to satisfy foreign wit in 
favor of their own interests.”78 To support his own criticism of the republic’s liberality toward 
the press and pamphleeters’, he reported that the gazetteer Benedetto Giuliani, “supported the 
party of France in his papers,” and that protected by “ministers of that Majesty, he had secured 
an annual stipend of fifty doppie.”79 What Badoer did not report to the inquisitors in detail, 
however, as Estrades informed Pomponne two months earlier, was that the Spanish ambassador 
threatened Giuliani’s life for refusing thirty écus a month to write on Spain’s behalf.80 
                                               
76 Lonardi, L’anima dei governi, 144. 
77 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 566, Castelnovo to the Inquisitori di Stato, 26 February 1676. When dealing with the ASV it 
should be considered that folders in different busta, while marked a certain year, often contain letters from other 
years that have been misfiled. 
78 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 566, Nizza to the Inquisitori di Stato, 19 December 1676. 
79 Ibid. 
80 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 97, Estrades to Pomponne, 3 Oct. 1676, Fs. 313r-313v. 
126 
After explaining to Pomponne the nature of Venice’s economy of information, the abbé 
petitioned the king to provide a stipend to Giuliani, a service that Estrades “assured” Pomponne 
“is more necessary in Venice than one would imagine.”81 The ambassador said Giuliani, “who 
writes the broadsheets here, is attached by inclination to France… and he is the only one to write 
for the advantage of our people.”82 Having procured the pension of five hundred livres, the 
ambassador remarked: “he is very useful to the King’s service through the ease with which 
Italians believe the news that one puts out and through the other advantages that our enemies find 
in publishing false (reports).”83 Estrades framed the discussion around Giuliani’s safety, but 
certainly he knew that the writer’s services could be bought if the French refused him a better 
offer. The ambassador also omitted the extent of Giuliani’s usefulness to him that became clearer 
in the negotiations for Casale in 1677. The abbé learned to spend for intelligence and the loyalty 
of his sources. Indeed, Estrades’s beneficence towards Giuliani earned a lifetime supporter of 
French interests, and Giuliani’s loyalty would, as chapter four will show, bring tragedy to his 
own family.  
Although the king was known to be generous in paying for information, the state of 
Estrades’s finances indicated that more than likely he was expected to pay sources out of his own 
income.84 Some sources, however, received gifts directly from the court. Badoer warned the 
inquisitors that the Marchese Annibale Porroni, and accomplices who, through letters written to 
France, “had offered themselves against enemies in the event that the king decided to bring 
armies into Italy.”85 He added that Porroni “dedicated his book to the Dauphin of France coming 
off the presses five months ago and entitled Trattati Universal Moderno. I know that the 
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ambassador, Signor Abbate d’Estrades sent abroad the books and dedicatory letters to both the 
King and to the Dauphin on his behalf.” “The Signor Marchese,” the confidente added, “speaks 
badly of the Venetian nobility through ignorant concepts… and in the bottegha of the earlier 
mentioned Nicolini [a publisher] foments many unjust ideas.”86 Estrades verified Porroni’s 
attachment to France, and he delivered the works of Porroni to whom the Dauphin made a gift of 
diamonds and a personal letter.87 Political literature became particularly unsettling to the 
Venetian government in 1676, and the French government tolerated works that undermined 
Venice’s mythologized stability and freedoms. 
Printed Friction between Louis XIV’s Monarchy and Venetian Republicanism 
For as much as Louis XIV publicly courted Venice as an ostensible ally, his broader 
pretensions to expansionism illustrated the possibility of encroachments upon Venetian 
authority. Estrades relayed that a senator made reference to Charles VIII’s Italian campaigns 
while discussing the growing presence of the French in Sicily.88 If Louis XIV promoted anti-
Spanish propaganda in the south and in Lombardy fomenting rebellion, then French 
encouragement of anti-Venetian propaganda and of proponents of a French military presence in 
the peninsula indicated that the king’s future ambitions could include hegemonic policies in 
Italy. Venetians’ traditional affinities for the French as counterpoise to the Habsburgs tensed 
after the loss of Crete and as French military might in Italy promised to grow.  
The diminished stato da mar injured Venice’s reputation abroad enough, but published 
critiques might undermine the reputed domestic tranquillity of the Serenissima in the eyes of its 
                                               
86 ASV, IS-RC, Castelnovo to the Inquisitori di Stato, 7 Dec. 1676. 
87 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Estrades to Pomponne, 23 Jan. 1677, F. 19r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Pomponne to 
Estrades, 24 Feb. 1677, F. 40v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Estrades to Pomponne, 5 June 1677, Fs. 128r-128v; AAE, 
CP, Venise, vol. 99, Pomponne to Estrades, 9 June 1677, F. 130r.  
88 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 99, Estrades to Pomponne, 19 June 1677, F. 141r. 
128 
European neighbors exposing its weaknesses to future depredation.89 The unfolding correction of 
the Council of Ten added evidence to an international audience that Venice’s famed stability was 
not without its limits. The state inquisitors sought even to control unflattering literature beyond 
its borders. Their response to the French publication of Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de la 
Houssaie’s Histoire du gouvernement de Venise in March 1676 underscored the republic’s 
insecurity toward works publicizing domestic dysfunction.90  
Amelot de la Houssaie had been secretary to Estrades’s predecessor, the Président de 
Saint-André. In his two-volume work Amelot described in uncomfortable detail the institutions 
of Venice’s government, and the secretary asserted that the losses to the Ottomans in the 
sixteenth century and in the recent Cretan war contributed to the republic’s “decadence.”91 
Although decline was not yet a certainty, Amelot painted a picture of a fractured government 
tyrannized through the Council of Ten and plagued with patrician greed and immorality.92 
Amelot revealed the alleged realities of a state that prided itself upon the impenetrability of its 
institutions. That these assertions came from a French secretary heightened the government’s 
distrust of subsequent French envoys as Louis XIV’s authority expanded.  
According to Lucien Bély, Amelot’s work no doubt delighted Louis XIV as the king 
disdained republics.93 The Histoire earned Amelot a short stay in the Bastille after protestations 
from ambassador Domenico Contarini. Contarini claimed to suppress “the torrent” attempting to 
have all of the copies siezed “to stop prejudice” that “mortally wounds” the image of the 
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republic.94 Estrades’s dispatches affirmed Amelot’s allegations of an ongoing crisis among the 
Venetian aristocracy. The abbé confirmed the rifts in political allegiance among patricians 
through the immense authority councils like the Ten held over the mechanisms of state. The Ten 
threatened nobles’ privileges and status within the hierarchy, but information leaks from within 
the government seemed to justify the harsh measures the Ten and the inquisitors employed.95 
Through its detailed coverage of Venetian government practices Amelot de la Houssaie’s history 
underscored the permeability of the republic’s government and the leaks of intelligence through 
government officials feeding ambassadors like Estrades with Venice’s state secrets to the benefit 
of France.   
Estrades’s Judgment Compromised: Pandering to Venetian Patricians and Alessandro 
Stradella’s Misfortune 
 
Studies like Amelot de la Houssaie’s indicated the breech in the attempts of the Ten and 
the state inquisitors to control information leaking from within the government through the 
aristocracy to foreign envoys. Investigations of Estrades’s correspondence reveals that his 
information networks consisted not only of spies and newswriters. The French ambassador 
maintained associates at the highest levels of the feuding Venetian patriciate. His role was to 
strengthen French policy in the republic, and the fissures among Venice’s nobility proffered 
nobles eager to benefit from the French association augmenting their prestige as well as swinging 
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the ostensibly neutral political elite further toward France. Throughout 1676 Estrades came to 
believe that many Venetians in the government were inclined to an alliance with France, and 
closeted conversations with senators and the efforts of operatives with access to the Venetian 
aristocracy sustained his assumptions.96 The confidenti confirmed that Estrades consorted with a 
number of patrician families. Those with whom he did not have personal access like the 
Contarini provided Estrades with news of the state’s internal politics gathered from them through 
associates like Father Bonaventura, an “intimate confidente of the Lord Ambassador of France.” 
Badoer relayed, that, although apparently speaking French only “barbarously,” Bonaventura 
frequented patrician homes posing as a docent of the language.97 
Included among the other patrician families to which the ambassador was linked were 
some of the republic’s oldest clans like the Mocenigo, Giustiniani, and Delfin. These 
relationships compelled Estrades to provide favors. The various branches of the Contarini family 
held high offices in Venice. Another member of the clan, Alvise II Contarini, was elected as 
doge in 1676 during the abbé’s embassy.98 Estrades worked to maintain links with those like the 
Contarini, “a family which,” the abbé said, “has already given [the city] so many leaders that it 
would seem the throne is hereditary due to the virtue which it [the house] is clothed.”99  
Estrades’s communication networks and his relationship with pro-French Venetian 
nobility, like the Contarini, created the first strand linking him to the attempted murder of 
Alessandro Stradella. Luigi Contarini hosted Stradella in Venice after he fled Rome. The 
composer’s behavior in Venice and escape to Turin then prompted Contarini to capitalize on his 
family’s association with Estrades. The composer’s employment in the household of Luigi 
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Contarini prompted Estrades’s ill-advised letter to the Marquis de Villars in a bid to placate the 
patrician. The ambassador’s career, however, necessitated that he use an international network in 
his own interests as well. The letter was compensation for services rendered to him as much as a 
political connection in Venice for Louis XIV. 
Estrades, Stradella, and the Veneto-Roman Connection     
The second strand linking Estrades to Stradella and evincing his abilities to create 
networks resulted from French aims in Northern Italy and in Rome. Venice was a beehive of 
information for purveyors of news.100 Keeping Estrades’s finger on the pulse of Italian politics 
along with private informers from Southern Italy were myriad contacts comprising cardinals in 
Rome. Louis XIV’s tense relations with the papacy became a matter of concern for the abbé. 
Most immediate to understand the Stradella affair were the abbé’s links in the Roman curia as 
the struggle between France and Spain required communication between the ambassador in 
Venice and the papal court.   
The long fingers of Spanish authority reached across Italy to Venice through the pro-
Spanish papal nuncio, Airoldi, with whom Estrades had an uneasy yet officially cordial rapport 
and through Spanish emissaries. The republic believed Spain an optional ally should warnings of 
further French invasions in Italy hold true.101 The senate considered buying land near Cremona 
from Spain to increase its own terraferma territory, a prospect that Louis XIV would view, 
according to Pomponne, as Venetian support for Spain.102 Incipient French seizure of Venetian 
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merchant ships off of the coast of Sicily, Naples, and Livorno as the royal navy dominated these 
waters in early 1677 provoked the republic’s disgust and a deeper sympathy for Spain.103 
Whereas Estrades claimed Venice’s attachments to Louis XIV strong in 1676, the outrages of the 
French navy made 1677 uncertain.104 The republic wanted to be “the peaceful and absolute 
master of the (Adriatic) gulf,” and French movement ever closer into eastern waters piqued the 
senate.105 1677 would prove a crucial year not only for France’s rapport with Venice but also for 
Estrades’s personal fortunes in which Spanish cardinals took a role.  
Spanish authority in Italy and the Mediterranean persisted in the late seventeenth 
century106 Indeed it would not be until after Nijmegen that Spain’s international might declined 
definitively before French predominance. Regarding Italian potentates and the Roman curia, “the 
Spanish monarchy had not suffered irreparable damage,” as Gianvittorio Signorotto averred, “for 
the church, it (Spain) continued to represent the greatest source of benefits and wealth” 
supplying notably “most of the cardinals” in the papal court.107 For Estrades the failing health of 
octigenarian Pope Clement X Altieri in 1675 and the anticipated conclave of 1676 represented a 
web of negotiations with Venetian and other Italian cardinals sympathetic to Louis XIV – the 
king and Pomponne foresaw the need to strengthen this web.108  
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The virulence of Franco-papal relations from the time of Alexander VII Chigi endured 
throughout the Clementine pontificate. As the curia anticipated the ailing pontiff’s death, Louis 
XIV pressed Venetian cardinals and those in Rome like Cardinals Chigi and Maidalchini to sway 
an imminent conclave in France’s favor. They instructed Estrades to remind cardinals of their 
attachments to France.109 Gallican policies toward the French clergy’s responsibilities to the 
monarchy and the king’s ability to control clerical nominations would be affected through the 
choice of Clement’s successor. Religious concerns – among them Jansenism and papal 
interference in the rights of the régale – and the problematic preponderance of Spanish influence 
within the curia with its extensive Italian networks were in the balance.110  
The conclave of 1676 saw the election of Innocent XI Odeschalchi – a pontiff concerned 
with ecclesiastical reform and purportedly opposed to bilateral papal alliance with any one 
dynastic power.111 The pope soon put this policy into practice. Estrades informed his father that 
the pontiff blocked a Spanish ship en route to Sicily carrying troops acquired in Rome from 
leaving the city. He remarked “His Holiness showed through this action that he wanted to be 
neutral and that he did not at all wish to permit either the French or the Spanish from levying 
troops in his states, which is all the two states could hope from him given his role as common 
father and mediator of the peace talks.”112 The pope’s publicized move against Spain, however, 
although perhaps inadvertently, aided French victories in the south.  
The months preceding the election witnessed the exchange of gestures to improve the 
Franco-papal rapport. From Venice Estrades solicited pro-French clergy such as Cardinals 
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Rospigliosi and Chigi, and he cultivated a relationship with papal secretary of state Cardinal 
Alderano Cibo while ingratiating himself with Venetian prelates.113 Cardinal Delfin supported 
France, and the abbé reminded him of his obligation to the king.114 Princes of the Church could 
inspire papal cooperation with Louis XIV in Rome and counter the Hispanophile nuncio, Airoldi, 
in Venice with whom a number of them clashed personally.115 Estrades’s correspondence 
throughout his embassy confirmed Sebastiano Foscarini’s belief that Bourbon foreign policy 
meant to “snatch the states of Italy from the Spanish.”116 The ambassador strove to promote 
French predominance in Venice and at the papal court through links with cardinals favorable to 
the king and others cardinals, like Maidalchini, to whom the French king paid handsome 
stipends.117 
Knotting the Strands of an International Scandal 
Estrades’s career aspirations – and those of his father for him – intertwined with royal 
and ecclesiastical affairs. The ambassador received the nomination to the abbacy of Moissac in 
1669 before he left for Venice, yet he had not received the expensive papal seals – or bulls – that 
legitimized the sinacure’s revenue.118 The cost of maintaining a magnificent household in Venice 
and payments to informants was far from negligible, and, as Saint-Simon averred much later, the 
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abbé “had indebted himself greatly” in his Venetian embassy.119 A legal struggle with the Bishop 
of Cahors for supremacy over the abbacy of Saint Melaine, favors paid for the possibility of a 
nomination to the archbishpric of Bourges – for which Estrades’s father lobbied for his son – and 
the latent revenues from Moissac bottlenecked Estrades’s income further in 1677. Such debts 
could only be settled finally through the bulls’ conferral.120  
The abbé and his father explained the difficulties of personal finances and the necessity 
of the bulls to Pomponne, Innocent XI, Cardinal Cibo, the Venetian Cardinal Basadona, and 
Cardinal d’Estrées.121 Estrades petitioned to have the bulls gratis foregoing the requisite – and 
costly – tax to the papal chancery.122 The business dragged on for months during which time 
Estrades curried Cibo’s patronage in particular to expedite matters and to demonstrate the “care 
that he had taken to manage the court of Rome.”123 The ambassador did not want to appear 
unable to command ties in the curia. To encourage respect in Rome he undertook special favors 
even for his French benefactor Cardinal d’Estrées providing protection for the singer Catarina 
Nardi. The songbird was a Roman protégé of Estrées’ going to Venice possibly to further her 
career at the new opera house of San’ Angelo that opened in 1677.124  
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Meanwhile, the Marshal d’Estrades recommended his son personally to the king, the 
pope, and Cardinal Cibo in hopes that he might receive the gratis for the bulls and, of greater 
importance to the Estrades clan, a nomination to the archbishopric of Bourges which fell vacant 
in 1676.125 The Marshal likewise worked in concert with the curia to negotiate the status of 
Cardinal Bevilacqua, the papal nuncio at the congress, in the hierarchy of ambassadors and 
plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen and in his controversial request for the personal use of one of the 
city’s churches. Given the tensions surrounding the negotiations, Estrades’s maneuvers were no 
small matter.126 His efforts undoubtedly contributed to his son’s favor with the pontiff.     
Finally, in March 1677, Estrades’ entreaties and favors prevailed. Innocent XI granted the 
gratis for the bulls no doubt also as a boon to Louis XIV and the marshal at Nijmegen.127 The 
abbé noted that “...even My Lords the Spanish Cardinals were favorable to me.”128 Estrades 
immediately set about gratifying those, like Cibo, who acted on his behalf through favors.129 By 
so doing the other strand in the Stradella affair emerged. Cibo was implicated when the 
composer and a castrato of his acquaintance contrived to extort ten thousand scudi from a Roman 
woman engaged into the Cibo family. The scheme failed leaving the Cibo family humiliated. 
Fleeing for his life, Alessandro Stradella left Rome taking refuge in Venice bringing the 
composer into Contarini’s household as a musical protégé.130 In Contarini’s service, Stradella 
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encountered his Venetian patron’s mistress, Agnese, with whom he began a love affair. The 
musician’s subsequent irritating behavior among Venetian nobility, the jealous Alvise Contarini 
in particular, opened a clear path for Estrades to show his gratitude and to strengthen French 
aims in Venice and Rome through what seemed a trifle.131 When Stradella fled Venice for Turin, 
Estrades complied with Contarini’s importunements to assist in his revenge against the 
composer.  
Here the strands of the Stradella case merged. The abbé provided Contarini and his men 
with the letter to be delivered to the Marquis de Villars in Turin. “It is true, Monsieur,” the abbé 
claimed to Cardinal d’Estrées, “I was told if Stradella refused to marry the girl he abducted 
(Agnese van Uffelle), which was the only way to satisfy M. Contarini, that he would be 
beaten…. The request (for the letter) did not seem violent, and as I have a natural repugnance for 
action of that nature, it did not win me over even when I learned that the musician often merited 
a more severe punishment. But what persuaded me further was that he cruelly injured Cardinal 
Cibo in Rome.”132 Estrades claimed innocence in the affair’s violence, but as the acknowledged 
representatives of Louis XIV, the participation of his ambassadors leant an air of royal approval 
to an extraterritorial act of aggression.133 Calm soon returned to Franco-Savoyard relations 
through the ministrations of Estrées in Turin and Cardinal Delfin writing on Estrades’ behalf.134 
In a Christmas Eve letter Estrades’s father remarked, “I am very pleased to learn…that the affair 
causing so much noise is over.”135 The marshal confirmed, indeed that “…the King no longer 
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thinks of it.”136 The young ambassador still believed that his reputation, however, could be 
compromised in the last month of 1677. He penned a long letter to Louis XIV containing 
documents that he hoped would fully rehabilitate him and his efforts.  
A Penitent Abbé d’Estrades Outing the Negotiations for Casale 
 
The Stradella incident resulted from the lengths to which Estrades went to secure an 
intelligence community in Venice and the continued loyalty of the pro-French members of its 
patriciate in the service of his career and of Louis XIV. The ill-advised involvement in 
Contarini’s vendetta, however, left him embarrassed, and it compromised his reputation with the 
king and his patron, Pomponne. The end of 1677 was a low point in Estrades’s nascent career, 
and as an ambassador maintaining royal favor came through prudent negotiation and personal 
engagement. Estrades labored under an absolute monarchy constructed through functionaries’ 
abilities to promote and seamlessly utilize personal bonds of fidelity. These were deployed both 
vertically and horizontally abroad and in the domestic hierarchy. Louis XIV’s eventual purchase 
of Casale from Ferdinando-Carlo di Gonzaga-Nevers, Duke of Mantua through Estrades’ 
connections must be analyzed through the lens of the humiliating Stradella affair and his father’s 
earlier warning to remain in royal favor. 
Count Ercole Francesco Maria Mattioli’s final confirmation to Estrades in November 
1677 that the Duke of Mantua was willing to sell Casale to Louis XIV arrived at just the moment 
when Louis XIV’s opinion of Estrades needed bolstering.137 The abbé awaited the Duke’s 
unreserved declaration to enter into negotiations with Louis XIV for the fortress for four months 
before writing of it to the king.138 Perhaps because of the Stradella debacle the ambassador 
believed he should come clean about the heretofore-secret negotiations. His first letter in 
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December after learning the king pardoned him for the miscalculation opened submissively.139 
Then followed twenty-two coded folios detailing secret meetings and correspondence in concert 
with Count Mattioli and the above-mentioned pamphleteer Giuliani. Estrades detailed the duke’s 
exact motivations for offering the fortress to Louis XIV. The gratifications the abbé secured for 
Giuliani in December 1676 were not solely for pro-French broadsheets in Venice. Giuliani 
served Estrades as intermediary in the early stages of talks just as Mattioli served the duke. The 
ambassador and Mattioli maintained the deepest secrecy throughout — evading even the vigilant 
Badoer.140 
The Duke’s positive response prompted the abbé to solicit a letter to Louis XIV from the 
count and an exact plan of the fortifications of Casale’s citadel. Estrades included a coded copy 
of Mattioli’s letter in his dispatch to his master.141 In the letter Mattioli opined that of all the 
ambassadors the king sent to Venice that Estrades “surpassed them all.” Through his negotiations 
with the ambassador Mattioli knew him to be “seeking…to procure for Your Majesty the most 
considerable expansion.”142 The count added that his master, alongside his Nevers roots, were 
“Princes more French than Italian,” and that the current duke desired to accommodate the 
king.143 Mattioli concluded saying that through his efforts and those of the abbé that they also 
heard from many contacts in the Milanese willing to be rid of Spanish rule there and favorable to 
the French.144  
Details of the subsequent dealings between Estrades and Mattioli for the final French 
purchase of Casale have been described adequately elsewhere so that a retelling is not necessary 
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here.145 Accounts of the negotiations leading to Louis XIV’s acquisition of the stronghold in 
September 1681, however, have not fully described Estrades’s motivations through the process 
before his December 1677 letter of apology to Louis XIV. In his full treatment of negotiations 
for Casale, Carlo Contessa mentioned only Estrades’s inducements for preferment but nothing of 
his thorny ordeal in relation to Alessandro Stradella.146 Indeed to understand the personal nature 
of Louis XIV’s foreign ministry and the abilities of its actors to create networks of information 
dependent to some degree on them as individuals such description is illuminating.147  
Sebastiano Foscarini, Venetian ambassador to France (1678-1683), understood the 
personal nature of the international system in which he and the abbé negotiated. Through the 
trenchant reportage of his 1683 relazione to the senate he analyzed not only the hegemonic 
intentions of Louis XIV, but he captured succinctly Estrades’s personal inducements. Foscarini’s 
report coupled with Estrades’s letter of 18 December 1677 depicted a clear image of the 
arrangement’s nuances prior to the well-documented events of 1678-1679 that effectively 
clenched the deal in favor of France.  
Foscarini described in a bleak synthesis his observations in France. For Louis XIV, 
according to Foscarini, the seizure of Casale, already a fait accompli by 1683, allowed the king a 
stronghold in Northern Italy and it, along with Pinerolo in Piemonte, provided two “piazze” from 
which to intimidate the Duke of Savoy who held “the keys to Italy.”148 The ambassador 
summarized, that while difficult to obtain, the king’s intentions to expand French authority 
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throughout Europe could materialize with further acquisitions in Italy like Casale.149 He 
expressed Louis XIV’s aspirations to a universal monarchy, admitting that the Duke of Mantua 
offered himself, perhaps unwittingly, as part of this design. He opted ostensibly to negotiate with 
France to maintain some semblance of his authority and to augment his pitiful finances.150  
Foscarini then described Estrades’s contribution to the potential growth of French 
hegemony in Italy. The duke was in part pressured from the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs to 
render Casale to them on a variety of pretexts.151 They beset the Duke of Mantua threatening to 
wrest Casale from him by force. Rather than posit French threats along with those of Spain and 
Austria, the “…Abbé d’Estrades, at that time the Crown’s ambassador to Your Serenity,” 
Foscarini continued, through an “active intellect,” manipulated the duke’s vanity. The 
ambassador, from Foscarini’s perspective, convinced the duke that by “putting Casale in the 
hands of the Most Christian King,” that he would “…confound the pride of the Spanish….”152 
Estrades was “happy to keep the threads of the negotiation in his hands until the most opportune 
moment, neither pulling them too hard nor abandoning them.”153 Foscarini implied the abbé, like 
the Bourbon foreign policy he served, saw that the acquisition of Casale – in conjunction with all 
of Louis XIV’s other seizures of Spanish territories and piazze across Europe – would allow 
France  “…to render its kingdom inaccessible [to attack].”154  
The Venetian ambassador relayed the strategem of the negotiation to the senate. He 
explained the method through which Estrades plied the prince’s defenses. Well-acquainted with 
the institutions of French absolutism through his four years at the court, Foscarini understood 
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Estrades’s position and that his future depended on performance.155 He offered then an 
explanation for the abbé’s personal interest in the arrangement. Having admitted Estrades’s 
intelligence, Foscarini said the ambassador was “…eager to give birth to a transaction in an 
otherwise fruitless ministry.”156 The abbé was indeed unable to persuade Venice from its 
neutrality despite his best efforts through secret channels and through direct representation. 
Foscarini recognized that the abbé was in Venice for that reason, and he undoubtedly knew that 
Venice had no intention of allying overtly with France as French forces gathered around Italy 
and as the king’s plenipotentiaries “dictated rather than contracted peace” at Nijmegen.157 
Conclusion 
Foscarini’s observation of Estrades’s conduct in his final year in Venice was more 
precise than he might have known. The Abbé d’Estrades’s work in the republic provided French 
leverage at the Congress of Nijmegen to gain “overlordship of the maritime ports of the 
Kingdom of Naples and to reenter Sicily.”158 He had relayed details of French entry into Spanish 
dominions in Italy and into the “commerce of the Levant and the Mediterranean…impeding its 
resources to all others” through his dispatches.159 Estrades reinforced French networks in Rome, 
and he upheld Franco-Venetian relations in a moment when the republic was growing anxious 
about its ally’s intentions.160  Yet, he had failed earlier to secure Giovanni Battista Nani’s 
nomination as mediator, and he could not shake the Venetians from their position of ostensible 
neutrality; a neutrality that allowed the republic an economic and geopolitical respite in the years 
following the loss of Crete. In this period, Estrades made use of the Duke of Mantua’s 
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predicament during the fallout of the Stradella case, writing “…Sire, this misfortune obliges me 
to act henceforth in all things through a greater circumspection for which I hope Your Majesty 
will never have reason to be dissatisfied with my conduct.”161 He sensed that his reputation and 
his future came close to ruin. His advancement depended on some advantage to offer the Crown 
as Venice stubbornly resisted an alliance and became increasingly anti-French. 
The duke’s final decision to negotiate with France for Casale through Count Mattioli 
arrived just as the abbé reeled from the Stradella affair. The confluence of these events, so well 
symbolized through Estrades’s penitent letter to Louis XIV in which he enclosed those of 
Mattioli, proved to be the conjuncture of events – both international and personal – to which 
Sebastiano Foscarini referred. Estrades waited for a fortuitous opportunity before he divulged the 
secret negotiations with Louis XIV and Pomponne. The prospect of a tidy purchase at Spain’s 
expense intrigued and pleased the king securing Estrades’s position as successor to the Marquis 
de Villars as ambassador to Turin where he served from 1679-1685.162 The French siezure of the 
enclave in 1681, however, would take place as Louis XIV’s authority across Europe swelled to 
an alarming degree from the vantage of other European rulers. In the early 1680s an embittered 
Venice would interpet the French occupation of Casale in conjunction with the king’s emergent 
politics of réunions and refusal to succor Leopold I against the Turks as evidence that he might 
soon seek to incorporate other Italian lands into his kingdom. Venetian amity toward the king 
was to shift to the House of Habsburg.  
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The Ambassador as a Target: 
Michel-Antoine, Sieur d’Amelot (1682-1685)  
 
 The Sieur d’Amelot attended the solemnities for the Feast of Saint Anthony in the 
basilica of Saint Mark on 13 June 1684.1 Inside the sanctuary, Amelot, the French ambassador, 
accompanied Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani, Venetian officials, and other foreign dignitaries. 
Meanwhile, outside in the crowded piazza, the captain of the sbirri — the guards of public order 
— conspicuously shoved two of Amelot’s liveried gondoliers and a French tailor living in the 
city through jeering spectators gathered in Venice’s most public space.2 The captain arrested the 
men for allegedly instigating a brawl in a cabaret abutting the piazza. Rather than moving the 
men to the prisons in gondolas away from the crowd, he made a scene of their arrest sending 
messengers into the basilica to alert members of the Council of Ten of the tumult. There 
followed an aggressive escort through the crowds after which the French prisoners were cast into 
the “black prisons.”3  
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This was the fourth and most public incident involving members of Amelot’s household 
since his arrival in Venice; it would not be the last. Amelot’s experience in the republic was 
punctuated with such events. He feared for his reputation with his master, but he maintained that 
these humiliations were “premeditated with enthusiasm” and aimed at his legitimacy as 
ambassador and at the king’s dignity.4 Since Louis XIV’s successes through the treaties of 
Nijmegen and Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1678-1679, the acquisition of Casale in 1681, and the 
ensuing politics of réunions, many in Venice became hostile to the French.5 Despite the 
controversies surrounding Amelot and his repeated pleas that the king demand satisfaction from 
the republic, Louis XIV kept the novice ambassador in Venice for almost three years.  
Amelot’s service in Venice from May 1682 to February 1685 was the most acrimonious 
of any French ambassador there in the late seventeenth century. His tenure coincided with 
France’s greatest territorial expansion and arguably the final ascent of Louis XIV’s authority in 
Europe.6 That the king allowed Amelot to suffer degradations underscored the objectives of 
French foreign policy in the early 1680s.7 Venetian treatment of Amelot revealed anti-French 
sentiment in these years reinforcing the republic’s pro-Habsburg foreign policy. Venice could 
not afford openly to attack Louis XIV as his international authority expanded. The government 
could, however, use state mechanisms to make his representative’s life miserable; it did so as 
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Louis XIV asserted international pressure that threatened Italy and as Venice's senate debated an 
alliance with Leopold I just prior to the formation of the Holy League in 1684.  
Amelot’s embassy illustrated the evolution and the restrictions of the louisquatorzien 
foreign relations apparatus at the apogee of French international authority. Correspondingly, 
Amelot revealed a republic persevering as a sought-after military and diplomatic ally in Europe 
and the Mediterranean.8 The French foreign ministry’s responses to the ambassador in these 
years showed that Louis XIV understood this.9 The king believed it necessary to threaten Venice 
with the possibility of war in Italy to avoid opposition to either French territorial designs in the 
empire or to compromise Franco-Ottoman relations.10 Incidents such as that in the Piazza San 
Marco during the Feast of Saint Anthony allowed the king leverage with the republic while 
focusing his attention on the depredations of the Spanish Netherlands and the German frontier.11  
The king proved through reprisals since 1661 that humiliating or attacking his emissaries 
was intolerable. That he allowed his ambassador in Venice to undergo embarrassment with no 
retaliation reinforced the reality that Venice posed a viable risk to French international policy in 
the early 1680s. France needed a neutral Venetian government vis-a-vis the Habsburgs.12 French 
territorial and commercial policies, however, compelled the republic into a pro-Habsburg 
alliance that was to last until the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699.13 Dangling the inexperienced 
Amelot in the void, Louis XIV intentionally gave Venetian antipathy a target at which to fire in a 
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bid to stop the senate allying with Leopold I while giving a novice ambassador a lesson in 
diplomacy. 
Amelot in Venice: A New Man in the Administration of Colbert de Croissy 
 
Amelot succeeded the Sieur de Varangeville (1679-1682) as ambassador to Venice.14 
Varangeville maintained the Franco-Venetian rapport after the Abbé d’Estrades’s negotiations 
for the acquisition of Casale.15 Casale cemented France’s foothold in Northern Italy after the 
Congress of Nijmegen, and the purchase hinted at what many feared were Louis XIV’s designs 
to incorporate Italy piecemeal into his kingdom.16 The shift in foreign ministers that occurred 
after Arnould de Pomponne’s disgrace in 1679 also unsettled the Venetian government. Charles 
Colbert, Marquis de Croissy (1679-1696), although friendly to the republic, was unknown 
among foreign states regarding the direction of French foreign policy under his supervision. The 
concomitants of French support for Hungarian rebels under the leadership of Count Tekely 
against Leopold I and the establishment of the first controversial chambre de réunion of Metz in 
1681 contributed to the senate’s continued disillusionment toward their ostensible French allies 
and the new minister of foreign affairs.17 Consequently, Venice was predisposed to mistrust 
Louis XIV’s newest emissary.  
Of Picard origin, Amelot was born in 1655 to Charles Amelot, Seigneur-Baron de Neury 
and Brunelles (1620-1671) and Marie Lyonne daughter of Jacques Lyonne, Seigneur de Cuilly 
and Livri, a former grand audiencier de France.18 Charles Amelot became a conseiller in the 
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parlement of Paris the year Louis XIV was born. In 1674, at the age of nineteen, Michel followed 
his father in this capacity, and in 1677 Amelot purchased the position of maitre de requêtes 
ordinaire de l’hôtel du roi.19 These charges soon brought him into the closed circle of conseillers 
du roi dans ses conseils d’état et privé - “the central nervous system of the government.”20  
Diplomacy became more centralized and systematic under the direction of Colbert de 
Croissy.21 As in other areas of louisquatorzien bureaucracy, there was a push to elevate men of 
robe origin to diplomatic posts.22 Attachment to the king and Croissy rather than noble birth 
propelled their careers.23 They owed continued preferment to the king, and under Croissy the 
push to control the training of the crown’s foreign ministry and its functionaries became 
exacting.24 In the context of a centralizing administration and the promotion of able servants, 
Amelot was ideal for elevation into Croissy’s ministry. His duties in the king’s conseils no doubt 
brought Amelot to the attention of Croissy. He received instructions on 17 February to leave for 
the Republic of Venice.25 As Louis XIV was installing his court definitively at Versailles in 
1682, the twenty-seven year old Michel-Antoine d’Amelot embarked upon his new career as an 
ambassador.  
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He arrived in Venice incognito on 10 May along with his suite and an expensive cargo of 
furniture and plate for the embassy.26 The ambassadress, Catherine le Pelletier de la Houssaie, 
followed her husband.27 Although his official entrée would not occur until 23 September, 
Amelot’s troubled rapport with the Venetians began while still incognito.28 Venetian suspicion 
revolved around members of Amelot’s household. His secretary, lackeys, and gondoliers became 
suspects involved in incidents ostensibly regarding the franchises that all foreign ambassadors 
claimed in Venice. It is uncertain how many servants Amelot employed, but it seems he had 
fewer than the Bishop of Beziers.29 Bonsy, for example, noted that he had eight gondoliers in his 
retinue whereas Amelot employed only six.30 The sources attest that serving Amelot in particular 
were Roger de Piles, his personal secretary, and a Signor Bartolomeo Franceschi, a “secretary of 
the Italian tongue.”31 For the first time an ambassador in Venice claimed the French consul there, 
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Jean-Guillaume Le Blond, and the vice-consul, Comel, as part of his retinue sharing in the 
privilege of duty free comestibles he dispensed to his household.32  
The enterprise of diplomacy and its consequences for foreign policy were not solely 
dependent upon the ambassador. The details regarding Amelot’s household that emerge from 
dispatches, affidavits, and the avvisi from the inquisitors’ spy, Badoer, revealed the extent to 
which the ambassador’s dependents fed the organism of espionage. They played a vital role in 
collecting the news informing the ambassador’s dispatches. Amelot was inexperienced with and 
allegedly arrogant toward the Venetian government. The discourse regarding diplomatic 
immunity and Amelot’s prejudice toward his hosts highlighted the problematic nature of early 
modern diplomats as individuals in representative roles. The scandals of Amelot and his staff 
exemplified incidents Louis XIV’s foreign ministry hoped to circumvent through the later 
creation of the académie politique.33 The foreign ministry increasingly believed a centrally 
trained pool of ambassadors and secretaries might protect state secrets and avoid mistakes on the 
part of diplomats.34  
Amelot’s papers demonstrate the praxis of Colbert de Croissy’s reorganization of the 
ministry of foreign affairs after 1679.35 Croissy’s creation of a foreign affairs archive began 
during Amelot’s embassy, and the ambassador’s correspondence with Louis XIV and Croissy 
highlighted the attempt to control information vertically that characterized the foreign ministry 
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for the rest of the reign.36 Previous ambassadors to Venice, as I have shown, corresponded with a 
number of ministers at court and ambassadors abroad. Bonsy and Estrades independently 
undertook cultural and commercial tasks expanding the scope of foreign relations at the 
instigation of ministers outside the ministry of foreign affairs like Jean Baptiste Colbert. 
Estrades’s embassy underscored the problems that arose through an ambassador’s independent 
correspondence, but such interventions are largely absent from Amelot’s papers.  
Amelot entered a hostile republic torn, as was Leopold I, between Mehmet IV in the east 
and the Ottomans’ French ally to the west.37 The ambassador was to report to Louis XIV any 
information of Venice’s relationships with Leopold and with Mehmet.38 Of critical importance 
too were the Venetian senate’s reaction to French movements in Italy and the republic’s possible 
negotiations with the Habsburgs in Italian affairs.39 Copies of communiqués between Amelot and 
other French ambassadors are rare in the sources. Amelot corresponded often with the 
ambassador in Constantinople, Gabriel-Joseph de Lavergne, Comte de Guilleragues, but this is 
evident only through references he made to Guilleragues in dispatches to the king. The 
correspondence with Guilleragues came as a direct order from Croissy as Venice was the closest 
destination for packets going from Constantinople to France that were to be included in those of 
Amelot coming from Venice.40  
The relative dearth of Amelot’s letters to and from other French emissaries in dispatches 
is, however, hard to account for. A possible explanation is that Amelot’s robe origins and his 
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relatively new post in the king’s conseils of 1677 left him dependent upon Louis XIV and 
Croissy until he was established within broader information circles. Amelot’s status as a new 
diplomat restricted a priori international networks at his disposal. He had no experience with 
intelligence networks beyond France as had Bonsy and Estrades. Amelot too was the first 
ambassador in Venice whose communication with Jean-Baptiste Colbert does not survive if it 
existed. Throughout his embassy Amelot corresponded directly with Louis XIV, writing letters 
to and receiving letters from Croissy infrequently; this was a different practice compared to 
previous foreign ministers who maintained triangular correspondences with ambassadors and the 
king.  
Amelot’s inexperience showed in his early writing as Louis XIV instructed Amelot to 
write more detailed information in his early dispatches.41 The reports of Amelot and Venetian 
ambassadors’ in Paris attest that he corresponded with personal acquaintances and members of 
other government ministries in France to be sure.42 None of these letters, however, found their 
way into the state archives as had Bonsy’s and Estrades’s. In fact, under Croissy’s ministry, the 
king forbade ambassadors to include personal papers in official dispatches and packets. This 
practice reflected the complex divisions among Croissy’s commis who had little enough time to 
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handle copious official communications.43 Louis XIV and Croissy wanted to control the flow of 
sensitive information with fewer intelligence breaches; fewer distractions from the ministry’s 
instructions to the ambassador; and no cluttered packets complicating the work of Croissy’s 
commis overseeing the synthesis of foreign intelligence sources and composing official 
responses.44 Amelot complied with this innovation.45 
A further novelty appeared in Amelot’s instructions. Scholars of early-modern Europe are 
familiar with the relazioni of Venetian ambassadors; these extensive reports possibly prompted 
Croissy to command the ambassador to write a final report.46 No previous ambassador to Venice 
was asked to do so. This suggests the affinity for documented information that Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert imposed throughout Ludovician bureaucracy. Colbert’s methodical control of affairs 
through meticulous documentation influenced his brother’s methods as foreign minister.47 
Curiously, if Amelot wrote a final relation it did not survive among his papers in the archives. 
Perhaps it has simply been lost although this would be uncharacteristic of Croissy’s formation of 
the first systematic diplomatic archive in France.48 Further examination of Amelot’s experiences 
in Venice, however, may help to understand why the document was either never written or 
omitted from the ambassador’s extant correspondence.      
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Amelot Reports the Venetian Response to Louisquatorzien Foreign Policy: Prelude to a 
Mediterranean War, 1682-1684  
  
Amelot’s communication with Louis XIV provides evidence of the monarch’s 
overconfidence in his intelligence system to predict the capacities of perceived weaker states vis-
à-vis French policy.49 An examination of Amelot’s embassy in the Serenissima amplified the 
limitations of Louis XIV’s authority. The king and Colbert de Croissy followed a policy meant to 
maintain peace with the Habsburgs after Nijmegen. Correlative and injurious to this course was 
the further annexation of lands through the chambres des réunions that the king believed legally 
belonged to him pursuant to the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nijmegen.50 Croissy’s imperative 
was to maintain peace while courting states, like Venice, whose loyalty could help avoid another 
war with the Habsburgs as his politics of réunions’ progressed.51  
Amelot revealed that the king and the foreign ministry underestimated the resilience and 
military strength of the republic and of Leopold I.52 The foreign ministry could not curtail 
Venice’s disapproval of Louis XIV’s seeming greed and treacherousness. The king’s relatively 
healthy relations with the Ottomans in the early 1680s provided an opportunity to filch territory 
along the Rhine while the emperor’s resources were directed toward Hungary and while Venice 
gauged which enemy was the most pressing – Louis XIV or the Sultan.53 In Venice many - both 
commoners and aristocrats - believed them to be one and the same.54 
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Amelot began relaying detailed knowledge from the republic. Initially he hypothesized 
that Venice was engaged in diplomatic and military negotiations with Leopold I and Spain to 
neutralize the French presence in Italy and the western empire.55 It is easy to understand why 
Venice’s concerted mobilization of military forces in 1682 and 1683 appeared directed against 
the French as much as was Venetian public opinion.56 The purchase of Casale in 1681 provided 
Louis XIV a stronger presence in the peninsula.57 The arrival of French troops into Casale 
occurred on the same day as the annexation of Strasbourg after the deliberations of the first 
chambre de réunion.58 Casale and Pinerolo provided territories with fortresses allowing the king 
enclaves of authority in which to station French military presence in Italy. These spaces lay 
suspiciously near the Spanish Milanese although the king claimed he had no intention to expand 
there.59 The Duke of Mantua’s further cession of lands in Monferrato to the French in February 
1683 seemed to contradict royal reassurances.60  
The king’s growing rivalry with Pope Innocent XI too gained strength in 1682 as the feud 
over the rights of régale culminated in the Paris parlement’s acceptance of the Four Gallican 
Articles cementing Franco-papal tensions for the rest of the decade.61 It appeared to the Venetian 
senate that the king might force his will upon Northern Italian princes as he had imposed it upon 
                                                                                                                                                       
de Kahlenberg à la prise de Buda (1683-1686),” Acta Historica Academiæ Scientiarum Hungericæ 33, no. 2/4 
(1987), 291-292, 299; Preto, I Servzi Segreti di Venezia, 191. 
55 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 6 June 1682, F. 25r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to 
Louis XIV, 1 Aug. 1682, F. 75r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Louis XIV to Amelot, 3 June 1682, F. 12v; AAE, CP, 
Venise, vol. 107, Louis XIV to Amelot, 10 June 1682, F. 16v. 
56 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Amelot to Louis XIV, 9 Oct. 1683, F. 552v 
57 Spanheim, Relation de la cour de France, 493. 
58 Foscarini, Relazione di Francia, 1684, in Barozzi & Berchet, 485-486; Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks, 
263; Saint Hilaire, Mémoires, 9-10. 
59 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 13 June 1682, Fs. 29r-29v. 
60 ASV, IS-AF, Busta 153, Inquisitori di Stato to Foscarini, 27 Feb. 1683; Foscarini, Relazione di Francia, 1684, 
433, 485-486. 
61 Bergin, The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France, 217-218, 219-220; Foscarini, Relazione di Francia, 
1684, 469. 
158 
the Dutch and the Spanish in the treaties that followed Nijmegen.62 Louis separated these states 
allowing France the upper hand on its eastern boundaries as a possible war on two fronts loomed 
before Leopold I. The king and Croissy believed Leopold would avoid a double front assuming 
he would concentrate his forces against the Turk and the rebelling Hungarian nobles under Count 
Tekely.63 Louis covertly encouraged both of Leopold’s eastern enemies in a bid to keep the 
emperor engaged by supporting Tekely with subsidies and reassuring Mehmet IV he would not 
help the emperor.64 Amelot indicated that imperial envoys were in Venice and the Milanese 
suggesting that the senate prepared to join an anti-French coalition in Italy; many in Venice 
believed they should do so.65 The republic’s Bailo in Constantinople, Giovambattista Donà, 
struggled to sustain peace with the Ottomans. Although the senate voted to augment troops and 
to fortify its traditional chain of strongholds along the Dalmatian coast and in Friuli, there was no 
indication yet that it aimed to enter a protracted Mediterranean conflict against Mehmet IV.66 
The announcement of the league between Leopold I and Jan III Sobieski soon changed this 
assumption.67   
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From Amelot’s arrival in the republic and throughout 1683 Venice began to mobilize 
military and naval forces.68 The ambassador reported to the king that the senate debated 
extraordinary measures to raise funds. Among the proposals were the augmentation of the 
nobility and the recall for payment of banished subjects.69 The government considered levying 
sums owing to the state too from religious houses throughout the republic.70 The monies the 
senate raised, according to Amelot, paid for an extraordinary mobilization that the republic could 
still scant afford. Among the preparations in early 1683 were the construction of six galleys and 
three other vessels in the arsenal and a search for prisoners to man them.71 The republic sent 
thirty thousand ducats to Amsterdam to purchase iron cannons for galleys.72 By the end of the 
year the senate augmented preparations in the arsenal to construct thirty more vessels and fortify 
twenty eight existing ships.73 Venice also hoped to rent existing ships from neighboring states 
such as Genoa.74 Amelot’s skillful reportage incensed the Venetian government, and it began to 
consider how to stop information leaks to France.75  
Detailed reports of the senate’s financial and military preparations still provided no clear 
indication of where Venice meant to direct its resources. The republic’s uneasy peace with the 
Ottomans became increasingly fractured through the weakness and poor negotiations of Donà. 
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The Bailo made unauthorized promises that Venice would pay large sums to maintain a distinctly 
disadvantageous peace that permitted the Turks to edge closer to Venice’s Dalmatian 
dominions.76 Ultimately, the recall and subsequent imprisonment of Donà in May 1683 saw the 
collapse of Venetian-Ottoman diplomacy for the rest of the seventeenth century.77  
The senate now seemed paralyzed in deliberation, and, aware that Amelot was feeding 
Louis XIV news of its talks with imperial envoys, it hesitated to engage overtly with the 
Habsburgs.78 The siege of Vienna from July to mid-September intensified the senate’s fear of 
Mehmet IV, and pressed the republic to send more troops and materiel to its Friulian borders.79 
The King’s refusal to aid the emperor during the siege infuriated many in the republic and 
throughout Northern Italy where he was reputedly known as the “Most Christian Turk.”80  
Louis disbelieved Venice would declare war on the Ottomans in concert with the 
emperor.81 The king was certain of Leopold’s unwillingness to fight a two-front war. Should 
Venice declare openly an alliance, he wrote Amelot, the republic would be left alone to fight the 
Turk if Leopold refused to accept further French acquisition of territories in the empire pursuant 
to the negotiations at the Diet of Ratisbonne.82 The king pressed Amelot to court the senate away 
from the emperor, but the pervasive anti-French sentiment that Amelot described in Venice 
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indicated that the government and its subjects were indeed favorable to a Habsburg alliance.83 
The king’s augmentation in September of twenty six thousand infantry and fourteen thousand 
cavalry in his Italian enclaves pushed the republic closer to the Habsburgs. Venice shared the 
threat of the Turk with Leopold I, and the senate and people of Venice now distrusted Louis XIV 
completely.84  
 Visits from imperial emissaries with the senate increased after the league formed 
between Leopold I and the Polish king.85 With the Ottoman siege of Vienna, the pope too 
pressed the republic to join its forces to the league. In the closing months of 1683 the senate was, 
according to Amelot, now fully in favor of allying with the emperor, the Polish king, and the 
pope.86 He remarked that many principal noble families expected that an alliance against the 
Ottomans would allow them to regain a Mediterranean empire and enrich themselves as many of 
them had done in the Candian War.87 Entreaties from Jan III Sobieski and subsidies from 
Innocent XI in December emboldened the senate further to consider the league.88 The death of 
Doge Alvise Contarini in January 1684 provided the opportunity the senate needed to make a 
final decision.89 The traditionally pro-French Contarini and his faction in the senate were the 
voices calling for prudence and impeding the league. Amelot reported that within days of 
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Contarini’s death the senate passed the measure spearheaded by Francesco Morosini to join the 
league with sixty three votes for and thirty against.90  
Soon after the election of Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani, Venetian plenipotentiaries 
departed to join imperial and Polish diplomats at Lindz, and the senate dispatched a delegation to 
Rome.91 Amelot reported the official announcement of the Holy League in Venice on 12 
March.92 Venice’s government had cast its lot with Leopold, and the alliance was to have 
profound effects for Franco-Venetian diplomacy later in the century.93 The provisions of the 
treaty stipulated that each party pledged perpetual membership in the defense of the others and at 
least six years offensive membership in the league. Each party was to eschew unilateral peace 
with the Turk and come to the others’ aid in any future war with the Ottomans. The members 
were allowed to attack Mehmet IV’s forces wherever each found the most advantage and 
pledging to cede ecclesiastical dominions to the pope.94 Venice enlisted a rehabilitated Francesco 
Morosini, the hero-cum-scapegoat of the Candian war, to lead its forces as captain-general in the 
coming conflict.95 By June, Venice, in conjunction with Innocent XI and the allied forces of a 
number of German princes, most notably the Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg who supplied Venice 
infantry in three regiments, was ready to proceed.96 With auxiliaries from German princes, the 
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Grand Duke of Tuscany, the pope, and the Knights of Malta the republic assembled a flotilla of 
seventy three vessels and twelve thousand men for Morosini to lead.97 
Louis XIV was certain that the senate made a mistake joining the league.98 Leopold I 
refused to accept French suzerainty of lands wrested through the réunions, and there seemed no 
alternative to a war with the emperor on the Rhine. In this event, Venice, he warned would suffer 
the brunt of Turkish wrath. The king instructed Amelot to urge the senate to influence the 
emperor to concede at Ratisbonne.99 Leopold opted throughout 1684 to let Spain counter Louis 
XIV. The latter declared war on France in December 1683 in response to French depredations in 
the Low Countries.100 The Venetians feared that Spain’s war and Leopold’s interventions in the 
east would bring French ire definitively down upon Italy, and the vicious French bombardment 
of Spain’s ally, Genoa, in May 1684 lent credence to the republic’s fears as it did to all Italian 
states.101 The king, however, seemed more concerned with the ratification of the treaty of 
Ratisbonne; the humiliation of the Republic of Genoa was meant to warn Spain to sue for peace 
with France more than signal a French offensive into Italy.102 Amelot was to reassure the 
Venetians that his attack on Genoa should not concern them, and he sent his formal, although 
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sarcastic, congratulations upon the formation of the league.103 The ambassador was to specify 
that the king wished the republic every success in taking back the three kingdoms the Turk had 
stripped them of in the last three centuries.104 
Venice’s war began in earnest in early July as Morosini moved against the Ottomans at 
Santa Maura.105 The republic was greeted with an early victory strengthening its resolve, and the 
general crisis in the Ottoman government weakened the Turks in the face of the league’s 
offensives.106 Leopold I’s armies under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, routed the Turks near Pest 
as Morosini advanced against Santa Maura.107 Invested in the treaty with the League, the 
emperor could not continue to resist the French on the Rhine.108 On 15 August he accepted the 
twenty- year peace laid out at Ratisbonne.109 The treaty allowed Leopold to maintain nominal 
lordship of lands taken by France before 1679. Louis XIV kept Strasbourg, and he demanded 
Luxembourg from Spain. The treaty seemed to promise a period of stability along the Rhine 
while the Holy League advanced. Europe waited to see if Louis XIV’s ambitions subsided after 
the truce.110 Meanwhile, with almost lightning speed, Morosini reclaimed Venice’s lost 
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Dalmatian dominions adding much of the Morea early in the war portending the reestablishment 
of a Venetian Mediterranean empire.111 
Amelot and the Protection of French Commercial Interests in the Mediterranean Sea 
 
Amelot’s portrayal of Venetian foreign policy suggested that Venice’s government 
believed the French king posed the greatest threat to its Mediterranean trade and dominions in 
the 1680s.  Only the Turk frightened Venice more. The king’s commercial relations with the 
Ottomans made Louis XIV as much of a menace on the sea as his armies made him on European 
soil. Venice, as we have seen, was uncompromising in regards to its traditional claims of 
lordship over the Adriatic Gulf.112 The government sought to press its dominance in the gulf and 
to counter Louis XIV’s pretensions pursuant to the 1673 capitulations with Mehmet IV as war 
seemed imminent in 1683-1684.113  
The king was adamant that the republic’s claims over the Adriatic were no longer valid, 
and he warned that its alliances against the Turk must in no way damage French commerce.114 
Amelot and the king agreed that the Venetian Bailo, Donà, sought from 1682-1683 to hinder the 
Count de Guilleragues’s efforts in Constantinople. He defended the imperial ambassador’s 
precedence above the count as the “affair of the sofa” unfolded, and he allegedly impeded the 
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expedition of Guilleragues’s dispatches to Amelot hampering communications with the king.115 
These were attempts to destabilize French authority in the eastern sea. Meanwhile, in the west, 
Livorno’s importance as a duty free port and Marseille’s vessels and aggressive merchants 
amplified the threat to Venice’s income as a port city.116  
At the death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert the 6 September 1683 the French navy and 
merchant marine had grown from the insignificant number of fifty six vessels in 1661 to two 
hundred seventy six ships either in the water or under construction.117  Departing from Marseille 
and Toulon French ships traversed the Mediterranean elevating the French commercial and 
military presence in the sea as never before in spite of the fierce competition that characterized 
maritime commerce on the sea.118 Amelot was the first of Louis XIV’s ambassadors in Venice to 
undertake outright mediation for French commerce in Venetian waters, and the king lauded his 
initiative.119 Furthermore, he undertook commercial negotiations seemingly with no prompts 
from Louis XIV or the Marquis de Seignelay who succeeded his father, Colbert, as secretary of 
the marine. Mention of Venice’s pretensions to dominance in the Adriatic can be found in the 
dispatches of previous ambassadors, but Amelot was the first ambassador in Venice to see 
commercial mediation there as related to foreign policy.   
Whereas under ambassadors like Bonsy and Estrades French commerce in the sea had not 
yet achieved a sufficient foothold to require negotiation in Venice, the situation was different in 
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the 1680s. Amelot’s successful interventions on behalf of the commercial fleet ranged from 
demanding the return of sequestered cargos to negotiating the end of a moratorium on vessels 
coming from Toulon when the senate alleged that some ships from the port carried plague - a 
charge Louis XIV denied saying he would know better than anyone if there was plague in 
Toulon.120 As in foreign policy, the senate could not control French policies outright, but it tried 
to slow them down in its traditional spheres of authority.   
Amelot protested against the molestation of French vessels, merchants, and cargo as 
consuls from the Levant reported incidents to him as the war of the Holy League began.121 The 
exchange between French consuls and Amelot corresponded to Colbert’s regulation of consuls 
and their responsibilities in l’Ordonnance de la marine du mois d’aout, 1681.122 Again, under 
previous ambassadors in Venice, consuls did not petition them for assistance in commercial 
affairs. The ordonnance stipulated that consuls were to petition the highest French minister near 
them for assistance, and thus, the role of ambassadors in Constantinople and Venice took on 
another facet.123 The return of war to the Mediterranean in 1684 saw an increase in consuls’ 
correspondence with Amelot in matters related to French merchants living in Venice’s stato da 
mar during the conflict. The ambassador complained to the senate when its officials abroad 
                                               
120 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 21 Aug. 1683, Fs. 490r-490v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, 
Louis XIV to Amelot, 9 Sept. 1683, F. 495r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Amelot to Louis XIV, 30 Oct. 1683, F. 
575r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107bis, Amelot to Louis XIV, 6 Nov. 1683, F. 581r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108 
supplement, Amelot to Senate, [Day unspecified] Nov. 1683, F. 200r-200v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 108 supplément, 
Senate to Amelot, received in dispatch of 18 Dec. 1683, F. 201r. 
121 The following dispatches include complaints from French consuls in Zante, Ancona, and Canea: AAE, CP, 
Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 21 Aug. 1683, F. 490v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 
F. 578v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 110, Amelot to Louis XIV, 16 Dec. 1684, F. 381v; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 110, 
Amelot to Louis XIV, F. 413r. 
122 Colbert reformed the role of consuls in 1669 to curb the ongoing corruption among them. Book IX of the 1681 
ordonnance outlined and further clarified consuls’ functions. I will examine this in more detail in Chapter 5. Jean 
Baptiste Colbert, L’ordonnance de la marine du mois d’aout, 1681, accessed on 18 December 2015, Gallica, 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k95955s/f91.image; Francisco Javier Zamora Rodriguez, “War, trade, products 
and consumptive patterns: The Ginori snd their information networks,” in Alimento, 58. 
123 Inalcik & Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 522. 
168 
intentionally demonstrated prejudice against the business of French captains and merchants.124 
The senate promised to maintain “the most cordial negotiations with the French…” in these 
instances.125 As chapter five will show, French maritime complaints against the Venetians only 
increased as Francesco Morosini led allied forces in reclaiming Venice’s Mediterranean 
territories. The Venetian senate became less accommodating as the war progressed.126  
The Ambassador and the Venetian Public’s “Blind Rage Against the French”:127 
  Venice sought to regain its dominions through the Holy League. The republic rallied 
regardless of the image of the weak state Amelot depicted. The Serenissima was highly capable 
of wielding influence, and the senate attracted cooperation from formidable international allies 
still in the late seventeenth century. Through the Treaty of Lindz, the republic pledged to assist in 
crushing Turkish power in Eastern Europe and the Western Mediterranean.128 Despite the 
financial turmoil Venice suffered in the decade following the loss of Crete, it rearmed in 
response to the threat of Ottoman and French encroachments in the early 1680s.129 Ultimately, 
the question of French aims in Italy was left open-ended, but Amelot’s reports could veil neither 
Venice’s readiness when war came nor the antipathy of Venetians for Louis XIV. 
In Venice’s public spaces, according to Amelot and the inquisitors’ confidente, Badoer, 
many in the republic demonstrated hatred for the French.130 The ambassador informed the king 
of the depths to which the people’s sentiments towards France plummeted. The Venetian 
populace’s anger coincided with details of the insults and accusations the republic’s government 
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leveled at the ambassador. Amelot indicated that Venetian inquisitors sought to curb discourse in 
public spaces as the international situation deteriorated to protect state secrets and quieten 
tensions in the city. While the senate deliberated whether the state should counter French 
intentions in Northern Italy or against Mehmet IV in an alliance with Leopold I, the inquisitors 
forbade ice cream shops from staying open throughout the night to inhibit “young nobles and 
foreigners” from engaging in political discourse.131 Some months later the senate passed 
legislation prohibiting banks, apothecaries, and fresh water vendors from keeping or displaying 
inflammatory pamphlets and gazettes in their establishments enjoining captains of the sestieri to 
arrest anyone speaking insolently of “crowned heads.”132  
Despite such measures Venice’s populace continued to make its anger toward Louis XIV 
known. Venetian ire stemmed from alleged French involvement in Count Tekely’s revolt in 
Hungary and the French alliance with the Ottomans.133 The growing presence of French troops 
and arms in Northern Italy too terrified and incensed the populace.134 Nobles in the Piazza San 
Marco were heard to shout “twenty one Frenchmen are twenty one devils,” and in February 1683 
Amelot reported to the king that: 
“...such discourse is in the mouth of the people as well as the nobles... . In a word,  
the French embassy, which has always been here, and which should be of the  
highest luster everywhere, is falling into the greatest disdain…. The evil, Sire, is  
greater than I can describe…. One speaks currently in such an outrageous manner  
one to another that I feel exposed to a thousand affronts everyday.”135  
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The ambassador was not alone in reporting Venetians’ prejudice. Badoer sent a copy of a 
widespread broadsheet to the inquisitors in which the traditional Te Deum was reimagined 
likening Louis XIV to Satan. The screed claimed that “The heavens and earth are full of your 
awful heresies,” and it called upon the judgment of God against the king and those who allied 
with him.136 The king’s refusal to assist Leopold I during the siege of Vienna drew the greatest 
outcry from Venetians.137 The siege coincided with the death of Queen Marie Thérèse, and some 
reportedly claimed that his queen’s death was the first divine scourge unleashed upon the king 
for his crimes.138 Some members of Venice's government refused to go into official mourning in 
protest drawing fulminations from Louis XIV.139  
 The king’s alliance with the Mehmet IV infuriated many in the republic.140 After the 
siege of Vienna was lifted in September Venetians were heard cursing the Turk and Louis XIV 
during the city’s rejoicing.141 Popular anger followed the suite of Venice’s new ambassador, 
Girolamo Venier, to Paris in December 1684. On 8 March Venier wrote to the state inquisitors 
that one of his lackeys, in a moment of drunkenness, boasted that he would assassinate Louis 
XIV for “one hundred or even for twenty five dobles.”142 Croissy summoned the ambassador to 
ask that he deliver the Italian into French custody. To preserve Venice’s “reputation and the 
immunity and decorum of its public grandeur,” Venier complied publicly divesting the lackey of 
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livery and remanding him to French justice.143 The inquisitors approved Venier’s response to his 
servant’s “diabolical utterances,” believing the servant merited his subsequent incarceration in 
the Bastille.144 The republic could not afford controversy as the recent alliance with Leopold I 
and Spain’s declaration of war against France left Venice vulnerable to possible French 
retaliation. 
The French bombardment of Genoa in May increased popular outrage almost to the 
breaking point.145 Amelot believed that his reputation and that of the king were completely 
compromised in the republic. By October he pleaded with Louis XIV to recall him to France.146 
The king did not seem particularly concerned with either Venetian popular discontent or 
Amelot’s fears; he seemed pleased rather to allow the ambassador to undergo a series of 
accusations and trials against this volatile backdrop. Amelot described the republic as having a 
violent atmosphere where rumor and the protection of kinship and honor fueled murder and 
violence on a regular basis.147 He feared for his reputation, his life, and the well being of his 
household. The allegations brought against him personally and those serving him occurred in the 
dangerous context of Venetians’ visceral anti-French sentiments.      
The Formation of an Ambassador: Domestic Arrangements, Two Murders, and a 
Contraband Ring 
 
The controversies unfolding around Amelot and his retinue in Venice's reputedly violent 
climate demonstrated the Venetian government’s response to the information networks 
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informing Amelot. Ultimately, his experience in the republic highlighted too the brutal resolve of 
Venice’s counterintelligence system as the senate prepared for war. The republic’s heightened 
security and measures to increase revenues to fund the war effort provoked attempts to stop the 
sale of contraband.148 Ambassadors in the city complained that the senate seemed to want to 
restrict their privilege to acquire wine, flour, and bread without paying duties as the clandestine 
sale of these items hindered Venice’s economic stability.149  
Amelot noted the presence of Venetian spies observing ambassadors and the goods they 
ordered.150 He indicated that he believed the French embassy was under closer surveillance than 
any other. The state inquisitors were investigating the ambassador’s household and how he 
utilized diplomatic privilege. Amelot worded his complaints to the king regarding the republic’s 
hostility toward his immunities to depict a republic in open defiance of French might, but the 
story that emerged in the riferte of the inquisitors’ spy, Badoer, and the ambassadors in Paris 
proved that the inexperienced ambassador had not yet learned to cover his informants’ tracks. 
The broader story can emerge, however, only after examining Amelot’s perspective. 
A document from 1664, “concerning rights and useful prerogratives,” described French 
ambassadors’ rights in Venice to import wine and flour into the embassy and its environs without 
paying duties.151 These were commodities that could not be sold freely in the republic, and so, 
ambassadors’ passports were required to accompany the products’ transport to the lista dei 
francesi. Ambassadors were allowed sparingly to sell a measure of these goods in this space. The 
diplomat’s protection was extended to anyone carrying his passports or lettres de familiarités – 
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letters of recognition – and, theoretically, these documents conferred the same rights the 
ambassador held to the individual possessing them.152  
Amelot was first charged with abusing his immunities while incognito in March 1682. 
Customs officials refused to recognize passports he provided gondoliers to transport wood and 
wine from Vicenza because he had not yet performed the entrée legitimizing his role as 
ambassador.153 He wrote to the king of the incident after complaining to the senate.154 Venice’s 
then ambassador in Paris, Sebastiano Foscarini, supplied reports from his government’s 
investigation of Amelot’s mistake to Croissy and the King. A letter sent from Louis XIV to the 
Venetian senate seemed to remedy the matter. He pledged the ambassador would regulate his 
domestic arrangements better and acquaint himself with Venetian protocol.155 Amelot apparently 
prejudiced his reputation early on in the republic through the arrogant language and “insults” he 
employed to negotiate the incident.156  
A second, and more violent, altercation occurred in November with Amelot present. The 
king and Croissy angrily demanded an explanation from the representative.157 Amelot explained 
that he returned from a hunting trip in the country when Venetian inspectors approached his 
retinue demanding to search the gondolas for contraband. The Italians allegedly attacked when 
the ambassador and his lackeys refused. Amelot remarked that since he believed the senate 
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would not protect his immunities he “decided to exact justice himself.”158 He ordered his 
servants to fire warning shots, but a mêlée ensued in which a Venetian was stabbed to death.159 
Foscarini reported the matter to Colbert de Croissy and Louis XIV first.160 Amelot initially chose 
not to speak of the affair to the king alleging that he had handled himself properly.161 Louis XIV 
was furious at the ambassador's presumption and the unseemly violence.162 He and Croissy 
upbraided Amelot for the effrontery of thinking that he, as a mere royal representative, was an 
arbiter of justice.163 The diplomat added insult to injury daring not to inform the king of the 
incident immediately. Louis XIV was humiliated. He commanded the minister to govern himself 
and his household and to make restitution to the dead man’s family.164 A chastened Amelot 
claimed his best intentions in the matter audaciously reprimanding the king and Croissy for not 
defending his actions to Foscarini and the republic: the king had sent him there, and he should 
support his decisions.165 
The ambassador’s alleged controversial behavior from 1682-1683 drew a series of 
exchanges between the state inquisitors and Foscarini in Paris. Amelot posed a double threat to 
the republic in relation to Versailles as Venice determined whether or not to ally with Leopold I: 
he presented Venice as a state hostile to French foreign policy, and he acquired dangerously 
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sensitive information for Louis XIV regarding its pro-Habsburg policies and its military and 
naval preparations.166 The republic’s government resolved upon a two-pronged strategy couched 
in both diplomatic immunities and the red herring of the senate’s sensitivity to contraband.167 
Foscarini was to downplay Amelot’s depiction of anti-French sentiment in Venice at the French 
court, but behind the scenes, he was to persuade Amelot’s connections at court to intervene.168 It 
was hoped the young minister would fear enough for his reputation and career that his alleged 
anti-Venetian zeal could be reformed before he turned the king against the republic.169 Foscarini 
met clandestinely with Amelot’s mother asking her to warn her son of the danger in his attitude 
toward his hosts.170 The Venetian ambassador met too with the Marshal de la Feuillade - one of 
the few individuals who could actually claim friendship with Louis XIV - to assure the monarch 
of Venice’s enduring amity despite the ongoing crises with Amelot.171   
 The investigation continued in Venice.172 The state inquisitors targeted the ambassadress 
and Amelot’s secretary, Roger de Piles, as links contributing to the ambassador’s anti-Venetian 
reportage.173 For the sake of diplomacy, Foscarini was to lay the blame almost entirely on the 
secretary.174 Amelot’s father employed de Piles in 1662 to oversee Michel’s education, and he 
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became an accomplished art historian before his service in Venice.175 De Piles received much of 
the inquisitors’ venom as Badoer reported that he facilitated the exchange of information for the 
ambassador through a network of spies under his oversight.176 Worse still, Badoer relayed that 
the ambassadress collaborated in espionage employing a teacher of the organ who doubled as 
one of her husband’s spies.177 
While in France Foscarini aimed to discredit Amelot, but the state inquisitors undertook 
more visceral measures to silence the sources feeding Amelot with state secrets. In the previous 
chapter I have shown that ambassadors in Venice “inherited” informants loyal to the French 
faction. Amelot reported to Louis XIV that he received news of the senate’s debates and 
decisions from senators themselves and from members of their families or households.178 The 
ambassador maintained a close rapport too with previous ambassadors’ agents like the Cavaliere 
Beaziano and also the family of Marchese Benedetto Giuliani who supplied the French embassy 
with news during the embassy of the Abbé d’Estrades.179  
The marchese was instrumental in negotiations for Casale, and the republic’s menaces 
forced Giuliani to accompany Estrades to Turin where he remained while Amelot was in 
Venice.180 Giuliani’s family continued to work for the French. His sons nurtured a close 
relationship with Michel Amelot providing sensitive information from within the Venetian 
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government and continuing a communication link with the Duke of Mantua.181 Benedetto’s son, 
Paolo, critically relayed information regarding imperial agents working in Northern Italy to form 
a league of Italian princes against Louis XIV.182 During Carnaval 1683 a group of maskers 
attacked and beat Paolo Giuliani in Piazza San Marco.183 By July of 1683 a number of reports 
arrived to the state inquisitors that Paolo was filtering news of Venice’s negotiations with the 
emperor’s envoy to the Italian princes, the Count Martinitz, who was then in Venice, and the 
imperial ambassador to the republic, the Count della Torre.184 Finally, he was summoned before 
the inquisitors on 6 July, but he refused to attend.185 The young man was a threat to Venetian 
state security.  
Amelot wrote to the king an outraged addendum to a dispatch of 10 July 1683 that Paolo 
was murdered that morning.186 He was assassinated in the Piazza of San Francesco della Vigna; a 
square where the ambassador himself often promenaded.187 Amelot accused the state inquisitors 
of having Paolo shot because of his friendship with him, and he pleaded with the king to 
intervene with the Venetian ambassador and to grant a royal gratification to the family.188 The 
confidente, Badoer, sent a riferta to the state inquisitors recounting the details of the 
assassination and of the rumor already circulating that it was at the Ten’s command.189 Louis 
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XIV agreed with Amelot that the Venetian government ordered the murder, but he believed it 
necessary to let events take their course with no official remonstrance from him.190  
In the months preceding the murder, Badoer informed the state inquisitors of Giuliani’s 
role as “secret correspondent” to Amelot and the friendship of his family with the ambassador.191 
He detailed the tearful visit Amelot paid the victim’s household after the crime and the 
ambassador’s promises of revenge.192 In Paris the event apparently caused enough scandal that 
Foscarini was obliged to visit with Croissy to promise that the republic would investigate the 
crime and execute justice.193 Ultimately, no sources detail how the case ended. Amelot’s 
successor, Denis II de la Haye-Vantalet, remarked in 1688 that the murder, while unresolved, 
was still attributed to the Ten.194 Although no direct proof exists that the Council of Ten ordered 
the murder, the flurry of reports to the Ten regarding Giuliani in the days just prior to his death 
and his failure to appear before the inquisitors' tribunal suggest the council believed him too 
dangerous to ignore.  
In his seminal work on the Venetian secret service, Paolo Preto used Giuliani’s 
assassination as an example of how the Ten dealt with Venetian traitors.195 The murder served 
also as a demonstration of the controversial authority the Ten held over Venetian society 
prompting debates about the nature of the council’s continued role in the republic’s justice 
system.196 The dangers associated with state secrets in the Venetian crucible taught Amelot 
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valuable lessons in espionage, but the situation in Venice alarmed the French court. Foscarini 
reported to the state inquisitors as early as January 1683 that Louis XIV considered reposting the 
novice ambassador to Portugal.197 It appeared, however, that the king opted to test Amelot in the 
pressure of the Venetian vise. He was after all relaying information sensitive and veridical 
enough to elicit vehement reaction from the republic.               
Sebastiano Foscarini departed Paris for Madrid in September 1683 sending his relazione 
to the collegio on 22 March 1684. The ambassador remarked that Amelot “destroyed in every 
ordinary dispatch the profit and repose that (ambassadors’) negotiations (in France) worked to 
bring to the patria.”198 Amelot’s reports of Venice’s philo-Habsburg politics were a threat. 
Foscarini noted the care he had taken “to nullify the false and poisonous seeds” Amelot was 
spreading, adding “that without pulling the plant out by the roots...every initiative would have 
been in vain.”199 Foscarini “applied ingenuity...persuading the king” to promise Amelot’s recall 
from Venice.200 Although Foscarini was confident in Louis XIV's remarks, Amelot remained in 
the republic for another year.  
Girolamo Venier replaced Foscarini in Paris in December 1683 by which time the 
inquisitors reported to him the discovery of Amelot’s network of informants and the means 
through which he paid them.201 Badoer pieced together that, with Amelot’s knowledge, Roger de 
Piles used official passports to collect and arrange stockpiles of contraband commodities that 
were then used to pay agents for information.202 French spies allegedly infiltrated the highest 
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levels of government through access to secretaries and notaries of the pregadi and the 
quarantia.203 The spy ring stretched from Venice as far afield as Vicenza, Mantua, and Rome 
through informants like Paolo Giuliani whose connections in these cities supplied Amelot with 
knowledge.204 Additional informants included pro-French noblemen in the Valier, Bernardo, 
Grimani, and Duodo clans who relayed news from within the senate.205 The ambassadress’s 
music teacher infiltrated other aristocratic homes while spies of less exalted social rank 
connected these households to de Piles who arranged contraband commodities to facilitate the 
exchange of information.206 According to the avvisi of Badoer, the houses of French merchants 
and tailors in residence in Venice served as spaces to store contraband and to exchange news.207 
Locations like the brothel of the whore, Pasqueta, and the church of the Madonna dell’Orto, just 
yards from the French embassy, served as points of exchange and as scenes of violent encounters 
with Venetian officials.208 The nuns of the convent of Sant’Alvise allegedly acted too as 
informants for the French.209 The lista dei francesi became a collecting space for the seepage of 
state secrets through the sieve that was the Venetian government, and Amelot poured the news 
into his dispatches. 
Venier added in his reports that Amelot supplied the French foreign ministry with much 
information regarding Venice’s negotiations to ally with Leopold I and the Poles. To incite 
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further turmoil through the revelation of the contraband ring could damage the Franco-Venetian 
rapport beyond remedy.210 Venier learned that Amelot remained in favor with the king at court 
through the protection of the Grand Chancellor, Michel Le Tellier, the marquis de Barbézieux, 
despite the calumnies he and Foscarini reported and Amelot’s vehement denial of charges of 
malfeasance.211 Venier counseled the government to relax its approach to Amelot and curb anti-
French sentiment in Venice suggesting to suppress the damning evidence of Amelot’s illegal 
activities.212 Venier’s lackey’s embarrassing threat in March 1684 to assassinate Louis XIV 
added weight to his counsel. Undoubtedly too the bombardment of Genoa in May halted further 
Venetian action.   
The episode opening this chapter illustrates, however, that Amelot’s position in Venice 
did not become much easier in 1684. The imprisonment of his gondoliers and the French tailor 
implicated in the contraband ring after allegedly instigating a brawl when Venetians mocked 
their nationality and their subsequent interrogation before the Ten highlighted the republic’s 
ongoing efforts to intimidate Amelot. Venetian officials stopped Amelot’s gondoliers on one 
further occasion in 1684 before the ambassador again begged to leave Venice.213 By October the 
king announced the decision to post Amelot in Lisbon, but he allowed the ambassador to come 
back to France in February 1685 for a respite.214  
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Venier observed Amelot and his family upon his return to gauge if they would slander the 
republic. He reported that Amelot seemed chastened.215 The king’s elevation of his lands to a 
marquisate in May indicated royal approval of his service. It demonstrated the success that robe 
functionaries could achieve through loyalty and service to the crown. Croissy’s new ambassador 
plied the foreign ministry with critical information at a time when it needed assurance that 
Leopold I was preoccupied in Hungary with the Turk and the Hungarian revolt. The 
ambassador's reports informed the king of the Habsburg’s interactions with Venice. Amelot 
supplied the information Louis XIV and Croissy required while the republic tried to keep the 
roots of an alliance with Leopold I secret in order to avoid bringing the French war machine into 
Italy and to buy time to raise a fighting force.  
Louis XIV miscalculated Venice’s willingness and readiness to commit to another 
Mediterranean war, but Amelot layed open the republic’s deliberations in the build-up to the 
Treaty of Lindz. The king was pleased with the ambassador’s ability to acquire information and 
the lessons in diplomatic maneuvering that he learned. He left Amelot to languish in the republic 
buying time to pressure Leopold I at Ratisbonne. In the meantime, events in the east evolved to 
the point that the emperor conceded to French demands and turned his forces against the 
Ottomans. Through the Holy League Venice began the reacquisition of its Mediterranean empire. 
Amelot’s breach of the republic’s foreign relations system revealed its rehabilitation as a player 
in Mediterranean diplomacy and exposed Louis XIV's inability to command the Serenissima’s 
foreign policy outright.  
                                               
215 ASV, IS-DAF, Busta 438, Venier to Inquisitors of State, 11 April 1685; ASV, IS-DAF, Busta 438, Venier to 
Inquisitors of State, 18 April 1685.  
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Chapter Five 
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Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet (1685-1701): 
Looking Back at Ludovician Politics from Venice and the Mediterranean in 1688 
 
 Wreckage from an abandoned French tartane washed ashore in the port of San Nicola on 
Cerigo during winter storms at the close of 1687.1 The new Venetian provveditore da mar in the 
Morea, Giacomo Corner, sequestered the flotsam. Captain Foucas of Toulon, the tartane’s 
owner, and his crew deserted the vessel after corsairs allegedly overtook and stripped it in 
Venetian waters. Learning that the incident occurred in territory under Venice’s jurisdiction 
acquired in the War of the Holy League, Foucas appealed to Louis XIV’s secretary of the 
marine, the Marquis de Seignelay.2 The captain sought to recover the price of his ship and to 
have restitution from the republic for the purloined cargo of wheat and the ship’s sails and 
anchors.3  
Foucas’s appeal to Seignelay set in motion the machinery of Ludovician centralization 
governing French interests in the Mediterranean Sea by the late 1680s. Concerned for the 
Crown’s reputation as a major competitor in Mediterranean commercial and political affairs, 
Seignelay entrusted the matter to the French ambassador in Venice, Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de 
Vantelet (1685-1701), and the French consul, Jean-Guillaume Le Blond (1679-1718).4 The 
secretary expected la Haye to compel the republic to explain its failure to protect a French vessel 
                                               
1 AN, MA, B7, 59, Seignelay to la Haye, 18 Dec. 1687, F. 272; Giovanni Battista Moro and Vincenzo Coronelli, 
Memorie Istoriographiche della Morea Reacquistata dall’Armi Venete (Venice: Giuseppe Maria Ruinetti, 1687), 
63-64. Tenenti defines a tartane as a ship with “...three or more small sails and a single deck.” He notes they were 
especially common among Provençal sailors. Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 156. 
2 AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 3 January 1688, F. 2r; Siriol Davies and Jack L. Davis, 
“Greeks, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire,” in Between Venice and Istanbul: Colonial Landscapes in Early Modern 
Greece, eds. Davies & Davis (Athens: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Hesperia, 2007), 28-29.  
3 AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 3 January 1688, F. 2r; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, 
la Haye to Seignelay, 15 May 1688, F. 56r; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, Venetian Senate to la Haye, [day 
omitted] May 1688. 
4 AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 3 Jan. 1688; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, Venetian 
Senate to la Haye [day omitted] May 1688.  
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in its waters and Le Blond to use his networks in Venice and across the Adriatic and Ionian Seas 
in the investigation.  
The level of cooperation between the ambassador and consul in cases not linked to the 
ministry of foreign affairs per se - such as Captain Foucas’s plight - illustrate the extent to which 
new legislation regulating the marine’s consuls elevated the ministry and its agents. These links 
evolved between marine jurisdiction and the ministry of foreign affairs after the death of Jean-
Baptiste Colbert in 1683.5 Communication between the ministers in Venice and Seignelay in the 
late 1680s demonstrated the growth of the administrative system that bound Louis XIV’s 
government to the contested spaces of Mediterranean commerce. 
La Haye’s predecessor, Amelot, was the first ambassador in Venice during Louis XIV’s 
rule to report frequently about French commercial interests in political negotiations. By 1688 the 
correspondence between la Haye and Seignelay became a consistent thread in Franco-Venetian 
diplomacy indicating the concern which Louis XIV’s administration held for commerce and the 
king’s prestige in Mediterranean affairs as the First Morean War (1684-1699) repulsed Ottoman 
authority in the sea. The collaboration between the ambassador and the consul in Venice served 
as evidence not only of the importance of France’s economic interests to its international 
engagements, but it highlighted the vital need for Ottoman slaves to man French galleys in the 
Mediterranean fleet. As French relations with Leopold I and Innocent XI moldered in the face of 
the French king’s expansionism the procurement of slaves required the increased attention of Le 
                                               
5 Drévillon, Les Rois Absolus, 271, 273. In his study of the Ponchartrains, Charles Frostin suggested that 
ambassadors to Venice and Constantinople received two sets of instructions upon their nomination: those from the 
ministry of foreign affairs and also commercial instructions from the ministry of the marine. Frostin seemed to 
indicate that this had always been the practice for ministers going to Venice. I have found no such specific 
commercial “‘mémoire’ annexe” until the embassy of Pomponne to Venice in 1704. Frostin also argued that 
ambassadors in Venice had always had the role of supervising French consuls. Again, as I argue in this chapter, tight 
surveillance and collaboration between ambassadors and consuls in Venice really only emerges in the sources from 
1687. See Frostin, Les Ponchartrains, ministres de Louis XIV, 13-14. 
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Blond after 1686, and Seignelay expected la Haye to assist the consul as international affairs 
tensed.6  
This chapter first explores the grim situation facing Louis XIV and his dynastic policies 
to understand the relevance of incidents in the Mediterranean like that of Captain Foucas and the 
French administrative machinery deployed in broader international politics. La Haye’s embassy 
in Venice endured the close of the seventeenth century and the years in which Louis XIV’s 
ascendance over European politics declined.7 1688 proved to be climacteric in European foreign 
relations writ large, and, although la Haye represented the French king in Venice for seventeen 
years, a sharp focus on 1688 indicates the direction that the king expected relations with Venice 
to take as his dynasticism encountered substantive threats. In that year Franco-papal relations 
reached their lowest point.8 The long feud between Innocent XI and Louis XIV saw the 
humiliation of a new French ambassador in Rome pursuant to breaches of the 1664 Treaty of 
Pisa. The embarrassment menaced another French invasion of Italy as the king’s authority 
among German princes too diminished.9 Italian states experienced the king’s efforts to maintain 
control of foreign politics, and la Haye used the Venetian senate's troubled rapport with the pope 
to resolve France’s impending crisis along the Rhine.10 
                                               
6 Paul M. Bamford, Fighting Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean Galleys of France in the Age of Louis XIV 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 142, 144, 167. Bamford noted, correctly, that Seignelay 
corresponded with la Haye in 1686 regarding the purchase of slaves from Venice, but their correspondence, as I 
argue and as the marine record indicates, became consistent only at the end of 1687 and from 1688 onward.  
7 Wolf, Louis XIV, 441-442, 451; Wolf, Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620-1715 (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1970), 90-91, 96; Spielman, Leopold I of, 142; Vierhaus, 122; Guy Rowlands, “Louis XIV, Vittorio 
Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689-96,” 534; Jeremy Black, European International Relations, 
1648-1815 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 98-99. 
8 Lecestre, Mémoires de Saint-Hilaire, Tome II, 56; Condren, Louis XIV et le repos de l’italie, 201-202. 
9 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Senate, 19 Jan. 1688, F. 23r; ASV, IS-DAF, Busta 438, Venier to 
Inquisitors of State, 17 March 1688; Wolf, 94, 95-96; Bruno Neveu, “Introduction,” in Correspondance du Nonce en 
France Angelo Ranuzzi (1683-1689), ed. Neveu (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1973), 149-150, 153-154, 160.  
10 Colbert de Croissy, Mémoire pour servir d’Instruction au Sieur de la Haye s’en allant Ambassadeur à Venise, in 
du Parc, 107-108; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, Louis XIV to la Haye, 4 Aug. 1688, F. 193r.  
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French relations with Rome grew septic as the pope refused to invest the king’s 
candidate, Wilhelm Egon, Cardinal von Furstenberg, to the archbishopric of Cologne.11 German 
princes aligned as never before with Leopold I in war against the Ottoman Empire and against 
Louis XIV’s incursions along Leopold’s western borders.12 The arch-episcopal-electorate 
represented one of the few remaining bastions of French authority in the German principalities.13 
Tensions mounted as the pope reclaimed Castro and Ronciglione from the Duke of Parma 
providing the king further leverage to use in the quarrel over Furstenberg’s election.14 French 
pressure to install Furstenberg as archbishop-elector has been cast as mere vainglory, but events 
surrounding the election and the king’s menaces of an invasion of Italy in defense of the Farnese 
must be seen in context as urgent correlatives.15  
The most brutal French incursions into German territories began in September 1688.16 
French tactics provoked the struggle between Versailles and the recently formed League of 
Augsburg and its powerful allies that would last until 1697.17 As events led to this eventuality, la 
Haye inflamed Venice’s senate against Leopold I.18 The king wanted to weaken the emperor’s 
position in the east protracting the war with the Turk to facilitate the concretization of French 
                                               
11 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 10 Jan. 1688, F. 8v; Marie-Madeleine Pioche de La Vergne, 
Comtesse de La Fayette, Mémoires de la cour de France pour les années 1688 et 1689 (Amsterdam: Chez Jean-
Frédéric Bernard, 1731), 12, 13-14; Neveu, “Introduction,” 137-138. 
12 Vierhaus, Germany in the Age of Absolutism, 122. 
13 Charles Gérin, Innocent XI et l’Election de Cologne 1688 (Paris: Librairie de Victor Palme, 1883), 10-11; Wolf, 
Toward a European Balance of Power, 94; Spielman, Leopold I of Austria, 142. 
14 Condren, Louis XIV et le repos de l’italie, 202-202. 
15 Black, European International Relations, 97; Condren, 195-196; Venier, Relazione di Francia, 1688, in Barozzi 
& Berchet, 472. 
16 Spielman, 145; Claydon and Levillain, “Introduction: Louis XIV Upside Down? Interpreting the Sun King’s 
Image,” in Claydon & Levillain, 16; Ziegler, “Image Battles under Louis XIV: Some Reflections,” in Claydon & 
Levillain, 32.  
17 Condren, 203. 
18 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, Louis XIV to la Haye, 17 March 1688, F. 60r. 
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authority along the Rhine and in Northern Italy as war loomed.19 If properly maneuvered, a 
disillusioned Venice represented another dart to hurl at the emperor’s eastern flank. 
The republic experienced a potential shift in its power structure in 1688 when Captain-
General Francesco Morosini ascended to the ducal throne while fighting in the Levant.20 
Morosini’s war machine successfully regained Venetian dominions adding most of the Morea in 
1687.21 Morosini’s forces became locked in the battle for distant Negroponte in 1688 interrupting 
communications between the senate and their Captain-General-Doge for months.22 Venetians 
and foreign emissaries alike awaited news from the Levant to anticipate evolving geopolitics 
should Morosini succeed. La Haye alleged that the republic’s political system approached a 
possible turning point as the doge’s fleet gobbled up territories.23 It was unclear if Morosini 
would challenge the nature of Venice’s republican governance through the “full power” he 
wielded at the head of a vanquishing military force.24 Venice’s allies in the league winced as the 
republic’s confidence in Italian politics reemerged in its brief defense of French policies. 
As Morosini capitalized on Ottoman weaknesses in the Mediterranean, continued respect 
for French commercial and maritime interests became critical to Louis XIV’s foreign policies 
and, by extension, to the secretary of the marine, Seignelay.25 La Haye’s interactions in Venice 
                                               
19 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, Louis XIV to la Haye, 9 June 1688, F. 129v. 
20 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Gravel, 26 March 1688, F. 82r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to 
Louis XIV, 3 April 1688, F. 91r.  
21 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 10 July 1688, F. 185v; Venier, Relazione di Francia, 1688, 
486; Topping, “Venice’s Last Imperial Venture,” 160. 
22 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 27 Nov. 1688, F. 310v. 
23 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 1 May 1688, F. 111v. 
24 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 1 May 1688, F. 112r. Louis XIV was curious to know how 
Morosini would use his “full power” as Captain-General-Doge. The king opined that Venice could capitalize on its 
victories if Morosini circumvented the senate’s authority to make decisions on the spot because “awaiting the 
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XIV to la Haye, 2 June 1688, 134v.  
25 Seignelay insisted the republic should in no way disadvantage French vessels in the Mediterranean in favor of 
other European states through tariffs or disregard for French standards. He signalled to la Haye that nothing was 
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in 1688 highlight the position that the French foreign ministry - and the ministry of the marine - 
believed the republic held in its policies towards Innocent XI, Leopold I, and France’s privileges 
with the Ottomans. As la Haye maneuvered in Venice, the evolving institutional structures of 
louisquatorzien bureaucracy came more clearly into focus.  
The role of the ambassador extended now not only to traditional high politics. La Haye 
assumed the task of safeguarding French maritime and commercial interests in Venice as never 
before while Louis XIV edged toward a new European-wide war requiring resources from and 
leverage on the sea.26 France’s predominance in European affairs depended too upon events in 
the Mediterranean. Commerce in goods and slaves became high politics. The pleas of Captain 
Foucas and the collaboration of the ambassador and the consul were not mere maritime 
wrangling. The ministers’ interactions in Venice represented the measure and reach of the French 
administration as Louis XIV struggled to control international affairs. Ultimately, they served as 
one institutional model of commercial arbitrage in the Mediterranean Sea for the later eighteenth 
century French “commercial boom.”27  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
more important to French commerce in the Levant than showing the Turks the respect that all “nations” have for 
French vessels and flags. AN, MA, B7, 61, Seignelay to la Haye, 5 Oct. 1688, F. 103; Greene, Catholic Pirates and 
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26 Venier, Relazione di Francia, 1688, 483. 
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A Seasoned Ambassador in Venice: Emphasizing the Serenissima’s Importance to French 
Foreign Policy in the Late Seventeenth Century   
 
Denis II de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet (1633-1722) succeeded Michel Amelot as 
ambassador in Venice. The fifty-two year old diplomat arrived there 9 February 1685 and made 
the entrée on 8 July.28 The disastrous relationship of Amelot with the Venetian government eased 
with the arrival of la Haye who informed Louis XIV that he would not have the same “patience” 
with the senate as had his predecessor.29 The ambassador’s confidence came from years of 
diplomatic experience. He had held no office other than ambassador. In April 1688 la Haye 
became the longest serving French diplomat, proudly reminding the king of this fact upon the 
Marquis de Feuquières’s death in Madrid making him “the doyen of Your Majesty’s 
ambassadors.”30   
Denis was the son of Jean III de la Haye, Sieur de Vantelet and Marguerite de Polluau. 
His parents were both of robe origin from Champagne. Jean began his career as an lawyer in the 
parlement of Paris as did his wife’s father.31 Jean’s diplomatic career began in 1639 in 
Constantinople, where he served Louis XIV until 1661, and Denis grew up at the foreign and 
often-hostile Ottoman court.32 Denis’s career began in Constantinople where he served from 
1665 to 1670.33 Louis XIV sent him to the Bavarian court at Munich as resident ambassador 
                                               
28 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 111, la Haye to Louis XIV, 14 July 1685, F. 130. 
29 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 111, la Haye to Louis XIV, 17 Feb. 1685, Fs. 3, 4-5; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 111, la Haye 
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31 The la Haye family held the fiefs of Saint Brisson, Vantelet, and la Bousselle in the vicinity of Charly-sur-Marne. 
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33 Saint Priest, 221, 227. La Haye’s imprisonment between 1669-1670 in the final phases of the Candian War nearly 
brought France into war with Mehmet IV. The outcome of this tense moment led to the successful renewal of the 
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from 1675 until 1680.34 He received instructions from Croissy to travel to Venice in August 
1684.  
La Haye’s first wife, Louise, followed her husband to Venice.35 She was the daughter of 
Guy-François de Montholon, Seigneur de Vivier and d’Aubervilliers, lawyer in the parlement of 
Paris and a conseiller d’état. Her mother was Marie Lasnier, daughter too of a conseiller d’état.36 
Louise allegedly loathed Venice. The inquisitor’s spy, Badoer, reported that the ambassadress 
claimed she “...absolutely did not want to remain in this despised capital.”37 She died in 1690 
prompting la Haye to petition Louis XIV to allow him to remarry the widow of a long-time 
French spy from Vicenza, Cavaliere Giulio Cesare Beaziano.38  
Amelot had successfully relayed information from the republic to the court to formulate 
policies with Leopold I, but he had not dissuaded the Venetian senate from allying with Leopold. 
The continuation of the war in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean became critical to the 
longevity of French policies against its enemies and to the concretization of French territories in 
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the Rhineland. The Franco-Ottoman alliance too was central to French Mediterranean 
commercial, military, and maritime prowess.39 La Haye was well acquainted with Ottoman and 
imperial politics. He was a logical choice to facilitate policies in Venice as the republic regained 
dominions and menaced the position of France’s Ottoman ally.40  
The anti-French sentiment in Venice from 1682 to 1685 precluded the dominance of 
French influence among Venetian politicians. The senate avoided negotiations with Amelot, but 
this would not be the case with la Haye.41 He demanded invitations to state functions 
complaining in 1685 that respect for Louis XIV required representation.42 He described his 
participation in many state functions over the years alongside four doges with whom he alleged 
frequent personal conversations.43 The improvement in Franco-Venetian relations through la 
Haye’s experience can also be seen as the reports of the confidente, Badoer, to the inquisitors of 
state focusing on the French slackened after 1685.  
La Haye’s long correspondence from Venice reveals his exactitude in communicating 
news to the court. Likewise, the twenty one volumes of his dispatches reinforce the previous 
chapters’ assertions about systemic trends that Croissy, and after 1696, Croissy’s son, the 
Marquis de Torcy, introduced into the foreign ministry. La Haye’s dispatches contained almost 
no personal letters, and they were addressed with relatively few exceptions to Louis XIV alone. 
The greatest innovation in Venice was the ambassador’s correspondence and collaboration with 
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41 The following dispatch was one instance where Amelot wrote to Louis XIV that the king would have to write a 
letter to the senate himself to force a Venetian secretary to come to the embassy as the senate refused to 
communicate with him: AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 107, Amelot to Louis XIV, 5 Feb. 1683, F. 280r; AAE, CP, Venise, 
vol. 111, la Haye to Louis XIV, 10 March 1685, Fs. 20v-21r. 
42 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Badoer to Inquisitors of State, 2 Sept. 1685; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to the 
Marquis d’Ares, 28 Feb. 1688, F. 55v. 
43 La Haye’s embassy in Venice coincided with the dogeships of Marc-Antonio Giustiniani (1683-1688), Francesco 
Morosini (1688-1694), Silvestro Valiero (1694-1700), and Alvise II Mocenigo (1700-1709).  
193 
the secretary of the marine and the French consul. This communication reveals the emergence of 
another administrative tether binding the ambassador to bureaucratic developments at Versailles. 
La Haye’s communication with the foreign ministry in conjunction with that of the ambassador 
and Seignelay contradict historians’ assertions that the level of information flowing to the French 
court diminished after the death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert.44 Information increased from Venice 
feeding two ministries. Contextualizing la Haye as correspondent to both ministries serves as 
evidence that the role of French ambassadors became increasingly bureaucratic and 
functionalized. 
France and Venice Counter Innocent XI 
 In 1688 French authority stretched beyond the limits that European rulers would allow. 
At William of Orange’s urging in 1686 the League of Augsburg had formed to countermand 
further French expansion into the Spanish Netherlands, the Empire, and Northern Italy.45 
Leopold I’s struggle to contain and overthrow imperial opposition in Hungary expanded his 
authority there to its greatest extent.46 Imperial forces under the Duke of Lorraine dominated the 
Hungarian nobility and pushed the weakened offensive armies of the Ottomans to Belgrade.47 
Consequently, Louis XIV feared the emperor’s strong position in the east would prompt Leopold 
to sue for peace with the Ottomans freeing the imperial army to counter French acquisitions 
along the Rhine.48 The gains of the réunions and the terms of the Truce of Ratisbonne tenuously 
left territories, most notably Strasbourg and Luxembourg, in French hands.49 Louis pressed to 
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make the truce binding as a treaty to assure these dynastic holdings, but the emperor stalled in 
this as he had formally to join the League of Augsburg.50  
It seemed increasingly likely that Leopold would turn his armies westward.51 French 
subsidies and pressure upon German princelings lost much of their allure by 1687 as Leopold I’s 
advances against the Turk elevated the emperor’s political caché in the Empire.52 France’s hold 
over German rulers dwindled to two principals. Louis XIV’s cousin, the Wittelsbach Elector of 
Bavaria, Maximilian II Emanuel, and Maximilian’s cousin, the Archbishop of Cologne, 
Maximilian-Henry, remained critical. The Elector of Bavaria vacillated in his loyalties to see 
where his house could achieve the most gain. His 1685 marriage to a daughter of Leopold I, 
Maria Antonia, and his military leadership against the Ottomans indicated Habsburg loyalties.53 
Ultimately, the Archbishopric of Cologne in the Rhineland-Palatinate was paramount for Louis 
XIV’s authority in imperial politics. Maximilian-Henry, however, despite years of French 
allegiance, impeded the elevation of the pro-French Cardinal von Furstenberg to the succession 
of the electorate.54 
The death of Maximilian-Henry in June 1688 left a political vacuum that discomfited 
Louis XIV. Louis pressed for the elevation of Furstenburg to the archepiscopacy.55 Leopold I 
accused the pro-French Furstenberg and his family of treason blocking the election.56 The 
greatest challenge to Furstenberg, however, was Innocent XI who preferred Clement-Joseph, 
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brother of Maximilian Emanuel. The pope believed conferring the title upon Furstenberg would 
signal a breach of canon law in the empire, and Innocent was weary of Louis XIV’s defiant 
policies vis-a-vis the debates over the régale.57 Additionally, the Holy League’s successes 
against the Ottomans disinclined Innocent to irritate Leopold I through the installation of a 
candidate that could weaken conditions in the western empire undercutting Christian advances in 
the east. Innocent posited himself in 1687 and 1688 not only as a barrier to Gallicanism but also 
as a challenge to Bourbon dynastic politics along the Rhine and in Northern Italy.58 
The stipulations of the 1664 Treaty of Pisa seemed distant by the 1680s. The pope had 
reincamerated Castro and Ronciglione from the Duke of Parma again upon the duke’s failure to 
pay the indemnities outlined in the treaty. Similarly, in 1687 Innocent also revoked the treaty’s 
guarantee of ambassadors’ extraterritorial rights in their Roman quartiers.59 The pope’s refusal 
to honor Alexander VII’s treaty provided Louis with leverage in Italy and over papal enclaves in 
France to force the election of Furstenberg.60 The prospect of a defensive war to protect France’s 
borders was something to which Louis XIV was unaccustomed. Threatening an invasion of 
Northern Italy, Rome, Avignon, and the Comtat Venaissin represented the lengths to which 
Louis would go to force Furstenberg’s election and protect dynastic territorial gains. 
In November 1687 Louis XIV dispatched Henry-Charles de Beaumanoir, Marquis de 
Lavardin to Rome as extraordinary ambassador escorted by an entourage of one hundred officers 
from Seignelay’s marines.61 The unusual martial display was to inspire acquiescence in the pope 
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toward the king’s demands regarding the quartiers and on behalf of the Duke of Parma and 
Furstenberg. Lavardin’s controversial and flamboyant entrée into Rome only strengthened 
Innocent’s resolve.62 He refused to acknowledge Lavardin as official ambassador forbidding the 
Sacred College and the chefs of religious orders from engaging with the envoy.63 The pope went 
further. In December he excommunicated the Church of San Luigi dei Francesi in Rome where 
French ambassadors traditionally attended mass.64 As a counter measure to papal intransigence, 
the king ordered a contingent of thirty-six French galleys prepared to cruise near the Italian 
coast, and troops mobilized to descend into the peninsula and papal enclaves in France.65  
As in the Corsican guard crises of 1662-1663, the Venetian senate interposed its 
ambassadors in Paris and Rome as mediators between the French king and the pope.66 The 
senate's primary concern was the successful prosecution of the war against the Turk; its members 
feared the threat of French invasions along the Rhine and in Italy would constrain Leopold I to 
withdraw from the east.67 La Haye’s correspondence with Louis XIV from Venice in the early 
months of 1688 dealt primarily with the debacle in Rome and Venetian diplomats’ role in its 
resolution. The king instructed la Haye to reassure the senate that he had no intention of invading 
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along the Rhine.68 These measures were to facilitate continued Venetian support at the Roman 
court and to show French solidarity with the senate in its quarrels with Innocent. 
Although Innocent XI provided Venice with sizeable contingents of troops, ships, and 
money for the ongoing war with the Turk, the senate tangled with the pope over ecclesiastical 
appointments.69 As promised in his 1676 election, Innocent proved to be an almost-incorruptible 
protector of the church’s privilege to nominate or approve candidates to vacant sees across 
Europe. He hindered the Venetian senate’s nominations to the bishopric of Cremona and 
Spaletro during Amelot’s embassy, and Venice’s government continued to spar with Innocent in 
1688 for control over the loyalty of its clergy.70 Venice too had quarreled in 1678 over the 
quartiers of its former ambassador to Rome, Girolamo Zeno. Consequently, the senate, in high 
dudgeon, recalled Zeno leaving its Roman embassy vacant. The formation of the Holy League 
renewed Venice’s diplomatic relations with Rome, and in 1683 the republic elected Girolamo 
Lando as envoy to the papal court.71  
Venetian successes in the Mediterranean from 1684 to 1687 tempered its government’s 
interactions with Rome further, and the Venetian ambassador in Paris, Girolamo Venier 
negotiated along with the papal nuncio, Angelo Ranuzzi, to halt French merchant vessels 
covertly providing military equipment and provisions to the Turks - actions that had enraged the 
republic and Innocent.72 La Haye indicated that the pope’s patience with Venetian ecclesiastical 
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policies, however, thinned again by 1688 especially as the republic’s ambassador in Rome, 
Lando, refused to ostracize the Marquis de Lavardin and purportedly upheld French demands at 
the papal court.73 
Giralomo Venier reported that, in spite of the pope's warnings, Lavardin bribed and 
threatened cardinals to counter Innocent XI’s opposition to Furstenberg’s election.74 Louis XIV 
expected Lando to follow Lavardin’s example pressuring the pope to relinquish Castro and 
Ronciglione to the Duke of Parma and to vet Furstenberg.75 La Haye praised the senate for 
upholding French interests in Rome and Northern Italy, and the king lauded the republic’s 
equally stubborn refusal to allow Innocent XI to dictate ecclesiastical nominations in its states.76 
Louis cast himself as an admirer of the senate’s devotion to its temporal sovereignty, and he cast 
Innocent XI as their common adversary in domestic matters of state. La Haye, however, was to 
use this commonality to pressure the Venetian senate as the king claimed that its members would 
share the blame if he brought war into Italy.77  
Venier and Lando allegedly continued to negotiate an accord between the king and the 
pope throughout 1688, and as Morosini’s forces besieged Ottoman Negroponte in July la Haye 
reported that Innocent XI and Leopold I complained that their Venetian allies became arrogant in 
Italian affairs.78 The ambassador reported the pope was certain to disregard the senate’s 
injunctions against investiture of non-Venetians in vacant dioceses in its territories, and he 
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remarked that the senate’s sympathy for Louis XIV’s policies regarding the pope grew.79 The 
republic’s government saw Innocent’s refusal to nominate Furstenberg as further proof that he 
ignored states’ temporal interests, and its members believed the pope’s suppression of 
Furstenberg’s election signaled a dangerous resurgence of papal power in matters of state.80  
Venice’s domestic dual with the pope escalated in August when a fight among parochial 
curés and monks over disputed burial plots in the city pitted the republic against Rome for 
control over jurisdiction of Venetian ecclesiastical properties in the capital city itself.81 The 
Venetian pregadi sided with the curés, and, as la Haye predicted to Louis XIV, Innocent XI 
defended the monks.82 The rapport between Venice and Rome at the end of 1688 was as tense as 
was that of France, but the senate, still dependent upon Innocent’s support in the Mediterranean 
conflict, could not afford to repulse the pope as fully as could the French king.83 The senate’s 
support of French policy in Rome was little more than an irritant to Innocent as long as it 
depended upon papal subsidies in the war.  
The senate’s quarrel with Rome remained open-ended in September 1688 when the 
Grand Dauphin and Sébastien Le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban led French troops into the 
Palatinate. In that same month French forces descended into Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, 
and the king ordered the sequestration of Ranuzzi in Paris.84 Innocent XI’s intransigence 
contributed to forcing Louis XIV’s panicked policies as Venier opined the circumstances relating 
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to Cologne “...could be said to be the first causes of the present universal conflagration.”85 
Ultimately, Innocent XI died on 12 August 1689 less than a year after the outbreak of the War of 
the League of Augsburg. In October the Venetian Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni became Alexander 
VIII through the machinations of the new French ambassador to Rome, the Duke de Chaulnes, 
and Lando in conjunction with French and Venetian cardinals. His election briefly resolved 
Venetian and French relations with Rome.86 It came too late, however, to halt the advent of war.     
France, Venice, and the Direction of Turn-of-the-Century International Affairs 
 Louis XIV was unwell in 1687 and 1688. Historians agree that a number of health 
problems afflicted the king, and, as Giralomo Venier reported, a miasma of depression followed 
the fifty-year-old monarch.87 Undoubtedly, the increasing hostility of European states against the 
king’s dynastic policies exacerbated his illnesses as much as they contributed to the controversial 
decisions the king made just prior to the War of the League of Augsburg.88 The most pressing 
concern for French foreign policy in 1687 and 1688 was shoring up the uncertain security of 
France’s Alsatian possessions that the Truce of Ratisbonne only temporarily buttressed. 
Louis awaited Leopold I’s reply to his requests that the truce be cemented into a treaty. 
Leopold’s avoidance of the question and the pressure of waiting unnerved the French king.89 The 
suspended climate forced Louis to fight Innocent XI for Furstenberg’s election in Cologne. 
Moreover, Leopold’s uncertain intentions contributed to Louis’s fears that the emperor might 
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settle with the Ottomans. If this occurred before the truce solidified, Bourbon dynastic gains 
along the Rhine, in the Spanish Netherlands, and in Northern Italy could be lost.90 News that 
Carlos II’s government pressured Ferdinando-Carlo, Duke of Mantua to accept Spanish troops 
into Guastalla threatened France’s grasp on the duke’s loyalty. Safeguarding the boundaries of 
the kingdom and hegemonic interests in Italy seemed to hinge upon events in Eastern Europe and 
in the Mediterranean Sea.91  
Since the beginning of the War of the Holy League Venetian forces under Morosini 
claimed more territories in the Mediterranean than they had held in previous centuries. The 
captain-general’s conquests by 1687 counted the Morea – as Venetians called the Peloponnese; 
in December Morosini quartered in Athens planning to continue eastward in spring 1688.92 War 
and an outbreak of plague diminished his forces, but the senate promised infusions of manpower, 
ships, and munitions in the coming months.93 Extraordinary levies, assistance from German 
princes, Swiss mercenaries, and Innocent XI provided these.  
La Haye reported that the pope regarded the senate’s renewed belligerent defense of the 
Venetian clergy a result of Morosini’s wins, and Leopold viewed the republic’s support of Louis 
XIV’s policies in Cologne and the claims of the Duke of Parma as a betrayal of the senate’s 
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alliance with him and Habsburg interests in Italy.94 The king simultaneously encouraged the 
senate to press on in the war, and, pursuant to la Haye’s reportage of the friction among the 
members of the Holy League, he conspired to drive a wedge between Venice and Leopold. 
Imperial armies besieged the Turks at Belgrade, and Leopold I controlled much of the Balkans.95 
The Venetian senate feared he would press for peace with the Ottomans as much as did Louis 
XIV. The continuation of the war for Venice depended upon Leopold, and the French king hoped 
to poison the rapport between the republic and the emperor in an effort to shake Leopold’s 
confidence.96 
The king craftily relayed rumors to la Haye in February that Leopold accepted forty 
thousand écus from the Republic of Ragusa for the investitures of Herzegovina and Bosnia. The 
king instructed la Haye to inform Doge Giustiniani personally of this news at the next possible 
public ceremony. He was curious to know if this were true and what the Venetian senate’s 
response would be in this event.97 Venice had promoted its claims to Herzegovina and Bosnia in 
Vienna since 1684 as imperial forces pushed further into Hungary.98 The Republic of Saint Mark 
believed Ragusa and its Dalmatian territories should be fully under its authority rather than a 
rival in Mediterranean commerce. The governments of the two republics had been rivals for 
centuries, but traditionally the Ottomans or the Holy Roman Emperors asserted themselves as the 
protectors of Ragusa to Venetian chagrin.99  
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Ragusa had become increasingly weak since a devastating earthquake in 1667, and 
Dubrovnich’s senate petitioned Louis XIV and other European monarchs for protection as it 
recovered.100 Venice’s government watched with hungry eyes for an opportunity possibly to 
annex the republic, and news that Leopold empowered its small adversary as he overran the Turk 
in the Balkans annoyed Venice’s senate against him.101 La Haye investigated to learn if this 
morsel was true, and, ultimately, it appeared that Leopold did receive money from Ragusa for the 
investitures. Venice’s senate threatened to invade Ragusa in this eventuality.102 To preserve the 
alliance with Venice the emperor did not concede the investitures, but he renewed the pledge to 
protect Ragusa against future Venetian predations.103  
Aggravating Veneto-Habsburg relations prevented the Venetian senate from cooperating 
with other Italian princes against French interests in the peninsula. Members of the League of 
Augsburg petitioned Italian sovereigns to commit to an anti-French coalition, and a number of 
Italian heads of state had met German princes in Venice during the carnival season in 1687 to 
discuss the proposition. The senate, although aware that the princes convened in the city, was 
unwilling to risk any action that would prompt French invasive action along the Rhine or in Italy 
that could cause Leopold to withdraw from the war in the east or to send imperial troops into 
Italy.104 The senate warned la Haye of the interviews the princes held in 1687, and the 
ambassador kept Louis informed of rumors that the princes were to meet again in Venice in 
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1688.105 Ultimately, most Italian princes avoided allying outright against Louis XIV or the 
emperor.  
The Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs sought to augment their authority in Northern Italy 
as war approached. The Duke of Mantua entertained Austrian and Spanish entreaties to accept 
Habsburg troops into his remaining lands to counter the French. News arrived in May that the 
duke accepted infusions of money from Leopold I and that he negotiated with Spain for the 
installation of troops in Guastalla.106 To balance Louis XIV’s authority in Casale and Pignerol 
and his relative, although diminishing, influence over the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and Savoy, 
the Spanish government conspired to add Guastalla to its Italian territories.107 Louis XIV 
expressed his confidence in the Duke of Mantua’s French loyalties, but the possible entry of 
Spanish troops into Italy concerned the Venetian senate believing Spanish actions indicated a 
French attack along the Rhine or an invasion of Italy imminent.108 The senate, however, refused 
Leopold I’s request to allow imperial troops to pass through the terraferma to supplant the 
French in any event.109 The emperor’s protection of Ragusa in conjunction with the build-up of 
Habsburg forces in Italy forced the senate to defy Habsburg interests to upset Leopold’s certainty 
in the advantages he now held in the Balkans and those of Spain in the peninsula.110 This action 
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would have continued consequences for Franco-Venetian relations a decade later when Venice 
could no longer afford to jilt the emperor as the War for the Spanish throne began.  
Doge Marc-Antonio Giustiniani died in March 1688, and Captain-General Francesco 
Morosini was elected in April.111 La Haye noted that Morosini’s election came with almost no 
opposition but that his command of the republic’s armies gave him an almost absolute power 
over the government.112 Venice’s power structure, according to the French ambassador, allegedly 
came under threat as Morosini controlled news arriving from the Levant and, hence, the senate’s 
decisions as the war continued.113 La Haye believed Morosini was jealous of his power and that 
he might prolong the war to augment his authority.114 The Captain-General-Doge’s siege of 
Negroponte began 23 July, but the paucity of information from the east left the senate in an 
uncertain position as much as was Louis XIV regarding Leopold I’s irenic overtures to the 
Ottomans.115 In much the same way that relations with Innocent XI and Leopold prompted 
developments in French foreign policy, so too, the Venetian senate juggled its own politics along 
with that of its European neighbors awaiting dispatches from Morosini’s distant progress. The 
senate’s initial elation at Morosini’s election to the dogeship soon soured, and the loss of 
                                               
111 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 26 March 1688, F. 82r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, 3 April 
1688, F. 91v; AN, AE, B1, 1159, vol.2, Le Blond to Seignelay, 27 March 1688, F. 38r; AN, AE, B1. 1159, vol. 2, Al 
Serenissimo Francesco Morosini eletto Doge di Venezia Capitano Generale da Mare and Copie des 41 Electeurs du 
Doge, copies sent by Le Blond, 10 April 1688, Fs. 42-43r.  
112 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 24 April 1688, F. 106r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye 
to Louis XIV, 1 May 1688, Fs. 111v, 112r-112v. 
113 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, Louis XIV to la Haye, 2 June 1688, F. 134r; AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to 
Louis XIV, 21 Aug. 1688, F. 220r. 
114 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 1 May 1688, F. 112r. 
115 Akerhjelm, Journal, in De Laborde, 317; AAE, CP, Venise, vol.113, la Haye to Louis XIV, 18 Aug. 1688, F. 
185v. 
206 
Negroponte 20 October meant that many in the government gnashed their teeth at the doge 
concluding that Venice too should consider peace with the Ottomans.116     
The static atmosphere in the autumn of 1688 resulting from the uncertain relations among 
the members of the Holy League and the prosecution of the war with the Turk contributed to 
Louis XIV’s decision to send a French army to besiege Philippsbourg in September 1688.117 The 
king awaited the turn of events as long as he could when Belgrade finally fell to imperial troops 
6 September.118 Louis used the rights of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte, Duchess of 
Orléans's hereditary claims to the Palatinate as his ostensible reasons for the invasion. 
Throughout the year the king denied any intent to move along the Rhine to the Venetian senate.  
The uncertain news from the war theaters of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea in 
conjunction with Habsburg maneuvers in Northern Italy in concert with Innocent XI supported 
French fears that the members of the Holy League neared a peace with the Ottomans and that 
Spain readied for war.119  
International events in 1688 forced Louis XIV’s hand as never before. The loss of 
Cologne and that of England as an ally through the imminent accession of William III and Mary 
II to the throne further compromised French dynastic policies in Western Europe.120 France’s 
invasion of the Palatinate in September and declaration of war against the United Provinces in 
November, in part, resulted from Louis’s inability to foresee events in the east and the 
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Mediterranean. The collusion of the members of the Grand Alliance as war began foreshadowed 
the anti-French balance of power that would determine coalitions in the later War of the Spanish 
Succession.121  
Venice’s traditional position as a neutral counterpoise to dynastic politics in Northern 
Italy shifted in favor of Leopold I with the Treaty of Lindz in 1684. Venice needed Leopold in its 
war through which it still hoped Morosini could regain Crete and Cyprus, and the senate’s formal 
alliance with the emperor continued until the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz.122 It can be argued, 
however, that the republic’s rhetorical politics of neutrality only reemerged in 1688. Venice was 
forced to devote its political authority among European states once again to the preservation of 
Italian stability as the peninsula became a central battleground in Bourbon-Habsburg dynastic 
warfare.123 Neutrality was, however, to be a fiction from the French vantage. 
La Haye and Jean-Guillaume Le Blond: Administrative Collaboration or Competition 
among the Colbert Clan’s Agents in Venice? 
Louis XIV had warned the Venetian senate in 1684 that the Holy League’s war against 
the Turk should in no way damage French commerce.124 After the capitulations of 5 June 1673 
between France and Mehmet IV, Louis XIV imposed the privileges of the Franco-Ottoman 
alliance in the sea upon other states - especially the Venetians, Dutch, and English and others 
trafficking in the Mediterranean.125 The Serenissima, however, boasted a much longer tradition 
of Mediterranean commercial and political involvement; Morosini’s successes revivified the 
senate’s assertions vis-a-vis its time-honored position as “mistress of the [Adriatic] gulf” and 
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now the Ionian seas.126 Morosini compromised the already moribund Ottoman maritime presence 
in the Levant.127 Captain Foucas’s misfortune highlights that the king expected la Haye and Jean-
Guillaume Le Blond to ensure the liberty and status of French vessels as Mediterranean 
boundaries shifted. 
Arbitrage of French commerce in Venice’s expanding empire became more frequent 
before the senate requiring investigation and negotiation from the French consul and 
ambassador. La Haye’s rapport with Le Blond could be described as that of a supervisor, but it 
can be argued that the duties required of these ministers in Venice reflected the shift in the role 
of the ambassador from that of a sacral representative of royal majesty to that of a professional 
functionary. Prior to the 1680s, French ambassadors in Venice dealt tangentially with the consul. 
Consuls in the republic worked as lesser extensions of the foreign ministry.128 La Haye’s 
predecessors looked to consuls for information regarding ceremonial protocol and for news 
received in Venice that might affect the negotiation of foreign policy.129  
In the Venetian context there existed no equal interaction between ambassadors and 
consuls in Crown affairs. Ambassadors corresponded with Louis XIV and the secretaries of 
foreign affairs and occasionally with Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Extant letters from consuls Paul 
Vedoa, father and son, in Venice before 1679 were most often requests for wages sent to Colbert 
via diplomats’ dispatches or news reports sent from Venice to the secretary of foreign affairs 
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when no ambassador was in residence.130 Ambassadors documented hardly any representation 
before the Venetian senate in matters relating to French commerce or seafaring, and the Vedoas 
functioned as obvious subordinates to the ambassador in service to the ministry of foreign 
affairs. 
The nature of the professional rapport between French diplomats in Venice and the 
consul changed after Colbert issued the Ordonnance de la Marine du mois d’août 1681. The 
Ordonnance outlined and defined the jurisdiction and limits of the marine and its officials within 
the boundaries of the kingdom and beyond. In Title IX of Book One, Colbert delineated the 
expectations of “the consuls of the French nation abroad.”131 The articles stated the qualifications 
for consuls and the extent of their authority. They were to be educated in maritime law, and they 
were to serve as arbiters in French affairs in the environs of their posts.132 Additionally, the 
Ordonnance reaffirmed the responsibility of consuls as purveyors of information. They were to 
provide the secretary of the marine with a “faithful memoir of important affairs from their 
consulate….”133 The consul was officially to fulfill the same task of information gathering for 
Secretary Seignelay as the ambassador fulfilled for that of foreign affairs.  
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As French legislation elevated consular service it streamlined that of the ambassador.134 
Colbert’s Ordonnance legitimated the role of consul beyond that of a minor functionary in 
foreign affairs to that of a critical link in the navy, and the Crown’s, chain of command. The 
consul became another instrument supplying Colbert and the ministries he and his clan 
dominated with the information feeding what Jacob Soll has called a “secret state intelligence 
system.” Michel Amelot was the first ambassador in Venice to claim the French consul as part of 
his household, but Amelot made no mention of collaborative negotiations with Jean-Guillaume 
Le Blond and no correspondence with the secretary of the marine such as that la Haye 
described.135  
By 1688 the Marquis de Croissy was secretary of state of foreign affairs, and Jean-
Baptiste Colbert’s son, Seignelay, had taken up command of the ministry of the marine as 
secretary.136 It made sense then that the direction of both ministries collaborate in more tangible 
ways after Colbert’s death in 1683 under the direction of the Colberts in opposition to the 
powerful Le Tellier clan.137 However, Croissy and Seignelay competed in their respective 
ministries for the reception and use of the knowledge they received from abroad. La Haye and Le 
Blond found themselves caught up in a family feud over information benefitting French 
international relations and commercial representation. Another factor effecting family dynamics 
was the reality that Seignelay did not yet sit on the conseil d’en haut as a minister of state. His 
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elevation depended, as with others in Louis’s government, on the benefits he procured for his 
master.    
The Venetian context demonstrates that the push to acquire knowledge affected the 
working relationship of the ministers serving Croissy and Seignelay outside the kingdom. That 
the ambassador corresponded with the secretary of the marine and the consul as well as 
communicated with the minister of foreign affairs, Croissy, indicated the triangular bonds 
connecting the two ministries. It would not be until the late 1680s, however, at least in the 
Venetian context, that the close connection of the two ministries’ interests merged in actual 
documented practice. It would be incorrect, however, to say that the Colberts’ competition 
manifested itself in the collaboration of the ambassador and the consul.  
There was a brief comment in 1687 from Seignelay’s envoy to Italian states, Paul de 
Louvigny d’Orgement, that indicated la Haye feigned his loyalty to Seignelay.138 Louvigny 
claimed the ambassador withheld information from Seignelay while appearing “all heart and 
affection” in his letters.139 This seems to have been corrected as there is no later documented 
evidence that la Haye failed to please Seignelay in his duties, and there are no extant letters to la 
Haye from Croissy that might indicate the foreign minister resented the ambassador’s work with 
Seignelay. On the contrary, the exchanges between la Haye and Le Blond evolved into a system 
that emerged after 1685, and, by the beginning of 1688, became fixed and, according to la Haye, 
almost daily.140 Louvigny testified to la Haye’s supervision of Le Blond, and, in a letter from 
Seignelay to la Haye of 15 January 1688, the secretary informed the ambassador that he was to 
make careful reports of the consul’s service.141 The correspondence from la Haye and Le Blond 
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to Seignelay testified to the newly regularized nature of their interactions. A brief examination of 
their collaboration provides a more detailed picture of the two ministers’ working relationship 
and the ways in which they served the secretary of the marine.142  
Protecting French Mediterranean Commerce in Venice: 
Wartime reacquisition of territories bolstered Venice’s claims to dominance in the 
Adriatic and the Ionian Seas.143 Corsairs allegedly overtook Captain Foucas’s tartane in the 
waters of the Ionian. It then came into the hands of the newly appointed provveditore da mar of 
the Morea, Corner. Such incidents were common in the insecure maritime atmosphere of the 
Mediterranean.144 How these cases were dealt with in Venice underwent a change by 1688 
especially as Louis XIV could now hold the Venetian senate responsible for infractions 
occurring in waters it claimed from the Turk.  
In 1688 la Haye and Le Blond worked to resolve five ongoing cases related to the attack 
or detainment of French vessels in Venice’s maritime territories.145 Foucas’s case provides an 
example of how these incidents were resolved. In the months following Seignelay’s initial letter 
to la Haye regarding the French tartane, the ambassador and the consul investigated the 
circumstances. As ambassador, la Haye petitioned the Venetian senate insisting that it recognize 
the injury such incidents caused to Louis XIV’s reputation in Mediterranean commerce and 
requesting its intervention. La Haye first bent the ear of Doge Giustiniani personally on Foucas’s 
behalf during a ceremony on 1 February, and he subsequently sent an official written report to 
                                               
142 AN, MA, B7, 61, la Haye to Seignelay, 3 July 1688, F. 80v. 
143 Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks, 300-301; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, mémoire from Amelot de Gournay 
sent in a dispatch from la Haye to Seignelay, 11 Sept. 1688, F. 90r.,  
144 Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, 108-109. 
145 See the following for evidence of cases: AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 3 Jan. 1688, F. 
2r; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 31 Jan. 1688, F. 12v; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, 
la Haye to the Venetian senate, 31 Jan. 1688, Fs. 14r-14v; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 
20 March 1688, F. 31r; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, la Haye to Seignelay, 30 Oct. 1688, F. 96r-96v.  
213 
the senate on the matter.146 According to the senate’s response to la Haye the consul Le Blond 
provided them details of consular agents’ investigation of the crime.147  
Over the next months the Venetian government opened an inquiry, and drew upon 
information from the Levant received from its by then Captain-General-Doge, Morosini. By 15 
April, after conferring with provveditore Corner, Morosini responded that Foucas’s tartane was 
first attacked outside the frontiers of Venetian protection and that winds blew the ship to 
Cerigo.148 In its concluding report of 5 May, the senate remarked that it was not, lamentably, 
responsible for Foucas’s loss, but it would continue to do all it could to accommodate Louis XIV 
in commercial affairs whenever possible.149 The senate’s judgment in the matter was in response 
to la Haye’s and Le Blond’s shared investigation in conjunction with its own sources.150 
Although the republic decided it was not at fault in the incident, the case documented that the 
ambassador and the consul worked in tandem to resolve cases related to French maritime 
interests in the shifting boundaries of Venetian waters.151 The senate’s responses in these cases 
denoted Venetian confidence in negotiations with Louis XIV regarding commercial issues 
attributable to Morosini’s conquests. 
The Venetian senate’s measures to augment finances for the war also affected French 
commerce. Seignelay wrote to la Haye on 5 June 1688 that the king was surprised to learn that 
the senate imposed a twenty percent duty on vessels docking in ports throughout its dominions. 
The secretary asserted that this levy was a novelty, and he wondered if the senate enacted it to 
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pay for war costs. He enjoined the ambassador to investigate upon what authority the republic 
could enforce the tariff upon French merchant vessels given the privileged status Louis XIV 
believed his ships held.152 Seignelay requested a copy of the letters patent legitimating the 
levy.153 La Haye found that the republic had, since the time of Amelot, claimed the right to 
impose new tariffs at will upon ships in its jurisdiction as it was “mistress of the [Adriatic] gulf.” 
While there were no letters patent, la Haye sent to Seignelay the memo on tariffs that Amelot had 
left in the embassy archives.154 Short of complaints to the senate, la Haye was unable to 
challenge the republic’s policy, and Seignelay made no further protests.  
Venice controlled commerce in the maritime territories under its jurisdiction, and it 
experienced stable commercial success until the end of the century in spite of the war.155 In the 
cases where the republic’s government believed it was within its sovereign rights, it did not 
hesitate to uphold its decisions in the face of foreign pressure. The senate did, however, 
accommodate Louis XIV in cases where French vessels or subjects were slighted unjustly 
reminding the ambassador that it wished to maintain good relations with his master.156 La Haye 
and Le Blond alike received instructions from Seignelay to insure French commercial interests. It 
fell to la Haye to represent French interests before the senate while Le Blond interacted with 
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other French consuls and French merchants trading in the Mediterranean to facilitate commerce 
in conjunction with Venetian law. Le Blond reported the findings of his inquiries or news from 
French consuls to the ambassador who used them to formulate his interactions with the Venetian 
government. Both ministers provided Seignelay accounts of the progress of commercial cases.157    
The Ambassador and the Consul Trade in Slaves 
 
The atmosphere of the Mediterranean was volatile in 1688. The successful military 
campaigns of Leopold I’s armies against the Turk in Hungary combined with Venice’s victories 
at sea left many Ottomans prisoners and slaves providing what Bamford called “‘windfall’ 
shipments” to interested parties.158 The slave market swelled in the lands imperial forces overran, 
but there was fierce competition for slave labor as belligerent states like Venice, the papacy, and 
the empire needed manpower to serve their military needs.159 The feud between Louis XIV and 
Pope Innocent XI regarding the election of the archbishop of Cologne pushed the king to order 
thirty six galleys readied in the port of Marseille to intimidate the pope.160 The galleys required 
many men to propel them, and the secretary of the marine was expected to obey the needs of 
French foreign policy requiring naval intervention.161  
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The search for slaves to man the entire French fleet of forty galleys preoccupied 
Seignelay in this turbulent international atmosphere. The secretary first wrote to Le Blond of the 
necessity to find slaves on 16 December 1686 reiterating to the consul the primacy of the 
demand for Turks in January and April 1687.162 By extension, it became a second shared task for 
la Haye and Le Blond throughout 1688 when the secretary ordered la Haye’s oversight of Le 
Blond.163 They used their location in Venice to attempt to fill a ministerial order for three 
hundred suitable slaves in the competitive market.164 The brunt of the charge fell to Le Blond, 
and his letters to the secretary outline the complex channels of finance, transport, and 
information the consul relied upon. 
Writing to Seignelay of the subject on 3 January, la Haye assured the secretary that he 
would oversee Le Blond in his efforts to find and purchase slaves.165 Attempts to strengthen 
Louis XIV’s military and naval apparatus were not well received in the late 1680s as French 
might in Europe and on the seas portended war in Europe. French use of Ottoman slaves was 
also in contravention of the 1673 capitulations with La Porte, and broadcasting the search for 
slaves was impolitic. The consul, therefore, worked under the strictest secrecy to obtain slaves 
for French vessels.166 Beyond the political and financial difficulties entangling the purchase of 
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manpower to serve the marine’s needs, the slaves themselves were often too young or sick.167 
Others maimed themselves fearing the horrors of the galleys.168  
The dispatches from la Haye and Le Blond to Seignelay illuminate the financial 
apparatus the ministry of the marine used in Venice to achieve its needs and the roles of the 
ambassador and the consul when using ministry funds. Seignelay sent bills of credit to la Haye in 
Venice.169 Seignelay ordered the ambassador to follow the exchange of money and the ways in 
which Le Blond utilized it.170 The secretary required the consul to account to la Haye and to him 
for every expense incurred once the Venetian banker, Piatti, delivered the funds.171 Le Blond 
carefully noted the exact amounts he provided to his agents, to the ships he rented and their 
crews, and the sums left at his disposal.172 Monies unused were again changed and returned to 
France; the consul noted exactly the exchange rates and each transaction in his reports. La Haye 
consistently checked the consul’s accounts commending his performance.173      
The sums sent to Le Blond were to expedite the process of finding slaves and paying for 
their upkeep and transport back to Marseille. He utilized a network of informants ostensibly 
sworn to secrecy stretching from Buccari in Imperial Istria, all along the Dalmatian coast, and as 
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far north as Vienna.174 These men were to locate healthy specimens, and they were provided 
funds to buy and ship the slaves to two French and two rented English ships anchored at Pirani 
for transport.175 The ships’ écrivains communicated with Le Blond to ensure that they were paid 
and that the ships were stocked and victualled to furnish the crews and to receive slaves as they 
trickled in over the months.176 La Haye monitored Le Blond’s search for slaves during the 
year.177 Ultimately, small groups of slaves arrived as the months passed, but in November the 
consul still dealt with obstacles in filling Seignelay’s demands.178 La Haye and the consul 
maintained a detailed correspondence with Seignelay throughout the process, and their letters 
indicated that the collaboration functioned under Seignelay’s supervision with no sense of 
ministerial competition among the two ministers in Venice.179 
Conclusion 
 The military and political circumstances that made the search for slave labor difficult 
attested to the violent and urgent attempts of European states to dominate the sea’s access to 
commercial and strategic resources in the midst of the War of the Holy League. In 1688 alone no 
less than five European states - France, Venice, England, the Dutch Republic, and the Empire - 
competed with one another or against the faltering Ottoman Empire for dominance in the 
                                               
174 AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, Le Blond to Seignelay, 10 April 1688, 40v; AN, AE, B1, 1159, Venise, vol. II, 
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Mediterranean Sea.180 Others, like Malta and the Republic of Ragusa, fought to maintain a share 
of the sea’s bounty amid the conflicts of the great powers. As the seventeenth century closed this 
competition only increased. 
The evolution of Louis XIV’s government responded to the now global race to dominate 
the Mediterranean. French ministers outside the kingdom worked to ensure safety on the seas 
and access to a thriving and rich eastern trade as well as maintain the reputation of the king as 
the reputedly senior European competitor in the sea. To facilitate these ends, new legislation 
from the early 1680s highlighted and informed expectations for French consuls abroad like the 
ambassador and the consul that concretized into documented practice later in the decade. The 
consul was no longer a minor functionary in the ministry of foreign affairs but a link between 
ministries. Additionally, the secretary of the marine expected ambassadors like la Haye to 
promote, supervise, and collaborate in business related to French commerce in the Mediterranean 
and the operations required for the French navy as geopolitical circumstances required.  
Although Louis XIV’s government could not control the reactions of states like Venice to 
its demands, it guaranteed that even subjects like Captain Foucas of Toulon could appeal to the 
state and its apparati for redress in a global maëlstrom. The European geopolitical tide turned 
against Louis’s dynastic policies, and as the War of the League of Augsburg began in 1688 the 
example of the French ambassador and consul in Venice demonstrated the methods of control the 
louisquatorzien machine could impose upon its personnel outside of the kingdom in an effort to 
facilitate French interests. The rapport between la Haye and Le Blond illustrates too the 
development of Louis XIV’s administration in which ministries composing the French 
bureaucracy, while in competition at Versailles, compelled cooperation among ministers abroad 
in response to an anti-Ludovician European international landscape as the seventeenth century 
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waned. The emerging conflict for the throne of Spain revealed a French government willing to 
menace Venetian interests in the sea. Diplomacy would not stop French ships’ efforts even to 
control Venetian ports as the eighteenth century dawned.  
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PART III: 
                      Venice Impotent Before Louis XIV, 1700-1702 
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César, Cardinal d’Estrées (1701-1702) ambassadeur extraordinaire:  
 The Expansion of French Authority in the Mediterranean and Venetian Neutrality 
Debunked  
Venice’s inquisitors of state ordered strangled two thieves in the prisons of the ducal 
palace at midnight 12 June 1702.1 The bodies of brothers Gian-Paolo and Gian-Battista Rizzati 
were then immediately hung between the two pillars of the piazzetta near San Marco for all to 
see at sunrise. The captain of the sbirri searched for the Rizzati for months, and the inquisitors 
purportedly ordered their capture and execution for crimes as blockade runners for the Duke of 
Mantua. The deaths of the bandits would have been irrelevant to the world stage had they not 
possessed letters patent from the new French ordinary ambassador in Venice, Joseph-Antoine 
Hennequin de Charmont (1702-1704), and passeports from René de Froulay, Comte de Tessé, 
one of the chefs of French military forces in Northern Italy.2 The Rizzati brothers were under the 
extraterritorial protection of Louis XIV, and the broader implications of their executions 
effectively rendered fruitless Franco-Venetian diplomacy in the eighteenth century.  
The executions of the Rizzati coincided with the tenure of Cardinal César d’Estrées as 
extraordinary ambassador to Venice from 1701-1702. The cardinal capitalized upon the 
diplomatic implications of the smugglers’ deaths to facilitate French interests in Northern Italy 
and the Adriatic Sea after a year and a half of indecisive negotiations with the Venetian senate. 
Estrées arrived in Venice 22 January 1701 to negotiate the descent of French troops into the 
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terraferma. Additionally, he solicited the Venetian government’s cooperation in countering the 
armies of Leopold I in Northern Italy and the Adriatic despite the republic’s ostensible neutrality. 
The senate, however, as had happened since the 1680s, proved evasive toward French interests 
vis-a-vis the emperor. The deaths of the Rizzati occurred only months before Estrées departed 
the city to serve in Madrid, and the episode threatened to bring Louis XIV’s vengeance down on 
the republic as the senate’s affinity for Leopold I belied neutrality to be a geopolitical ruse.  
Estrées’s manipulation of the deaths of two Italian miscreants in 1702 highlights three 
arguments connecting the chapters of this dissertation. First, the years of Estrées’s embassy were 
decisive for the history of Venice and the stalling of Franco-Venetian relations in the broader 
discursive context of a Venetian “decline.” Scholars comment on the “beginning of the end” for 
the Republic of Venice with no clear consensus. I have suggested through an examination of 
Franco-Venetian relations, rather, that in the context of the final decades of the seventeenth 
century, Venice remained vital and active among European states. There was no clear-cut 
discussion of a moribund republic that neighboring polities discounted or ignored.  
Europe’s late-seventeenth-century monarchs courted the republic as a useful ally in 
European and Mediterranean political and commercial endeavors; Venice’s political apparati and 
its military-naval forces proved resilient and capable of withstanding and standing with the great 
dynastic monarchies albeit increasingly requiring financial subsidies from its neighbors. 
Venice’s successes against the Ottomans in the Morean War reinforced that the republic 
continued to wield diplomatic and maritime authority. Its most recent alliances after the 1684 
Treaty of Lindz affected international realignments that had, by the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz, 
reasserted Venetian authority as far afield as Southern Greece and islands of the Ionian Sea. 
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The build-up to and the advent of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701-1702, 
however, created a context in which Venetian resources and political rhetoric faltered in terms of 
one diplomatic relationship.3 The republic’s government could not sustain its pretensions to 
neutrality towards the Bourbons and the Habsburgs while trying to defend its authority in the 
Mediterranean and Italian theaters. Through the negotiations and observations of Cardinal 
d’Estrées, I highlight that the pressures of the war revealed the over extension and limits of the 
Venetian government to the French. Venice’s senate struggled to protect its sovereignty in the 
terraferma and Mediterranean territories against impinging French and imperial armies while 
protecting and re-acculturating its newly reacquired spheres of authority in the eastern sea. The 
small republic could not be neutral in the power politics of the great dynastic states as they again 
brought war into Northern Italy and the Adriatic. 
The discourse surrounding the Rizzati affair and the republic’s unwillingness to disavow 
strategic ties with Leopold I illustrated that Venice’s government ceased to be a beneficial 
diplomatic and tactical partner for Louis XIV. And in this context, the diplomatic relationships 
between Venice and France destabilized. Venetian international involvements decayed in 
specific rapports. By 1702 diplomatic relations with the republic ceased to provide France with 
reciprocal benefits; one might claim the photodegradation of Venetian relations with Louis XIV. 
Reference to the dissolution of Franco-Venetian relations in 1702 also underscores the further 
enervation of Louis XIV’s influence in Italian affairs suffered in the war for the Spanish throne. 
Already curbed at the end of the Nine Years War, French authority diminished further in the 
Italian peninsula as war progressed with the ultimate installation of Austrian dominance there 
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through the 1714 Peace of Rastatt.4 As Estrées’s embassy revealed, however, French maritime 
and commercial authority in the eighteenth century Mediterranean Sea rose also at Venetian 
expense.5  
This brings me to the second theme of this chapter. Cardinal d’Estrées’s embassy was 
ineffective in persuading the Venetian senate to ally outright with France against the 
replenishment of Prince Eugène’s forces in the terraferma.6 Venetian vessels in the Adriatic 
allegedly sustained Eugene, the imperial generalissimo in Italy, through replenishments coming 
into the lands of the republic and the Duke of Modena from the sea.7 Venice’s maritime officials 
protected ships and ports in the same endeavor.8 Estrées pressured the Venetian senate: it could 
either chase imperial contingents from its lands; assist French naval forces in securing the 
Adriatic against the passage of imperial troops and material to Italy; or recognize the end of its 
time-honored sovereignty over the sea.9  
Venice’s government continued to maintain a fighting naval presence in the 
Mediterranean until 1718.10 The republic’s attempts to deny French ships from passing into the 
Adriatic in 1701-1702 with no defensive naval contingents to reinforce its complaints against 
them, however, demonstrated that its maritime authority in the Adriatic was severely impaired if 
not finished. Ultimately, Venetian protestations against the attacks of the Chevalier de Forbin’s 
squadrons underscored that Venice could no longer claim to be “Mistress of the Adriatic;” the 
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senate nearly cancelled the ceremonial sensa – marriage of the sea – as a result of its impotence 
before Forbin. By August 1702 the chevalier’s vessels even came within sight of the bell tower 
of San Marco to destroy an armed English vessel.11 Forbin bragged this action left him “master 
of the Gulf.”12  
Finally, it was through the initiatives of the seventy-four-year-old Cardinal d’Estrées that 
these extractive shifts in Venice’s international utility for France emerged. Estrées’s series of 
private conferences with Venice’s savvio del consiglio, Benedetto Capello, demonstrated the 
cardinal’s difficulty at holding the Venetian government’s proverbial feet to the fire to make 
good on its claims of neutrality early in the conflict. The republic’s senate stopped neither 
Franco-Spanish nor imperial armies from passing through the terraferma. As a gesture of 
goodwill Louis XIV removed his troops in the winter of 1701, whereas Prince Eugène prolonged 
his withdrawal.13 Estrées’s repeated complaints that Venice made no move to ally with France in 
response to Eugène’s belligerence served as the first evidence to the French of compliance with 
Leopold I.  
As the struggle for Spanish dominions increased and saw the Bourbons and Habsburgs 
sparring across Venetian lands, the republic’s government could not eschew Leopold I 
completely as the threat of Ottoman resurgence in the east made Venetian reliance on the 
emperor non-negotiable.14 The republic’s refusal to aid in the blockage and destruction of the 
vessels assisting Prince Eugène from the Adriatic served as added evidence of the senate’s 
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alleged partisanship if not of its outright participation in the emperor's aims.15 The frustration 
emerging from Estrées’s correspondence showed that, by late 1702, the French government 
prepared either to force Venetian compliance both on land and sea; to humiliate the republic 
outright; or at least to have the Venetians think it would do so.16 
The Venetian inquisitors of state condemned the Rizzati brothers amid this turbulence. 
This diplomatic windfall provided Estrées an excuse to challenge Venice. He used the affair to 
avenge Venetian unwillingness to damage imperial advances laying bare the inconsistencies in 
Venice’s neutrality and the secret institutions of its polity. Heretofore Louis XIV and his 
ambassadors respected the autonomy of the Venetian government as a sovereign equal. French 
ambassadors observed the strains that (shadow) councils like the Ten and the state inquisitors, 
who arguably controlled the Venetian state behind the republican façade, placed upon Venetian 
foreign and domestic political culture, but they made no attempts to undermine the republic’s 
polity. Thanks to Estrées, the Rizzati affair brought these abstruse ministers headlong into a 
contest with Louis XIV threatening to subvert the inquisitors’ power publicly.  
The affair afforded the king an opportunity to menace the republic with harsh retribution 
if it refused to punish the inquisitors.17 At this point in its history, Venice would have had no 
leverage to stem an all-out French onslaught, and the senate and people of Venice came to fear a 
French naval bombardment. A reading of Estrées’s correspondence with Louis XIV provides a 
diplomatic lesson. The affair revealed the long years of experience of Louis XIV and the cardinal 
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as these aged statesmen manipulated an event that would have been of “least importance” to the 
almost utter submission of the republic before the king.18  
The republic avoided the king’s ire in diplomatic altercations since the 1660s while 
observing from afar Louis XIV’s penchant for humiliating and humbling diplomatic enemies like 
the papacy and the Republic of Genoa. The senate could either submit to the authority of Louis 
XIV or suffer the consequences. As will be argued further along, the ambassador’s 
manipulations in the affair and the humiliating outcome for Venetian government prepared the 
ground for Venetian submission before Louis XIV signalling the the disintegration of Franco-
Venetian relations and diminishing the maritime authority of one French competitor in the 
Mediterranean.  
France and Venice after the Treaties of Ryswick (1697) and Carlowitz (1699): Toward the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) 
 
 Since 1688 Louis XIV’s dominance in Europe slackened. The Nine Years War pitted the 
Grand Alliance against the French, and by the time negotiations concluded at Ryswick in 1697 it 
was clear that French dominance in Europe was recognized but contained.19 Among the 
stipulations set out in the treaty, France maintained Alsace and Strasbourg, and Louis withdrew 
his support of Cardinal von Furstenberg for the Electorate of Cologne. The king relinquished 
territory in the Spanish Netherlands and the French Palatinate duly recognizing too William III 
as king of England.20  
It was in Italy where the Nine Years War cost Louis XIV the loss of all small but potent 
territorial gains with their access to authority over Italian princes. As the Nine Years War neared 
its end, Louis and his ambassadors enticed the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, to abandon the 
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alliance against France.21 Leopold I’s 1695 plan to attack and wrest Casale from the French 
unsettled the duke, and he softened toward French advances rather than risk a full Habsburg 
presence in the peninsula.22 Louis empowered the Comte de Tessé to treat secretly with the duke 
in 1695-1696. The resulting 1696 Treaty of Vigevano, a measure to avert the descent of war into 
the Milanese, compelled the king in its measures to relinquish Casale back to the Duke of 
Mantua after demolishing its fortress; the Abbé d’Estrades’s 1677 initiative was undone.23 
French gains in Italy were lost in the final negotiations with the Savoyard court through the 1696 
Treaty of Turin. Louis ceded the fortress of Pignerol to the duke.24 To finalize the Franco-
Savoyard alliance, the king agreed to the marriage of the duke’s daughter, Marie-Adélaïde, to his 
grandson, the Duke of Burgundy.25 These losses curtailed Louis XIV’s grasp over Italian 
politics, and Northern Italy represented again territories over which the Bourbon and Habsburgs 
would contend in the eventuality of Carlos II’s death.26       
The 1697 Treaty of Ryswick could be interpreted as evidence that Leopold I and his 
government were still more concerned with the establishment of imperial rule in Hungary and 
the Ottoman threat to the east than with Louis XIV.27 The Grand Alliance and the impositions of 
the treaty underscored that Louis could be quelled in the west through a coalition of European 
princes. The menace of Hungarian malcontents and the Turk to imperial gains and borders in 
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Hungary and the Balkans, however, remained very real in Vienna.28 The war that raged in 
Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean since 1684 finally came to a conclusion with the 1699 
Treaty of Carlowitz. The treaty ostensibly confirmed Leopold’s dominance over Hungary, and 
the proximity of Sultan Mustafa II's forces to major urban centers within the empire was 
temporarily repulsed. It was uncertain, however, if the Ottoman court would try to reclaim its 
losses, and so, imperial attention and resources turned to fortify and protect the installation of 
Habsburg authority in the east.29 The question of the Hungarians and the Ottomans continued to 
plague the government of Leopold I, but the Ottomans terrified the Venetians.30 
Venice’s senate concluded its second seventeenth-century war with the Turk at Carlowitz 
bringing its formal alliance with Leopold I and the papacy to an end. After a series of financially 
crushing campaigns, the republic regained sovereignty of almost all of its former Mediterranean 
territories through Francesco Morosini’s successes in 1687-1688, but the republic’s monetary 
and naval resources were exhausted; the public debt soared as the century closed.31 To bring its 
Mediterranean acquisitions under control, Venice’s senate left the majority of its naval fleet in 
the east to safeguard against an Ottoman resurgence and to fortify the installation of Venetian 
reggimenti.32 Expenditures for building and maintaining a redoubtable naval force in the years of 
war, as we have seen, obliged the Venetian state to borrow funds from the papacy, to enforce 
new taxes within the republic, to raise tariffs on foreign merchants and their goods, to debase the 
ducat, and to promote the sale and expansion of its nobility.33 Historians have shown that as the 
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eighteenth century opened Venice’s commercial economy continued to adapt and to thrive, but 
its state coffers depleted eventually seeing the debt accrue to fifty million ducats by 1714.34      
The unstable empire of Mustafa II, therefore, remained a potential danger to both 
Leopold I and the Venetian republic after Carlowitz.35 The emperor’s accord with the Grand 
Seigneur, however, promised an ostensible twenty-year truce, whereas, the peace signed between 
him and Venice's senate did not.36 A seriously impaired state treasury combined with an 
uncertain peace and expanded maritime borders left Venice’s government unable to alienate 
Leopold. The alliance between Leopold and the republic grew tense though as imperial authority 
in the Adriatic threatened Venetian claims to the sea. Leopold bullied Venice’s Dalmatian rival, 
the Republic of Ragusa, after Carlowitz pressing the republic for assistance against France in 
1701-1702.37 He trumpeted his lordship of the port of Trieste becoming another adversary for 
Adriatic trade.38 Still, the senate understood that it needed the emperor in the event of another 
war with the Ottomans, and, ultimately, he too depended upon the Venetian navy to counter 
Mustafa in the Mediterranean.39  
Not long after peace between Mustafa II and members of the 1684 Treaty of Lindz, Louis 
XIV accepted King Carlos II’s will.  Carlos’s death 1 November 1700 tentatively elevated a 
Bourbon to the Spanish throne, but Leopold I refused to accept the alienation of Spain and its 
vast global patrimony from the Habsburgs.40 War seemed inevitable. The governments at 
Versailles and Vienna almost immediately hastened military forces into Northern Italy to seize 
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Spanish possessions.41 The Republic of Venice and its terraferma formed a corridor through 
which imperial armies needed to pass en route to Milan and in which Franco-Spanish forces 
could impede their progress. The belligerents hastened to gain the cooperation of Venice’s 
senate.42 The republic’s own difficult international affairs, however, meant that French 
ambassadors in Venice would be hard pressed to persuade Venice’s government to ally against 
Leopold.43 The Venetian senate had no recourse than to hide officially behind the rhetoric of 
neutrality.  
 
Fig. 12 
Cardinal d’Estrées incognito: Elderly Representative of Louisquatorzien Diplomatic Praxis 
in Venice 
Cesar, Cardinal d’Estrées’s arrival in Venice emphasized the crucial role that the 
republic’s government still represented as hostilities related to the Spanish succession began. The 
elderly ambassador arrived in the republic from Rome 22 January 1701 foregoing the ceremonial 
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entrée.44 The cardinal elected to remain incognito throughout his tenure in the republic avoiding 
time-consuming ceremonial and protocol requirements that he believed would hinder his tasks.45 
Estrées believed too that the foreign policy demands that he was to make in Venice would be 
compromised if they were not undertaken in the strictest possible secrecy. To aid in these 
considerations, Estrées accepted the invitation of his long-time acquaintance, Vincenzo 
Coronelli, the then Reverend-Father General of the Franciscan Order, to lodge in his apartments 
in the Franciscan monastery of Santa Maria Gloriosa dei Frari.46 Centrally located in the city, the 
Frari afforded quicker access to government messengers than the embassy in Cannaregio, and 
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lodging there instead of the embassy distanced Estrées from the appearance of official diplomatic 
service.    
Estrées’s recondite embassy was unique among French diplomats in Venice. First, he was 
the highest-ranking ambassador sent to Venice in Louis XIV’s “personal rule.” Secondly, at no 
other point in the “personal rule” had an extraordinary ambassador been sent to the republic, and 
finally, at no other moment did two ambassadors overlap there. Estrées’s tenure coincided with 
the last months of Denis II de la Haye’s long service in late 1701 and the incognito arrival of his 
replacement Joseph-Antoine Hennequin, Seigneur de Charmont, Baron de Chasenay in 
September. Both of these ministers had orders from Louis XIV to defer to Estrées while he 
negotiated in Venice. Their interactions with the senate were to follow Estrées’s lead, and the 
cardinal made it clear that he was jealous of his primacy.47 
Details of the long life and career of Estrées (1628-1714) are much better known than 
those of Louis XIV’s other ambassadors to Venice and need not be recounted fully.48 Suffice it 
to say Estrées’s family was of the highest nobility. The Estrées were of Picard origin; César’s 
father, François-Annibale I, Marshal-Duke d’Estrées, was the brother of Gabrielle d’Estrées, 
mistress of Henry IV. His mother, Marie, was a member of the Bethune-Sully clan.49 César and 
his two brothers served Louis XIV faithfully: the middle brother, Jean II, was an accomplished 
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naval officer. The eldest, François-Annibale II, Duke d’Estrées, served as French ambassador to 
Rome from 1672 to 1679. In turn, César, the youngest, rose through the ranks of the church 
receiving the beretta in 1671. He acted as a second French ambassador at the Papal See assisting 
his brother and informing the court and French ambassadors (as we saw the Abbé d’Estrades 
regarded Estrées as a patron) for over thirty years of news from the curia.50 His imperious 
manner and the pride he demonstrated in his rank made him detestable to Popes Clement X and 
Innocent XI at whose courts he upheld the Gallican pretensions of Louis XIV during the crises of 
the 1670s and 1680s, and he was instrumental at the conclave following the death of Innocent 
XII that elected the pro-French Clement XI.51   
Estrées’s practices as an ambassador conformed to Colbert de Torcy’s “world of paper,” 
while hearkening back to diplomatic correspondence from earlier in the reign of the king. The 
three principal volumes of the cardinal’s numerous dispatches from Venice serve as additional 
evidence that there was no shortage of information flooding into the foreign ministry after the 
death of Jean-Baptiste Colbert eighteen years earlier or under former foreign ministers. Estrées’s 
packets included letters to Torcy and, despite gout crippling his hands, many hand-written copies 
of letters inter alia to the Cardinal Forbin-Janson in Rome and to the Comte de Tessé.52 As we 
have seen, the inclusion of such letters had been curtailed in the official packets of French 
ambassadors to Venice since Colbert de Croissy’s nomination as secretary of state in 1679. 
Although it could be argued that the circumstances of Estrées’s embassy to Venice required the 
inclusion of this information in his packets to the court.  
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Documentational novelties appeared in the packets of the new ambassador, Charmont, 
such as printed passports instead of the hand-written ones issued in previous decades.53 Such 
items reinforced the move to the professionalization of diplomacy under Torcy whereas Estrées’s 
correspondence adhered to earlier forms. Cardinals Estrées and Forbin-Janson were among the 
last four high-ranking ecclesiastics the French foreign ministry utilized on relevant foreign 
missions in the ancien régime. Two more cardinals would serve as ambassadors in the eighteenth 
century, Cardinal de Rohan to Vienna and Cardinal de Bernis to Rome; both were sent as 
courtesies to honor the prestige of the Austrian and papal courts.54   
Estrées used a nom de guerre while negotiating. He met on a regular basis with the savvio 
del consiglio, Benedetto Capello, under the pseudonym of the “Abbé de Rivalta.” From the 
moment of their first interview, Estrées insisted that his diplomatic presence in Venice be denied; 
he was not there personally as an ambassador but as a visitor maintaining cordial relations with 
Franco-Spanish allies like the republic.55 In the secret conferences with Capello, however, he 
was the “Abbé de Rivalta,” a liaison, speaking on behalf of the Cardinal d’Estrées who in turn 
the kings of France and Spain empowered to observe from Rome and Venice on their behalf.56 
For his part, Capello, made it clear that he really could only “listen and relay” for and to the 
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collegio during their conferences.57 Estrées reported on their first meeting 5 February 1701 with 
Vincenzo Coronelli making the introductions.58 
“You judge correctly that the resolution of the pope and of the Republic of Venice will 
determine those of the Princes of Italy”:59 The Myopia of Cardinal d’Estrées 
 The French foreign ministry believed the Republic of Venice and Pope Clement XI could 
sway the princes of Northern Italy against Leopold I. Cardinal d’Estrées travelled to Venice to 
impress upon the senate the need for an outright alliance with France or at least an alliance of 
neutrality between the senate and the pope.60 The importance of this policy increased as the 
situation in Italy became more volatile throughout 1701. First, Estrées was to insist that the 
republic prohibit the emperor from sending troops across the Tyrol through Venetian lands 
toward Milan.61 Leopold’s war council elected Francois-Eugène, Prince of Savoy to lead thirty 
thousand imperial troops into Italy that massed just across the Venetian border.62 The French 
army would soon comprise about thirty thousand men entering Italy piecemeal beginning in 
January. They joined with Spanish troops already in the Milanais and those that Victor Amadeus, 
Duke of Savoy pledged. The duke was elected generalissimo of the allied troops with inter alia 
Marshals Catinat and Villeroy and the Comte de Tessé under his command.63 Estrées pre-empted 
the passage of imperial troops arriving in Venice three months before Eugène’s army descended. 
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Estrées worked to secure Venetian permission for French troops to cross from the Milanese into 
the terraferma to oppose Eugène’s entry.64 Reluctantly the republic acquiesced to the passage but 
not to an alliance with France.65 
From January to May French leadership in Northern Italy negotiated with Clement XI, 
the Venetian senate, the Dukes of Mantua, Parma, and Modena, and lesser potentates to establish 
a defensive arc stretching from the Alpine border of the Milanese to the Adriatic coast.66 The 
firmly pro-imperial Duke of Modena denied his assistance to Franco-Spanish armies early on.67 
After decades of playing the puppet to Louis XIV's Italian policies, the Duke of Parma was 
hardly pro-French, but Louis XIV promised major financial and military assistance against the 
emperor for his complicity. Through the reluctant cooperation of the Duke of Mantua, Franco-
Spanish forces stationed in his lands promising to do as little damage possible to the states of the 
princes of the Paduan planes.68 The duke feared the possibility of losing his capital and Casale to 
Leopold, and Tessé established a close link with the duke positioning the soldiers under his 
command in the duke’s lands and residing variously in the ducal palace. The duke’s agents in 
Venice served too as spies and blockade runners for Tessé which, as will be seen, included the 
Rizzati brothers.    
It remained to be seen if Venice would follow the example of the dukes of Mantua and 
Parma formally impeding Eugène’s progress. Throughout the early spring Capello insisted to 
Estrées that the senate was resolute that Leopold’s forces should not enter its state; Venice 
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vaunted its neutrality.69 Tessé alleged that the senate expressed tacit permission for Leopold’s 
troops to cross the Alps through their inaction, but Prince Eugène indicated that he led his army 
into Italy in early May flaunting the warnings of Venetian provveditori in the Terra Ferma who 
reminded him of Venice’s “pretence of neutrality.”70 Estrées could only express extreme chagrin 
at what he believed was the senate’s ultimate betrayal of its promises to him that imperial troops 
would not cross its frontiers when Eugène’s forces descended in late May soon encountering and 
then overcoming those of Marshal Catinat at Carpi on 10 July and on 31 August at Chiari.71 The 
remainder of the campaign season witnessed a number of skirmishes bleeding across the plains 
and rivers of North-Central Italy to the advantage of Eugène.72 As the autumn approached the 
patience of Louis XIV and Estrées with the senate’s allegedly neutral vacillations faltered, but 
their attention had already shifted from the moot point of impeding Eugène’s forces in the 
Veneto to pressing for an outright alliance between the Venetian senate and Pope Clement XI to 
guard against the entry of more imperial troops and any attempt to march south toward the 
Kingdom of Naples.73 
Clement XI Albani became pope in 1700 only weeks after the death of Carlos II. The 
pope immediately angered Leopold I upholding Louis XIV’s acceptance of the defunct king’s 
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will, and he leant his support to repulse imperial troops.74 Louis XIV believed that an alliance 
between the pope and the Venetians could possibly galvanize the other princes of Northern Italy 
to league en masse against Leopold I, and the French agreed not to move any troops into the 
papal states in exchange for Clement’s backing.75 Initially Estrées feared that if Venice allied 
with Clement XI the senate’s own seeming affinity for the emperor could turn the pope against 
Franco-Spanish interests.76 After the sound defeat of the French at Carpi and Chiari, however, 
Clement XI appeared more vigorously than ever to oppose the emperor’s advances into the 
peninsula especially as the revolt of the Prince of Macchia in Naples threatened traditional papal 
overlordship in the south as much as it did that of Philip V.77 Protecting Naples against imperial 
machinations to inspire further anti-Bourbon turbulence in the kingdom became critical as the 
year passed, and Estrées seemed sure that Eugene's plans were to filter troops and, ultimately, 
march himself to Naples.78 Adding to the case against Venice, from Rome the Venetian Cardinal 
Vincenzo Grimani assisted the Neapolitan conspirators in favor of Leopold I.79  
Estrées continued to add his counsels for an alliance between Clement and the republic in 
his meetings with Capello.80 Through his correspondence with the papal nuncio in Venice and 
the French ambassador, the Cardinal Forbin-Janson, in Rome, he reported that the Venetian 
ambassadors at the papal court, Nicolò Erizzo and his successor there, Francesco Morosini, had 
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instructions from the senate to cement a formal treaty for the “common security of Italy.”81 By 
December a treaty was negotiated in which both Venice and Clement pledged at least to remain 
neutral in the conflict.82 Estrées appeared enthusiastic about the potential effects of the treaty, but 
as 1701 drew to a close the cardinal’s distrust for Venetian neutrality grew as the republic 
continued to provide quarters, victuals, and forage to Eugène’s men and horses despite the 
French troops’ withdrawal into the lands of the dukes of Mantua and Parma.83  As will be seen, 
the Chevalier de Forbin’s alarming reports from the Adriatic Sea of blatant Venetian maritime 
aid to imperial forces strengthened Estrées's belated incredulity. Louis XIV’s commanders in 
Italy assured him that Milan was well-defended under the governor there, the elder Prince de 
Vaudémont, and the attention of the French military command in early 1702 turned to Eugène’s 
blockade of the city of Mantua and the march of imperial troops south to Naples.84  
The King had desired that Venice ally outright with France and Spain, but the events of 
the campaign season and winter of 1701 proved that the senate was either incapable of adding 
any military assistance against Eugène’s troops or that it willingly allowed the prince to profit 
from its lands. By late 1701 the correspondence between the cardinal and the king indicated that 
they began to believe that Venice was anything but neutral.85 Estrées received instructions to 
insist that Venice’s government demand the same behavior from the German troops in the 
terraferma as they had from the French.86 The senate uneasily complied with French interests 
throughout the campaign allowing Franco-Spanish troops into the terraferma to counter Eugène, 
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and the senate reluctantly permitted the forces of Catinat and Tessé to forage as they had done 
for those of the prince. Estrées and Tessé labored to assure the obedience and decency of the 
French army among Venetian subjects, and with few official complaints from Venetian officials 
it appeared that they succeeded.87  
This had not been the case with German troops under Eugène. Still, the senate did not 
ally with France to eject the Germans, and as the prince delayed the departure of his troops from 
Venetian lands into Mantua until 21 November 1701, Estrées and the king became more 
suspicious toward the senate’s tolerance for imperial forces.88 For the French, Venetian inaction 
belied the rhetoric of neutrality; as the new year approached, the senate’s unwillingness to block 
ships in the Adriatic Sea victualing and arming Eugène’s troops who entered and blockaded 
Mantua heightened the king’s anger destroying the senate’s credibility and poisoning Louis 
XIV’s ostensible good will.89 It seemed Estrées's ministrations and patience with the republic 
regarding the French presence in the terraferma and the treaty with Clement XI left the cardinal 
unaware of the extent to which the Venetians were assisting Leopold I's war effort in the waters 
of the Adriatic. It took the persistence of the Chevalier de Forbin to “open the eyes” of the 
cardinal and inspire him and the king to search for more effective measures to weaken Venetian 
resolve.90        
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The Chevalier de Forbin and French Dominance over Venetian Adriatic Sovereignty 
Louis XIV understood from the beginning of the conflict that Venice might be reluctant 
to forego the strategic advantages of ties with Leopold I after the recent war with the Ottomans. 
The king empowered Cardinal d’Estrées, therefore, to assure the senate that if it allied with 
France and Spain that it could expect French assistance and influence in the event that Mustafa II 
should attack Venice’s territories in the Mediterranean or disturb its commercial interests.91 
Louis had promised the Venetians aid against the Ottomans in the past with no real benefit to 
them, and, as Capello opined to the collegio, the French always reminded them of their earlier 
assistance when they needed something in return.92 For Venice the loss of Crete was still very 
raw; Louis XIV did not appreciate the residue of Venetian resentment that ineffectual French 
assistance from thirty three years earlier inspired in Venetian attitudes toward him. Energized 
through the growth of its states after Carlowitz, Venice was in no hurry to upset Leopold I who 
had helped acquire them.  
The senate made no move to accept Louis’s offer to manage the Turks in 1701, and 
throughout the year the question of Venetian sovereignty in the Adriatic became an increasing 
matter of doubt and then derision for Estrées.93 Estrées believed there was no evidence in the 
first six months of 1701 that the emperor planned to move troops, provisions, or arms through 
the Adriatic to Italy despite rumors of an alliance between Leopold and Ragusa to that effect.94 
The Venetians tried to use the evidence of this treaty to solicit the bombardment of its Dalmatian 
rival. Venice's rancor against Ragusa and its call for a French naval bombardment was soon to 
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come back to haunt it.95 Venice’s senate reassured Estrées that it would brook no such actions in 
the sea contrary to its neutrality.96 In his memoirs, however, the Chevalier de Forbin contradicted 
this information depicting an Adriatic teaming with Venetian agents and merchant ships 
stockpiling and transporting provisions, men, and arms from Trieste in imperial Dalmatia to 
ports along the eastern coast of Italy. Forbin alleged that the Venetians lied to Estrées throughout 
1701 and early 1702, and he claimed that Louis XIV's eagerness to placate the "delicacy" of the 
republic to secure French strategy in Northern Italy blinded Estrées to Venetian duplicity on the 
sea.97  
Forbin went to the Adriatic with orders only to guard against the eventuality of imperial 
movements in the sea.98 As the months of 1701 passed, the chevalier increased attacks against 
Venetian vessels threatening Estrées's sense of control in diplomatic relations with the republic 
as he negotiated the alliance between the senate and Clement XI.99 The cardinal accepted 
Capello’s assurances on behalf of the senate that it was unaware of these actions. He rebuked 
Forbin for an impetuosity he believed endangered French manipulations of the Venetians in 
regards to the logistical requirements of the French army and the possible alliance with the 
pope.100 Forbin received orders from the court and from his uncle in Rome, the Cardinal de 
Forbin-Janson, however, that he should continue locating and destroying any vessels in the sea 
supplying imperial forces.101 The chevalier patrolled the sea searching scores of suspicious 
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vessels of Venetian, Ragusan, and imperial origin burning those on which war material and 
supplies of grain were found.102  
As the Venetian senate’s complaints grew against his attacks, Forbin suggested to Estrées 
and the new French ordinary ambassador, Charmont, that the senate require all of its vessels to 
carry patents to prove they were not dealing in imperial munitions.103 The senate raged that the 
French could not make such demands on its sovereignty, and it tried to tighten its control of the 
sea further against the French closing all its Dalmatian and Italian ports to Forbin.104 These 
actions compounded the evidence that Venice was covertly assisting imperial policies.  In May 
1702 Forbin sailed unmolested into the Venetian port of Chioggia up to the mouth of the Po.105 
Some in the senate argued this action signalled they had already lost overlordship of the sea since 
they could not repel him. A senator of the Erizzo clan lamented that the republic should cancel 
the sensa as it would be ridiculous to make the ceremonial claim of maritime dominance when 
foreign ships beset Venice’s ports.106 For some weeks the senate entertained the notion that it 
would have to cancel the centuries-old nuptial ceremony, but Estrées assured the senate he would 
protect against Forbin if it would give some sign of curtailing Prince Eugène.107 The ceremony 
went ahead, but it was clear that Venice no longer had means at hand to defend its traditional 
claims to the Adriatic. The majority of its navy remained in the distant Mediterranean, and the 
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ships it could muster in the Adriatic would scarcely be able to fend off French squadrons in its 
major ports should Forbin attack them.108  
The circumstance that finally persuaded Cardinal d’Estrées of the extent to which Forbin 
was correct in his assertions of Venetian cooperation with the emperor was the news that an 
English vessel, the Bonaventure, was outfitted with fifty cannons and soldiers at Trieste in the 
summer of 1702 and that upon its departure it saluted a Venetian admiral who returned the 
salute.109 The vessel was armed to escort and protect smaller convoys carrying supplies to 
Eugène on the mainland against Forbin’s squadrons. News arrived that the English ship aided 
convoys sent with cargoes of grain from the Venetian port at Malamocco that were then 
stockpiled in ports and fortresses belonging to the Duke of Modena.110 Forbin’s focus in 1702 
became the destruction of this vessel. 
The chevalier’s reports persuaded Estrées that the time for dealing softly with Venice was 
over. For its part, the senate fulminated especially as Forbin bombarded Trieste and cannonaded 
the armed English vessel at night within eyesight of San Marco in August 1702.111 The explosion 
of its powder was so great that many in the city believed they were under attack.112 The chevalier 
remarked that he had become infamous among the Venetians. They feared he could launch a 
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bombardment on the city at any time; undoubtedly, the Venetians remembered the brutal French 
bombardment of Genoa is 1684 in retribution for Genoese support of the king of Spain.113 Louis 
XIV began to utilize Venetian fear and uncertainty asserting that it was time for the senate finally 
to demonstrate that it was sovereign of the gulf and stop facilitating Prince Eugène’s success or 
renounce its nominal lordship of the sea.114 
Augmentation of French naval squadrons sailing to reinforce Forbin’s actions and Philip 
V’s arrival in Italy to secure his possessions provided Franco-Spanish forces briefly with the 
upper hand in the peninsula against Eugène’s increasingly depleted forces.115  By late-1702 news 
that imperial reinforcements would not come to Eugène’s aid in the near future coupled with the 
fear of the Venetian senate and populace that the French could bombard the city provided Estrées 
with leverage in negotiations giving the senate pause as to what the French might do as evidence 
of Venetian deference to Leopold mounted.116 In his important survey, Frederic Lane concurred 
that the republic’s inability to repulse the entry of French vessels into the Adriatic and the 
senate’s compulsion to assist the emperor and his allies in the Grand Alliance on the sea in 1701-
1702 “signalled the end” of significant Venetian maritime sovereignty.117 
The Circumstances of the Rizzati Affair 
Franco-Spanish forces temporarily dominated in Northern Italy and the Adriatic Sea by 
June 1702. Milan and Naples remained secure from imperial armies for the time being.118 In part, 
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this success resulted from the diminished numbers of Eugène’s troops and finances.119 Another 
contributing factor was the aggressive campaigns of Forbin in the Adriatic interrupting imperial 
replenishments. Undoubtedly, French commanders, Villeroy, Tessé, and Catinat waged an 
effective defense against the westward and southward deployment of imperial troops either into 
the Milanese or to Naples. This defense had not come without numerous losses including the 
embarrassing capture of Marshal de Villeroy.120  
In November 1701 Prince Eugène’s troops at last retreated from the Venetian terraferma 
obtruding on the lands of the Dukes of Parma and Mantua; these princes pleaded for French 
succor.121 The Duke of Parma’s state was “reduced to the extreme,” and soon too Eugène 
blockaded Mantua.122 During the “blocus” the Comte de Tessé was shut up in the city with the 
ducal court and French troops. Forbin impaired the arrival of supplies to Eugène from the sea, 
and the prince’s much reduced fighting force surrounded the city impeding the entry of 
provisions swallowing up the meagre foodstuffs available in the countryside for his men and 
animals.123 To prohibit further the victualing of the city, Eugène issued a command that those of 
any nationality smuggling goods into or out of Mantua should be hanged.124 The situation was 
dire as the blockade endured six months. Supplies became scarce for the Germans and the 
French, and subjects and soldiers within the city depended on blockade runners for supplies, 
money, and correspondence. Charmont wrote about gangs of bandits employed by the Duke of 
Mantua, and he encouraged the French to use them to cause “much annoyance” to Eugène’s 
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forces.125 The duke and the Comte de Tessé depended in particular on scouts coming from 
Venice 126  
With the arrival of French reinforcements into Italy under the Duke de Vendôme by 1 
June 1702 Eugène’s blockade of Mantua ended.127 Eleven days later Cardinal d’Estrées wrote the 
dispatch to Louis XIV detailing the executions of the Rizzati brothers. From the sources little can 
be known about the background of the Rizzati or about the full scope of their involvement. What 
is clear is that they were executed for smuggling goods and information for the Duke of 
Mantua.128 Three points about the Rizzati and their executions can reasonably be concluded. 
First, by April 1702, the inquisitors of state knew the brothers to be malefactors in the employ of 
the duke. Estrées reported that they made themselves more odious to the inquisitors by taking up 
residence in the duke’s palace in Venice during carnevale flaunting their attachments to the 
Duke of Mantua flamboyantly appearing masked and in ducal livery during the festivities despite 
the knowledge that they were being hunted.129  
Secondly, the brothers possessed letters patent from the French ordinary ambassador in 
Venice, Charmont, and passeports the Comte de Tessé provided them in which he claimed the 
brothers as soldiers in the French army.130 Given the evidence that the Duke of Mantua and 
Tessé relied upon blockade runners especially from Venice to carry official correspondence, 
news, currency, and goods it is likely that these documents were given to the brothers to facilitate 
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the passage of information and lend official protection to them in case of their capture. Finally, 
the inquisitors’ search for the brothers throughout the spring and their ultimate capture and 
execution occurred during the final weeks of the blockade of Mantua.131 They were apprehended 
finally on 10 June and imprisoned.132 The execution of the Rizzati two days later could indicate 
Venetian deference to the requirements of Prince Eugène: their strangulation and the subsequent 
hanging of their corpses, while not uncommon in Venice’s prisons, mirrored Eugène’s field 
order that blockade runners be hanged.133  
The Rizzati Affair and Cardinal d’Estrées: The Strategic and International Implications 
In any case, the Rizzatis’ executions set off a diplomatic furor that the French utilized 
against the senate.  It was Cardinal d’Estrées that Louis XIV pressed to use the Rizzati affair to 
full effect. Estrées echoed strong royal complaints in his discussions with Capello throughout the 
last three months of his tenure in Venice. The evidence of Venice’s “insidious conduct” toward 
the French to the benefit of Leopold I became undeniable in the eyes of Louis XIV, the cardinal, 
and the French military and naval leadership.134 Through the added weight of the Rizzati affair 
the king and Estrées demanded that the republic add action to its rhetoric of neutrality either 
joining the Franco-Spanish cause outright to push imperial troops to the coast of the Adriatic and 
out of Italy and again take up true sovereignty of the Adriatic or risk the consequences.135  
                                               
131 Preto’s brief mention of Gian-Paolo Rizzati suggests that in April 1702 the inquisitors were already seeking to 
dispatch the brothers. Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia, 345. 
132 The cardinal first mentioned the capture of the Rizzati 10 June, AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 136 supplément, Estrées 
to [destinataire unknown], 10 June 1702, Fs. 166v-167r, 167v. 
133 Estrées confirmed the brothers would have had “prices on their heads.” AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to 
Louis XIV, 12 June 1702, F. 185r; Mauvillon, The History of Francis-Eugene, Prince of Savoy, Book II, 130-131; 
Amelot de la Houssaie, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, Tome II, 527; Horatio F. Brown, Venice: An 
Historical Sketch of the Republic (London: Percival, 1893), 407. 
134 Mauvillon, The History of Francis-Eugene, Prince of Savoy, Book II, 130-131. 
135 In a mémoire to the king, the Marquis de Chamlay urged lifting the blockade of Mantua and pushing the 
imperials back through Venetian lands toward the coast by winter as requisite strategy for the 1702 campaign 
season. Mémoire de M. de Chamlay, Février 1702, in Pelet, 709. 
252 
Louis XIV demanded that the senate send an express courier to France to explain the 
affair.136 The senate duly sent messengers to the French court and to Charmont claiming they had 
no knowledge that the Rizzati were under French protection.137 Capello visited Estrées for the 
first time after the executions only on 24 June claiming too the ignorance of the inquisitors.138 
Estrées wrote the king that, given the particular moment in which French forces found 
themselves in control of Northern Italy and the Adriatic, that the affair provided an opportunity 
to frighten the senate into compliance with French war aims, and so, “without pressing this affair 
more than Your Majesty judges [beneficial] it is necessary still to keep it alive until the moment 
arrives...when one can put it to rest according to the resolutions Your Majesty would like to 
take.”139 Louis XIV agreed seeing that this affair provided him with an added means to 
intimidate the senate: “for my service it is [good] to make the Venetians fear my resentment, but 
it is not necessary to reduce them to despair for an affair that is in itself of least importance.”140 
The king decided that the Rizzati affair should be used to unsettle the Venetians throughout the 
rest of the campaign season 1702 making the senate believe that royal retribution could come at 
any moment.141 
For their part the Venetian senate delayed response to angry French demands for redress. 
They defended their neutrality and issued complaints that they had been very patient with French 
armies’ usage of resources in the terraferma since 1701.142 They reiterated their outrage at 
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Forbin’s attacks in their waters, and as the chevalier bombarded Trieste and burned the armed 
Bonaventure within sight of the city in August.143 The senate now accused Forbin of destroying 
Venetian merchant vessels and interrupting its commerce.144 Estrées, remarked that the king had 
already forebore with the senate, and its refusal to rectify the Rizzati affair only heightened the 
danger it faced from superior French military and naval forces. He pointed out to Capello that in 
addition to the evidence that the senate favored the emperor over the past months that the 
imperial ambassador in Venice maintained an armed escort contravening Venetian law with 
impunity, and Venetian bankers exchanged bills of credit for Eugène.145 
French pressure through the affair began to have its intended effect. By late August, the 
Venetians permitted French troops back into the Veronese sending orders to the provveditori to 
provide them with whatever resources they could reasonably afford.146 The king increased 
Forbin’s naval forces just in case, and permission was given for the chevalier to continue raids 
on Venetian commercial vessels.147 The senate learned that the French allowed Forbin to attack 
Ottoman ships taking prisoners and cargo in Venetian waters for which the Turk could demand 
redress from the senate.148 These actions combined with news from Constantinople that the 
French sought to ally with the Turks to mount an offensive against the Venetians and Leopold I 
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brought Venice to heel.149 By August 1702 the senate was ready and willing to placate the king 
in regards to the Rizzati. The affair benefitted the French for four months. The measures the 
senate at last agreed upon signalled the extent to which French threats intimidated and brought 
them to submission before Louis XIV. 
The Rizzati Affair and Diplomatic Implications: The Dissolution of Franco-Venetian 
Relations in the Eighteenth-Century 
The executions compelled the Venetian government to make strategic concessions to the 
French. It became clear that Louis XIV intended to humble the Republic of Venice for its 
associations with Leopold I. It is through the discourse Estrées used in his discussions with 
Capello regarding the affair that we glimpse how well European states in the early-modern 
period saw through the Serenissima’s mythologized political stability recognizing an allegedly 
tyrannical oligarchy that its own patricians loathed.150 A brief analysis of the discursive strategy 
the king and the cardinal employed in manipulating the affair reveals that the king wanted to 
humiliate the Venetians.  
Previous French ambassadors described the closeted authority of the state inquisitors to 
Louis XIV. The senate tried to “correct” the growing power of the Council of Ten and the 
inquisitors of state in 1677-1678 while the Abbé d’Estrades was in Venice.151 These ministers’ 
authority angered the patricians over whom they held seemingly absolute power.152 Estrades took 
notice of the internal politics as they might affect French interests, but the turbulent internal 
tumults wracking the republic were then of little consequence to French foreign policy as Louis 
XIV’s authority increased relatively unimpeded during the Dutch War.   
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It was, as will be remembered, during the tenure of the Sieur d’Amelot, that the French 
ambassador almost clashed with the inquisitors as they allegedly ordered the murder of Amelot’s 
associate and informant, Paolo Giuliani. The French foreign ministry expressed outrage at the 
murder, but it was contrary to French strategy toward the Venetian government in 1684 to indict 
the inquisitors’ truculence. The Rizzati Affair, however, interposed the authority of the three 
inquisitors between the needs of Europe’s greatest monarchs in a heated diplomatic and military 
context in which the services of agents like the Rizzati facilitated the movement of information 
while the kingdom of Spain was en jeu. The affair occurred when Louis XIV needed to frighten 
the Venetian government enough to make it remember its own tenuous defense against the 
French in the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy. 
From the perspective of the king the Venetian government at last rose above its station in 
European affairs, and the inquisitors, heretofore left to direct the arcana of Venice’s polity from 
the shadows, dared to oppose high French foreign policy.153 The king demanded the Venetian 
government make an example of the three state inquisitors responsible for the executions of two 
men in his service and defend against ministers who, it could be said, contradicted Venice’s 
conciliar sovereignty and international reputation.154 Cardinal d’Estrées unleashed diatribes 
against the inquisitors’ authority and the international implications for the republic’s 
government. In the initial meeting 24 June after the executions Estrées remarked to Capello: 
It would be too difficult [for the Venetians] to try and justify how the the sovereign 
power of the Great Council, that is the general assembly of all the nobles, could be 
transferred to the inquisitors of state to delimit; that this pretended sovereignty might 
have control over private subjects of whatever rank they might be, but that the laws from 
within the boundaries of their city and their states should have absolutely no effect on the 
necessities of Foreign Princes especially the First Two Crowns of Europe. Moreover, it 
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would be strange that one would make three subjects of the Republic arbiters to decide 
whether to respect or not any person Kings would honor with similar dignity [that is royal 
protection], and, moreover, even the collegio which represents the sovereignty of the 
Republic even had no right to involve itself in such a case, but it seemed to suffice, 
however, to be an inquisitor of state to ignore without punishment this respect…. I upheld 
that in the present circumstances the actions of the inquisitors of state was inexcusable…. 
After such a precipitous action, the senate was now placed in a very embarrassing 
situation as to what is might do: [Estrees’ suggested] they [the senate] should forbid them 
[the current inquisitors] in perpetuity from holding a charge that they had abused with 
impudence.155  
 
On 1 July, Estrées “repeated and even exaggerated all of the circumstances that rendered that 
action most offensive and which should oblige the Republic to repair it through all of the 
satisfactions [sic] Your Majesty might demand.”156 The savvio, Estrées alleged, became very 
agitated begging the French not to blame the entire Venetian “publico” for the conduct of “three 
inquisitors over whom neither the collegio nor the senate had any authority and who acted with a 
sovereign and absolute power in these types of cases.”157 Estrées rejoined: 
I believed that I had to ridicule what he said by remarking that I did not know that there 
was any other sovereign power in Venice other than the bodies of the Republic, and that 
he was teaching me something new that I had never understood [about the Republic] like 
so many other things; that if the fault lay with the three inquisitors and if they should be 
considered the sovereigns over which the Republic had no authority, it should be, 
therefore, these three sovereigns who should be held to account for their actions before 
Your Majesty, and You would be forced into combat if they did not do so seeing that it 
[the Republic] had already declared in so many ways against You and against the Spanish 
Crown, for which it did not appear in the least embarrassed. I continued saying that the 
Republic could clearly expect the power of these inquisitors to hold sway over 
merchants, artisans, and the inhabitants of Venice, but to pretend that such [a system of] 
laws permitted them to disrespect the just regard owed to Crowns and to such a great 
King, that it would be too great a wrong toward the Republic to believe it capable of such 
a thing….158 
 
He added the republic could publicly demonstrate that this was not the case “...as they [the 
inquisitors] merited to be deprived forever of the titles which they had abused to the degree of 
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bringing the Republic into conflict with Your Majesty, and if the Republic facilitated their 
capricious acts it would find itself engaged justly to render the satisfaction Your Majesty 
deserved.”159  
Throughout July the senate avoided formal diplomatic satisfaction to the king. Estrées 
explained that the nature of the Venetian system meant that the three sitting inquisitors would 
finish the six months of their appointments by the end of August; the senate intentionally delayed 
responding to the king’s demands until this time.160 The senate had no intention of publicly 
admitting the contradictions in its polity. The city was alarmed at the thought of French reprisals 
stationing available warships at its ports, reinforcing the earthworks of the Lido, and building up 
“batteries” in the case of a bombardment.161 News that the king increased his troops in Northern 
Italy and that Philip V arrived in the peninsula to take up command of Franco-Spanish forces 
heightened the panic.162 Imperial reinforcements were not set to arrive for some time still, and, at 
this time, Forbin was attacking Venetian merchant vessels. Ultimately, the added horror that the 
Ottomans considered renewed conflict in the Mediterranean at French urging pressed the senate 
to satisfy Louis XIV in regards to the Rizzati.163 
By August it had been decided that Estrées would leave Venice and join Philip V as 
French ambassador to his court. The cardinal, however, took special care to finalize the Rizzati 
Affair before his departure demanding resolution. Undoubtedly the months in which Capello and 
the senate duped Estrées through the politics of neutrality compelled the cardinal to end his 
embassy with some successful negotiation. The senate first suggested to Estrées in late August 
                                               
159 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to Louis XIV, 1 July 1702, F. 228r. 
160 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to Louis XIV, 2 Sept. 1702, Fs. 373r-373v. 
161 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to Louis XIV, 15 July 1702, F. 264r; Mémoires du Comte de Forbin, Tome 
II, 123. 
162 AAE, CP, Venise, vol. 134, Estrées to Torcy, 22 July 1702, F. 269r.  
163 ASV, IS-LAF, Busta 153, Inquisitors of State to Pisani, 21 Oct. 1702; Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks, 
413, 415. 
258 
“the idea of a letter” in which the republic expressed in submissive terms its apologies to the 
king.164 Estrées informed Capello that a letter was still only rhetoric, and that the king expected 
decisive action on the part of the republic.165 A second suggestion was punishing the captain of 
the sbirri, Giorgio Aliprandi, blaming him for not reporting the letters to the inquisitors.166 
Neither of these acts sufficed for the king who found especially risible the idea of a “simple 
letter.”167   
Louis XIV asked the cardinal what measures he believed would embarrass the senate the 
most.168 Estrées believed nothing less than a command extraordinary embassy led by two high-
ranking patricians would humiliate the republic demonstrating the extent of its submission.169 At 
last on 30 September, the senate decided upon a two-fold act of obedience: it would send the 
letter of apology to Louis XIV in the hands of an extraordinary ambassador, and it would send a 
copy of the letter to Pope Clement XI with a request that the pontiff notarize, publish, and send 
official copies of it to all of the courts of Europe “in such a manner that the whole world would 
be convinced of the high respect and sincerity of their sentiments.”170 Estrées departed from 
Venice in late September to join Philip V. Before his departure he helped Capello edit the letter 
of submission.171 The senate elected Lorenzo Tiepolo extraordinary ambassador to deliver and to 
read the letter to the king. Tiepolo presented the letter on 1 January 1703 ending the Rizzati 
Affair.172 With the permission of Louis XIV and the senate, Tiepolo’s title then changed to 
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ordinary ambassador to France. He replaced Alvise Pisani remaining at the French court until 
1708.173  
The time-tested ludovician politics of subjugation through diplomatic bullying finally 
reached Venice. Its submission was not as spectacular as the bombardment and subsequent 
ceremonial humiliation of the Republic of Genoa in 1684-1685. Unlike the senate of its sister 
republic, the Venetian senate chose prostration before French demands rather than risk the 
possible further destruction of its war-weakened state and the inevitable humiliation that would 
have followed. Tiepolo’s extraordinary embassy signalled that Venice recognized Louis XIV’s 
international superiority. The republic feared armed retaliation in the terraferma or in the 
Mediterranean Sea either through Forbin’s squadrons or diplomatic machinations with the 
Ottomans. Louis XIV could not force Venice to abandon its attachments to Leopold I; the king 
seemed satisfied, however, that the republic recognize his authority and that it could no longer 
pretend to see France as a diplomatic equal in the future.174 The Venetian government’s affinity 
for the emperor in 1701-1702 neutralized eighteenth-century Franco-Venetian diplomatic 
relations; the Rizzati Affair was the instrument with which the Cardinal d’Estrées rendered the 
Republic of Venice impotent before louisquatorzien might. 
Conclusions 
 
 Believing Venice respected the benefits he offered, Louis XIV sent Estrées to the 
republic to persuade it to ally with France and Spain against Leopold I. The king initially 
underestimated the extent to which the Venetians favored Leopold in their Mediterranean 
policies and engagements since the Morean War. Venetian distrust for the king since the loss of 
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Crete in 1669 and the subsequent growth of his authority in Europe and the Mediterranean 
pushed the republic closer to the emperor. Leopold provided the republic with tangible 
diplomatic and strategic benefits over the course of their war with the Ottomans in the last two 
decades of the seventeenth century; it was presumed he could continue to do so.  
Belligerents for the Spanish Crown poured into Northern Italy in 1701-1702, and 
Venice’s senate presented itself to the French as a neutral state to forestall a French onslaught. 
Eager to cement an alliance between Venice and Pope Clement XI, Estrees initially accepted the 
senate’s neutrality at face value. Forbin’s reports combined with mounting evidence of Venice’s 
regard for Leopold I’s military needs in the terraferma signalled that neutrality was a mask to 
dupe Louis XIV. The senate bought time providing resources for the augmentation of imperial 
authority in Italian lands belonging to the Spanish Crown. Venice’s reliance upon the emperor in 
the event of a future conflict with the Ottomans compelled the republic to favor Leopold’s 
dominance in Italy. Events and evidence forced Estrées to recognize his miscalculation. As 
French armies experienced temporary dominance in Italy in mid-1702, the Rizzati Affair 
presented the cardinal with an opportunity to correct his error.   
Cardinal d’Estrées’s manipulation of the Rizzati Affair confirmed three points. First, the 
republic’s financial and naval resources were too over-extended in its recent Mediterranean 
acquisitions to disavow Leopold or to maintain its traditional sovereignty in the Adriatic against 
French squadrons. Secondly, the republic’s financial and naval distress left it incapable of 
forcing Franco-Spanish troops out of its terraferma states; the senate tolerated the French while 
continually favoring Eugène’s armies with provisions on land and sea. Finally, the affair 
demonstrated the republic preferred humiliation before Louis XIV rather than face a potential 
bombardment and jeopardize hard-won gains in the distant Mediterranean. For modern scholars  
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the Rizzati Affair indicates that the republic’s international and diplomatic “decline” was not a 
totalizing process. Students of Venetian history should reconsider individual cases of withered 
diplomatic relations between Venice and neighboring states in the early-modern period; each 
deserves separate analysis to draw accurate conclusions. 
The kings of France maintained ordinary ambassadors in Venice until the revolution, but 
the post was important more as an entrepot for the collection and passage of information from 
and with the distant Mediterranean and Italy.175 The relazioni of two Venetian ambassadors to 
the court of France in the first decades of the eighteenth century, Lorenzo Tiepolo and Nicolo 
Foscarini, confirmed the cause of Venice’s diminished relations with France after 1702. Tiepolo 
wrote in 1708: 
Thus I cannot conceal the continuous laments coming from that court against the alleged 
partiality demonstrated for the Germans. The repeated, rather the never-ending, reports 
that officials and generals sent to the court, produced such a disadvantageous effect...that 
even the most distinguished persons, the ministers and princes, showed themselves 
persuaded…that if the Eccellentissimo Senato had wanted it so, Lombardy would not 
have suffered war, and the States of the King of Spain would still be under his 
dominion….176 
In a later dual relazione of 1723 Tiepolo and Foscarini again echoed these sentiments: 
But the profound subtlety and penetration of that court seems to consider with little favor 
the present direction and aims of the eccellentissimo Senato. It is well known, that the 
distraction of Ottoman power and the always stronger links that have formed between 
Caesar and the Republic, against this power, created the results even for Italy of the 
recent treaty (Treaty of Passarowitz 1718)... There is the inherent notion that Vostre 
Eccellenze will never enter into hazardous negotiations that would displease 
Caesar….The Court of France, having by custom to treat with a distinct superiority, 
betimes exceeds the limits towards those from whom it cannot hope to profit sometimes 
maybe to its own detriment.177 
France came to disregard the Serenissima as a viable partner after 1702. The advent of the War 
of the Spanish Succession debunked Venetian neutrality from the French vantage confirming the 
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republic’s allegiance to the Emperor. For the French, like its famed political stability, Venetian 
claims of neutrality were a myth. With no irony, it would be the French to demand the final 
sacrifice of the Serenissima to their war aims against the Habsburgs ninety-five years later 
through the Treaty of Campo Formio.178 
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Conclusion 
One generally regards an embassy to Venice as an unimportant commission; this is why courts 
have for some time stopped sending capable ministers to this post. It is correct that it does not seem 
necessary given the little influence that the Republic of Venice has in European affairs. However, I do not 
know of a better school for the formation of ambassadors…. No ambassador before me sent detailed 
mémoires about every part of the Venetian government; I fulfilled my service there then with the most 
ample attention, and I dare say that my mémoires revealed the inner workings of the Republic of Venice 
more than anyone before me who had written about that celebrated and singular government…and I 
examined all of the dispatches of the king’s ambassadors to Venice from the last fifty years.1 
The Abbé de Bernis served as resident ambassador to the Republic of Venice from 1752 
to 1754. Bernis’s later critiques serve as fitting prompts to draw conclusions about Franco-
Venetian diplomatic relations in the late seventeenth century and the careers of the five 
ambassadors examined in my work. If one takes him at his word, Bernis prepared for his role as 
envoy to Venice by reading the fifty years of correspondence of former French ambassadors 
preceding his departure for the republic – roughly that would have been dispatches written from 
Venice since 1702. Based on his research, Bernis concluded that French relations with the 
Serenissima – indeed with all European courts – were of little international importance by the 
mid-eighteenth century. I have agreed with Bernis on this point regarding the rapport between 
France and Venice, but I contend that the abbé would not have made the same observations of 
Franco-Venetian relations before 1702.  
I have used three principle arguments in my dissertation: First, the dynastic imperative to 
expand the boundaries of France undergirded Louis XIV’s diplomatic relations with the Republic 
of Venice, and the same imperative informed the personal motivations that led the five 
ambassadors I have examined. Secondly, I argued that a mutual though antagonistic interest in 
the commercial and political dynamics of the Mediterranean Sea connected the French and the 
Venetians. Finally, I have claimed that the personal choices and preoccupations of the individual 
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ambassadors that Louis XIV and his ministers chose to serve in diplomatic posts effected the 
development of subsequent French domestic and international policies. Louis XIV was forced to 
react to their decisions rather than being the sole author of them. Framing these claims has been 
the contention that the government of Venice remained a vital diplomatic factor in Louis XIV’s 
international and hegemonic strategies.  
Contrary to the Abbé de Bernis’s blanket allegation that previous ambassadors reported 
little useful information in their dispatches from Venice prior to 1752, the ministers that I have 
introduced here demonstrated a punctilious and thorough attention to detailing the domestic and 
international affairs of the republic. Their correspondence contained ample evidence that the 
French ministries of foreign affairs and the marine interacted vigorously with the Venetian 
government to further specific French policies in the Mediterranean Sea, the Italian peninsula, 
and in Western Europe. French dynastic politics relative to the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, 
the papacy, and the Ottoman Empire in the forty years from 1662 to 1702 benefitted from the 
rapport with the Venetians.  
Ambassadors’ desire for personal advancement required that they satisfy the king.2 I have 
investigated ambassadors from two different social orders: three were drawn from the clergy and 
two from the noblesse de robe. In both cases, the ministers went to Venice with the 
understanding that their role afforded opportunities to promote their interests. Even Cardinal 
d’Estrées, who arguably had achieved the highest rank possible (save the papacy) in his career, 
expected that his service in Venice could promote the advancement of his nephew, the Abbé 
d’Estrées. The cardinal had vetted the abbé’s nomination as a future ambassador to Spain while 
serving in Venice. Ambassadors in my work operated within the constraints of the centralizing 
louisquatorzien monarchy. The results of their performance while in the Venetian republic have 
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been sketched looking then through the dual lenses of personal and royal interests.  This has been 
the dynamic of louisquatorzien monarchy that I have described at work between Louis XIV, his 
government, and ministers working in that governement who were sent abroad to represent him.  
 Of the five ambassadors I investigated four went on to hold other diplomatic or 
ministerial posts. The Bishop of Beziers served in Poland until 1668 returning then to France to 
succeed in higher ecclesiastical positions including the cardinalate in 1672. The Abbé d’Estrades 
was ambassador in Turin until 1685. After returning from Venice in 1685 Louis XIV elevated 
the Sieur d’Amelot’s lands to a marquisite. The Marquis Amelot de Gournay then served the 
king as envoy in Portugal and Switzerland. Later he became a counselor in the royal conseil de 
commerce before serving again as envoy in Spain and Rome.3 Denis de la Haye-Vantelet had 
passed his long life in diplomatic service to Louis XIV, and at the end of his tenure in Venice the 
king allowed the aged la Haye and his family to retire to his lands in France where he died later 
in his ninety-sixth year.4 Finally, Cardinal César d’Estrées continued to serve the king as the 
second ambassador to Felipe V of Spain.5 The Venetian embassies of these men, in spite of the 
challenges each faced in the republic, secured their personal advancement or that of their 
families in the French government and aristocracy. 
Describing the forty years during which these ministers served in Venice and through 
their correspondence under succeeding French secretaries of state for foreign affairs I have also 
wanted to provide evidence of bureaucratic developments occurring within the louisquatorzien 
foreign ministry. The directives ambassadors received and with which they complied during the 
ministries of Colbert de Croissy after 1679 and Croissy’s son, Torcy, after 1696 provided further 
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evidence of the “management of information…of a ‘brain trust’ of diplomatic personnel” under 
the Colberts’ leadership.6 Ambassadors in Venice, most notably Michel d’Amelot, received 
direct instructions of how to write diplomatic correspondence and the types of information that 
the ministry believed appropriate for official dispatches as the foreign ministry coalesced under 
the Colberts’ leadership.7 The correspondence of Amelot’s successor, Denis de la Haye followed 
the same guidelines, and the work of both ministers was markedly different in style and content 
than those of the Bishop of Beziers and the Abbé d’Estrades prior to 1679. I would argue that the 
long experience and the nature of Cardinal d’Estrées mission exempted him to some degree from 
following the same guidelines as his predecessors in Venice who were both of less exalted rank 
and whose diplomatic tasks did not exhibit the same immediacy as that of Estrées who sought 
with all haste to impede the troops of Leopold I entering the Venetian terraferma.  
Moreover, I would argue that the turbulent experiences of the Abbé d’Estrades and 
Michel d’Amelot were exactly the types of scenarios that Colbert de Torcy had in mind when he 
began to formalize and then institute a curriculum for and training of ambassadors and embassy 
sercretaries through the formation of the académie politique in 1710.8 Estrades’s 
mismanagement of information related to the composer Alessandro Stradella and the secret 
negotiations for Casale undertaken without royal command resulted from a lack of experience – 
although the abbé was able to defend and then remedy his errors. The distasteful and 
embarrassing domestic controversies that plagued Michel d’Amelot and his secretary, Rogers de 
Piles, likewise, provided an example of the awkward position of ambassadorial secretaries in the 
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seventeenth century. Piles was loyal to his master and not to the Crown per se.9 His plodding 
oversight of a contraband ring to pay spies for information for his employer ended in scandal and 
repeated royal and ministerial rebukes to the ambassador. Torcy’s objective in developing the 
académie politique, although it did not survive long after the death of Louis XIV, was to train 
ambassadors but especially to train competent secretaries loyal to the Crown with an 
understanding of the requirements of their role.10 The ambassadors I have discussed and their 
embassy staffs served in Venice before the appearance of “diplomatic” treatises in France; they 
received on-the-job training along with its pitfalls and humiliations.11 
These ambassadors’ experiences in Venice do more than demonstrate the precariousness 
of the life of diplomats in the Venetian republic and the ways in which service there shaped their 
subsequent personal careers in their socio-cultural context. Louis XIV sought to present his 
domestic and international authority as an all-encompassing emanation of royal will. This was 
far from the reality that diplomatic correspondence revealed. During the decades of the king’s 
personal rule, the relationship of ambassadors in the republic with the Venetian government and 
its spies and with ministers at the French court highlighted that royal policy emerged sometimes 
piecemeal after ambassadors’ decisions had been made far from the king’s gaze.  
The example of the Franco-Venetian rapport demonstrates that the French Crown’s 
foreign policies were often reactions to circumstances that emerged on a quotidian basis. 
Louisquatorzien foreign policy was often dependent upon diplomats’ abilities to mitigate 
extensive webs of intelligence, political institutions, and the personal interests that motivated the 
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individual actors composing these same webs and institutions. French envoys’ frequent 
dispatches from the republic relayed the intelligence details required to fulfill the prompts of the 
king and the secretaries of foreign affairs – and after 1687-1688 the secretary of the marine – in 
regards to the official direction of foreign policy. The vignettes that opened five chapters of this 
dissertation, however, illustrated the varied and sometimes tense circumstances that arose in an 
ambassador’s day-to-day tenure in Venice that could alter Crown policy and either threaten or 
promote a diplomat’s career. Ambassadors received instructions only to include details relevant 
to the construction of foreign policy in relation to the Venetian government. In light of such 
direct commands to relate relevant information the facets surrounding these extraordinary events 
stood in contrast to the other many pages in dispatches that recounted the minutiae of 
international politics. Upon investigation and reconstruction it became apparent that ambassadors 
included these experiences because they believed them pertinent to the development of French 
relations with the republic and to their individual performance as the king’s creatures.  
Viewed from this perspective two points emerge. First, ambassadors became the author’s 
of foreign policy as much as they were the mouthpieces of the official royal will. I argue that the 
received narratives of early modern European international and diplomatic history – those of 
late-seventeenth century France in this case – resulted as much or more from the efforts and 
failures of ambassadors like those I have examined as they did from the commands of the 
governments that sent them. These narratives can be understood and appreciated more fully only 
after scholarly reappraisals present the fraught circumstances diplomats underwent in the 
process. In this way I have drawn attention to the personal nature of what Sharp called the 
diplomat’s predicament. 
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Second, scholars agree that Louis XIV sought to consolidate or centralize his authority 
through robust chains of command at the ministerial level that required the final decision of the 
monarch in council. Paradoxically, for the Crown’s authority to coalesce in what has come to be 
understood as absolute rule, royal authority had to accommodate – adapt to – the demands and 
assumptions of individuals like ambassadors and institutions – be they domestic or foreign – 
such as the government of Venice. The politics of accommodation between the French Crown 
and its ministers and with the Venetian government that I have described are further indications 
that a putatively absolute authority was ultimately dependent upon a series of institutional 
accommodations that would characterize the French monarchy until the end of the ancien régime 
contributing to its ultimate dissolution. 
Additionally, I have suggested that relationships between larger states such as Louis 
XIV’s France with smaller polities like Venice in the early modern period deserve further 
scholarly attention. One could argue that Louis XIV’s willingness to tolerate and accommodate 
the often vexatious foreign policies and diplomatic strategies of the diminutive republic were 
unusual when compared to the king’s bullying approach to states like Genoa. It could be argued 
that the king, although disdainful of republics in general, maintained Cardinal Mazarin’s respect 
for the venerable Republic of Saint Mark. I contend, however, that although Mazarin may have 
inculcated a level of respect for Venice in the monarch, it was the state’s proximity and long 
experience in Mediterranean and Italian affairs that tempered the king in his policies with the 
republic for forty years.  
Venice’s government and geographic situation represented a strategic relationship that, as 
I have shown, Louis believed could be manipulated to counter Habsburg and papal foreign 
policies on the Italian peninsula and in Western Europe. Throughout the early decades of his 
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personal rule, the king and his foreign secretaries pressed Venice to comply with Bourbon 
hegemonic aims while leaving the republic’s government to believe that it could benefit from 
French military and monetary support during its struggle for Crete. Venetian interests in the 
Mediterranean Sea left the republic vulnerable to Louis’s Ottoman allies, and the king attempted 
to use this threat to inspire Venetian compliance. From the 1680s, however, the republic’s 
tolerance of the French king’s territorial expansionism and authority in Italy and the 
Mediterranean weakened and Venice turned instead to Leopold I as an ally. Louis had 
underestimated the republic and its unwillingness to be easily controlled. The Franco-Venetian 
rapport finally diminished when the king realized he could not use diplomacy to dissuade the 
republic from its ties with the emperor as the War of the Spanish Succession began. Moreover, I 
believe that I have argued persuasively that discussions of Venice’s diminishment in European 
and Mediterranean politics should be reexamined through the breakdown of individual 
diplomatic rapports such as I have described to understand better the nuanced circumstances that 
result in a state’s international “decline.”  
For as much as the small Venetian republic’s relevance faded in the context of its 
relations with Louis XIV so too did the king’s aspirations to command the politics of Italian 
states. The momentary French dominance in Northern Italy that existed after Cardinal d’Estrées 
departed Venice in 1702 did not survive the long years of the War for the Spanish throne. The 
1713 Peace of Utrecht laid the foundation for almost thirty years of diplomatic and military 
tensions in Italy between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Spanish Bourbons.12 Any aspirations 
that Louis XIV maintained to expand French authority into the peninsula had vanished by 1697. 
The king’s efforts to cement Spanish rule on behalf of his grandson in Northern Italy dissolved 
                                               
12 Geoffrey Symcox, “The political world of the absolute state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,” in Early 
Modern Italy, ed. John A. Marino, Short Oxford History of Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 116-117.  
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too after his death when Felipe V faced diplomatic pressure from European states, including his 
native France, to maintain Spanish states in the peninsula.13  
The Venetians again lost the preponderance of their Mediterranean gains since 1699 
through the Second Morean War (1714-1718), and it’s government and merchants fought 
thereafter to remain a vital and relevant Mediterranean port city as the great dynastic states 
encircling it forced the Venetians into a position of a truly neutral and secondary importance – a 
medio stato as the eighteenth century theorist, Vattel, posited – in international and 
Mediterranean affairs.14 The Republic of Venice, although independent, grudglingly accepted 
Austrian dynastic pretensions over those of France and Spain in Italy until after 1748 when the 
Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties at last released Italy from their territorial ambitions for a short 
period of peace until the advent of Napoleonic armies.15 
The Abbé de Bernis observed that Venice had relinquished the elements of its former 
international relevance in European affairs when he arrived there in 1752, but a relative domestic 
stability, a level of commercial prosperity, and the cultural renown of the republic continued 
until its dissolution in 1797.16 Post-revolutionary European historians, expecially in France, 
would be left to initiate “modern” interpretations of Venice’s history and the mythologies – myth 
and antimyth – associated with its government and society.17 The correspondence of the 
ambassadors I have examined contained no discussion of any Venetian myth as an interpretive 
model through which to understand the social and political dynamics of the state in which they 
                                               
13 Symcox, “The political world of the absolute state,” 117. 
14 Frigo, “Trieste, Venezia e l’equilibrio italiano nel Settecento,” 22-23, 28; Antonio Trampus, “The circulation of 
Vattel’s Droit des gens in Italy: the doctrinal and practical model of government,” in Alimento, 225, 228-229, 232. 
15 Ibid., 27-28; Randall Lesaffer, “The Diplomatic Revolution: The First Alliance of Versailles (1756),” Online 
Article in Oxford Public International Law, Oxford University, Accessed 26 August 2016, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/Alliance-Versailles-1756. 
16 Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, 424, 431-432, 433-434.  
17 Claudio Povolo, “The Creation of Venetian Historiography,” In Martin and Romano, 492-492; Eric R. Dursteler, 
“Introduction: A Brief Survey of Histories of Venice,” in A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797, ed. 
Dursteler, 6 
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served. They did not refer to the “Myth of Venice.” They functioned, rather, as envoys of Louis 
XIV in a vigorous republic undergoing the continued evolution in institutions that contributed to 
later articulations of a myth.  
The envoys investigated here often described the contradictions of the republic’s famed 
stability and liberty. Their clashes with the recondite Venetian government and its allegedly 
repressive instruments like the Council of Ten and the state inquisitors provided additional 
evidence no doubt for later nineteenth century French scholars’ who sometimes villainized 
Venice’s government and society for alleged brutality and suppression.18 In their service to Louis 
XIV ambassadors sought royal favor, but Pierre Daru described the Venetian polity on its own 
terms in his controversial analysis as, “…a shadowy government that placed among the number 
of its maxims the careful humbling of the pride or the glory of those who elevated themselves 
through brilliant (notable) services.”19 Perhaps French ambassadors’ unflattering descriptions of 
Venice can be partially explained through such republican maxims or at least through later 
commentators’ creation of them. Ambassadors in the last half of the seventeenth century had 
judged Venice while seeking to justify their actions for personal advancement and for the 
dynastic aims of Louis le Grand at the expense of the republic. 
  
                                               
18 Dursteler, “Introduction: A Brief Survey of Histories of Venice,” 6-7. 
19 Pierre Daru, Histoire de la République de Venise, Tome I, 184; Povolo, “The Creation of Venetian 
Historiography,” 497-498. 
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Appendix I: 
Chronologies of Pertinent Political Figures 
Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs during the personal rule of Louis XIV  
Henri-Auguste Lomenie, Seigneur de Brienne (1643-1663) [Hugues de Lionne served along with the 
elderly Brienne in the early 1660s] 
 
Hugues de Lionne, Marquis de Fresnes           (1663-1671) 
Simon-Arnauld de Pomponne                           (1671-1679) 
Charles Colbert, Marquis de Croissy                (1680-1696) 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy          (1696-1715) 
 
Doges of Venice during the personal rule of Louis XIV 
Domenico II Contarini (1659-1674) 
Nicolo Sagredo (1674-1676) 
Alvise Contarini (1676-1683) 
Marc-Antonio Giustiniani  (1684-1688) 
Franceso Morosini  (1688-1694) 
Silvestro Valiero  (1694-1700) 
Alvise II Mocenigo  (1700-1709) 
Giovanni II Cornaro  (1709-1722) 
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Venetian ambassadors to France during the personl rule of Louis XIV20: 
 
Alvise Grimani  (1660-1664) 
Alvise Sagredo  (1663-1665) 
Marc-Antonio Giustiniani (1665-1668) 
Giovanni Morosini (1668-1671) 
Francesco Michiel (1670-1674) 
Ascanio II Giustinian (1673-1676) 
Domenico Contarini (1676-1686) 
Sebastiano Foscarini  (1678-1683) 
Girolamo Venier  (1682-1688) 
Pietro Venier  (1688-1695) 
Nicolò Erizzo  (1695-1699) 
Alvise Pisani  (1699-1702) 
Lorenzo Tiepolo   (1702-1707) 
Alvise Mocenigo (1707-1721) 
 
Popes during the Personal Rule of Louis XIV 
Alexander VII  [Chigi] (1655-1667) 
Clement IX [Rospigliosi] (1667-1669) 
Clement X [Altieri] (1670-1676) 
Innocent XI [Odescalchi] (1676-1689) 
Alexander VIII [Ottoboni] (1689-1691) 
Innocent XII [Pignatelli] (1691-1700) 
Clement XI [Albani] (1700-1721) 
 
                                               
20 N.B. Ambassadors mentioned in the preceding chapters are bolded. The presence of three overlapping Venetian 
ambassadors in the late 1670s and early 1680s will be noted. I believe this demonstrated further evidence of 
Venetian anxiety towards Louis XIV’s growing authority in European affairs. This anxiety also explained the reason 
for which the sieur d’Amelot faced the difficulties described in Chapter Four above.  
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Ottoman Sultans during the Personal Rule of Louis XIV 
Mehmet IV (1648-1687) 
Suleiman II (1687-1691) 
Ahmed II (1691-1695) 
Mustafa II (1695-1703) 
Ahmed III (1703-1730) 
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Appendix II: 
“Des Droits et prérogatives utiles,” 16641 
F. 180r/ La principale des prérogatives des ambassadeurs, et celle du droit de Franchise dans un 
certain district marqué par la Republique autour du Palais qu’ils occupent, et c’est pour cela 
qu’ils ne logent jamais aûpres de la Place St. Marc. 
Ces franchises consistent en ce que 
Il ne peut etre fait aucun acte de justice, soit pour enlever des gens et les mettres en prison, soit 
pour y donner des assignations, sans la permission expresse de l’Ambassadeur. Il est seul le 
maître de permettre qu’on y vende de la viande, du pain, et du vin seules marchandises dont le 
commerce n’est pas libre à Venize. Cette permission se donne rarement a cause de 
l’inconvenient des contrebandes. 
Toutes les Gondoles des Ambassadeurs conduites par sa livrée sont exempte de toutes visites tant 
dedans qu’en dehors de Venize et si par hazard les Sbirres en arrêtoient quelques unes 
l’ambassadeur s’en plaint au Senat qui lui fait rendre ce qu’ils pouroient y avoir pris. 
L’Ambassadeur a droit en tout tems de faire venir à Venize pour sa personne ou sa Maison, et 
sous son adresse, ou avec son passeport, tel ballot que bon lui semble, sans qu’il puisse etre 
visité, ni sujet a payer aucune Douanne. Nota. Il y a [  ] souvent des difficultés pour la visite. 
Tout criminel qui se sauve sur les franchises de l’Ambassadeur ne peut etre enlevé de force et 
sans la permission de l’Ambassadeur Lorsqu’il est obligé de permettre qu’on donne sur ses 
franchises une assignation pour dettes, l’Huissier doit y venir sans aucune 
F. 180v/ [    ] qui derangent sa charge. 
L’Ambassadeur est le maître de recevoir qui il veut sur ses franchises et l’en chasser qui bon lui 
semble, il est aussi le maître de donner des passeports pour faire entrer de la farine et du vin a 
qui il veut de ses gens, memes Vénitiens logeants hors de son Palais. 
L’Ambassadeur a droit de faire porter des armes, meme à feu, a toute sa Maison. Tout ceux qui 
la composent ne peuvent etre arrêtés ni insultés dans Venize, et si cela arrivoit on lui en feroit 
justice. 
L’Ambassadeur a droit de donner ce qu’on apelle des lettres de familiarité; ceux qui les ont 
jouissent de tous les droits des gens de l’Ambassadeur; comme pour d’armes, droit de ne 
pouvoir etre arrêtés ni insultés. Mais ces lettres ne s’accordent que rarement et avec une grande 
conoissance de la personne a cause des inconvenients. 
Les Ambassadeurs ont de droit des Loges dans tous les Théatres, quand ils en demandent. Le 
Doge les leur fait donner pour un prix reglé tres anciennement, et pour éviter les disputes entre 
les Ambassadeurs des differents Couronnes le Doge lui meme les tires au sort pour eux; il leur 
en envoye les clefs, et les Ambassadeurs gardent ces loges s’ils veulent tout le tems de leur 
ambassade
                                               
1 The above document outlined the privileges or franchises French ambassadors claimed in Venice in 1664 and 
thereafter. This piece can be found in the following: AAE, MD, France, vol. 45, 1664, Des Droits et prérogatives 
utiles, Fs 180r-180v. 
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Appendix III: 
Il Te Deum, Sopra il Re di Francia, 16831 
Te Deum Laudamus Gallicum 
Te Ludovicum Damnamus 
Te Hereticum Confitemur 
Te errorium Patrem omnis ecclesia detestatur 
Tibi omnes Angelli et Laici, incessabili voce proclamunt 
         Sathan, Sathan, Sathan; Rebelis Pape, et Deo Sabaot. 
Pleni sunt cœli, et Terra horrende Heresis tue. 
Te Luxuoriosis Apostatorum chorus, 
Te Hypocritum damnabilis numerus, 
Te Fornicatorum maculatus Laudat exercitus; 
Te per Orbera Terrarum Sancta Anathemizat Ecclesia; 
         Patrem immense pravitatis: 
Venenum Docinatum, et iniqui Consilij, 
Falsum quoque per tuum decipientur spiritum, 
Tu Rex impie scite; 
Tu Patris Diaboli execrandus es Filius; 
Tu, ad perdendus Fideles Homines, non horruisti excutere Pape jugum; 
Tu, abiecto Veritatis fundamento aperuisti tibi portas Inferorum; 
Tu, ad Dexteram Luciferi Sedes, 
Judicandus crederis in Eternum Arsurus: 
Te, ergo quæsumus tuis Gallis subveni, quos pernicioso sanguine perdedisti; 
Eternum fac eos in reprobis flammis cruciari. 
Salvum fac Populum tuum Ludovice, et maledic impietatis; 
Revocas eos, et non conculies eos in Eternum. 
Per singulos dies maledicimus Te, 
Et damnamus Heresia Tuam in sæculum sæculi. 
         Dignare Ludovice, quam primum, a peccato tuo resilire: 
         Miserere tui Ludovice, miserere tui. 
Sic fiat Justitia Dei super Te et tuos quemadmodum speraverunt in Te. 
         In Ludovico Sperantes confundantur in Eternum 
                                               
1 ASV, IS-RC, Busta 547, Enclosed in an avviso from Badoer to the inquisitors of state, 25 Aug. 1683. The Te 
Deum reflects the venom hurled at Louis XIV and the French in Venice during the early 1680s. 
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